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1 INTRODUCTION
“A revolution is taking place in global agriculture that has profound implications for our health, livelihoods, and envi-
ronment.” 
(Delgado et al. 1999, 1). 
1.1 Context
Animal agriculture emits more greenhouse gases than the global transport sector, it is the single 
largest driver of biodiversity loss and ocean acidification, and it contributes to the crossing of 
almost every other planetary boundary as well. It covers 45 percent of global land surface and 
turns 35 percent of the global cereal harvest into fodder. These environmental repercussions af-
fect the Majority World first and foremost.1 Almost one billion human beings compete in the 
demand for food against the animal industry’s use of grain for feed. Essentially, the industrial 
exploitation and commodification of animals is linked to societal injustice: working conditions 
in factory farms and slaughterhouses are extremely precarious and risky, and the sector is inher -
ently entangled with processes of colonization and the violent displacement of indigenous peo-
ple. Last but not least, animal agriculture kills almost 70 billion land animals and more than a 
trillion aquatic animals every year for profit.
Nevertheless, international institutions anticipate global livestock production to virtually double 
by 2050.  This “Livestock Revolution,” referring to the agricultural Green Revolution of the 
1960s, was coined in a joint discussion paper by the International Food Policy Research Insti -
tute, the International Livestock Research Institute, and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations in 1999 (Delgado et al. 1999). Back then, it projected an increase in the 
1  The  wording  “Majority/Minority  World”  aims  to  replace  Eurocentric,  colonial,  or  otherwise  unsatisfactory 
terminologies like “developing/developed,” or “Global South/Global North.” The author of the term, Alam, wanted  
to highlight that people living in so-called “developing countries” constitute the majority of humankind (Alam  
2008).  The  dominant  distinction  developing/developed  insinuates  primitive/civilized,  and  implies  one 
unidirectional pathway for all societies (Winant 2000, 174). “Developing” countries are defined by their lack of  
“development,”  which  often  translates  into  lack  of  economic  development,  progress,  and  money.  Apparently, 
cultural achievements, social movements, or religious practices all do not contribute to such “development” (Tyner  
2015). The split of the world into “Global South/Global North” suggests two equivalent categories (Dirlik 2007).  
Finally, the term “Western” builds on the “West” versus “East” clash of the Cold War (Sheppard and Nagar 2004),  
and  simultaneously  implies  a  center  of  the  world  of  which  some countries  are  “Western”  (yet  not  so  much 
“Eastern”). In contrast, the new concept Majority World “defines the community in terms of what it has, rather than 
what it lacks. In time, the majority world will reaffirm its place in a world where the earth will again belong to the  
people who walk on it,” so Alam (2008, 87). The terminology Majority/Minority World has not yet fully entered 
academic discourse despite its origins in the 1990s. Interestingly, it is relatively prominent in (Critical Global)  
Disability  Studies  (Barnes  and  Mercer  2005;  Grech  2016).  The  advantages  of  the  Majority/Minority  World 
distinction  include  its  lack  of  a  value-laden  past;  in  addition,  it  accentuates  a  quantitatively  disproportional  
relationship  and  thereby  draws  attention  to  asymmetric  global  power  structures.  Nevertheless,  the  
Majority/Minority dichotomy still draws on the developing/developed or Global South/Global North legacy and 
simplifies an actually much more complex relationship.
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consumption of animal foods through 2020, but the forecast has since been further developed 
through 2050. According to the discussion paper, the rising consumption is due to a growing de-
mand for animal products in the Majority World triggered by population and income growth 
and urbanization. Basically, the Livestock Revolution and the concomitant “nutrition transition” 
towards higher intake of animal protein are deemed inexorable—and even beneficial—evolu-
tions in the course of development and modernization.  Furthermore, the sector is portrayed as 
crucial for food security and the environment, and “a rare opportunity for smallholder farmers to 
benefit from a rapidly growing market” (Delgado et al. 2000, 10). 
Indeed, global livestock production has multiplied almost tenfold since 1961. This upsurge has 
only been possible via a rapid industrialization of the sector.  Nonetheless, the geography of 
meat is highly unequal: while in 2011, the world mean per capita consumption of meat was 42 
kilograms, the average U.S.-citizen consumed 118 kilograms, a Chinese citizen consumed 58 
kilograms and an Indian citizen consumed four kilograms. People in the Minority World eat  
roughly three times as much animal protein as people in the Majority World.
The expansion of animal production is to be met through “sustainable intensification” in order 
to both increase productivity and decrease the sector’s impact on the environment, its “ecologi-
cal hoofprint” (Weis 2013a). Hence, the current thrust of sustainability policy, green growth or 
green capitalism, is also pursued in the animal industry, which concentrates on efficiency gains  
through technological enhancement and better management. 
In light of finite resources, climate change, and the food crisis, one asks oneself: How can the 
Livestock Revolution be achieved? Why is it necessary in the first place, who has an interest in  
advancing it? And what about the consequences for animals, people, and the planet as a whole?
1.2 Research question, methods, and research field
This thesis dismantles the discourses and structures fueling the Livestock Revolution and inter-
rogates its inevitability. Moreover, it examines the political ecology of sustainably intensifying 
animal production and its repercussions for farmed animals. 
The two corresponding hypotheses are that the Livestock Revolution universalizes the Minority 
World’s “meatified” system of production and consumption and that the  sustainable exploita-
tion of  animals,  while benefitting capital interests,  exacerbates current  social  and ecological  
crises. 
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The applied method is a discourse analysis of reports on the Livestock Revolution from 1999 to 
2016. Sociological discourse analysis studies the production, reproduction and transformation of 
social order on the basis of texts. Discourse analysis is therefore not solely about ideas but also 
about material reality. Analytically reconstructing the “storylines” (Hajer 1995; Keller 2013) of  
the Livestock Revolution, the dissertation scans who or what is responsible for the Revolution, 
by which means it shall be reached, and what reference values underlie the endeavor. As the  
Revolution builds on sustainable intensification, the study is embedded in a wider theoretical  
exploration of green capitalism and proposes a “mirror move” of naturalizing capitalism and 
capitalizing on nature.
This investigation is situated at the intersection of two research fields, critical animal studies 
and political ecology. Human-animal studies examine the societal relationship towards animals 
whereas its subfield, critical animal studies, particularly explores the political and economic 
conditions of this mostly oppressive relationship.2 The myriad presence of animals in our daily 
lives and their immense cultural, religious, social, and economic importance imply that this rela-
tionship is not a biological but a highly social one, and, as such, historically and culturally con-
tingent. The same assertion can be made for humanity’s relationship with nature in general, and, 
more fundamentally, for the nature/culture divide per se.3 Remarkably enough, a real boom in 
the scholarly exploration of the animal as a social subject—as part of society, and not as mere 
symbols or scientific objects—can be witnessed in the last decade, prompting an “animal turn” 
in science.4
Integrating ecology into political economy, political ecology, then, investigates the link between 
power structures on the one hand, and environmental destruction and access to resources on the 
other  hand (Paulson,  Gezon,  and Watts  2005,  17).  For  instance,  natural  disasters  are  never 
solely “natural,” but political: They disproportionally affect socially oppressed and economi-
cally disadvantaged groups (Peet, Robbins, and Watts 2011, 35). Similarly, the ecological crisis 
is always a multiple crisis composed by rising food prices, hunger, degradation of livelihoods,  
2  Introductions to human-animal studies include DeMello 2012a; 2012b; Waldau 2013. For critical animal studies, 
refer to Nibert 2002; 2012a; 2013; Nocella et al. 2014; Nocella, White, and Cudworth 2015; Sanbonmatsu 2011a; 
Torres 2007. On tensions between the two areas, see Best 2009; Wilkie 2015. Distinctively sociological publica-
tions encompass  Arluke 2002; Hobson-West  2007; Irvine 2008;  Kruse 2002;  Nibert  2003;  Peggs 2012;  2013; 
Tovey 2003; York and Mancus 2013; and, for environmental sociology, compare Gunderson and Stuart 2014; York 
2014.
3  This thesis approaches nature as socially produced and mediated, and autonomous at the same time. On the one  
hand, it departs from a constructivist position. There is no fixed and eternal essence of nature; nature is a social 
construct. On the other hand, the environmental crisis, the non-compliance of nature demonstrate that humans can-
not define, govern, or control nature as they like (Brand and Wissen 2013, 690–91). Social relations are constituted 
by this materiality of nature. Haraway (2003) suggests to blur the distinction between the spheres of nature and cul-
ture and speaks of “naturecultures;” likewise, McCarthy proposes the term “socionature” (McCarthy 2005, 735). 
4  For an explanation of the animal turn, compare Peters, Stucki, and Boscardin 2014; Ritvo 2007; Weil 2010; Wolfe 
2011.
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scarcity of energy, and so on (Brand and Wissen 2013, 688). Environmental problems are thus 
perceived as problems of social relations (Torres 2007, 78, 81). International institutions and the 
state are part of these socio-ecological relations, as well (Brand and Wissen 2013, 694). 
On a disciplinary level, both critical animal studies and political ecology can be subsumed under 
environmental sociology, which typically combines social theory and empirical research on the 
environment (Dunlap, Michelson, and Stalker 2002, 15–16).
1.3 State of research
A discussion of the global increase in the consumption of animal products, in particular meat 
consumption, is still rare in sociology; even less widespread is a critique of the authority and un-
avoidability of this claim, or of the necessity to slaughter animals for profit in the first place. In 
consequence, the Livestock Revolution discourse remains uncontested, almost like a self-fulfill-
ing prophecy. Likewise, the structures and interests behind the Revolution are unchallenged, 
and so is its modernization narrative. A small interdisciplinary group of authors, however, argue 
that the Livestock Revolution is a form of deliberate and directed change in global nutrition.  
Weis (2013a) and MacLachlan (2015) identify the “industrial grain-oilseed-livestock complex” 
backing the Revolution, Schneider (2014) complements the analysis with the concept of the “in-
dustrial meat regime.” Rivera-Ferre  (2009) tests the notion of the demand-driven character of 
the Livestock Revolution while Jarosz (2009) and Fritz (2014) scrutinize international trade. 
However,  whereas  these researchers  underscore  the  power of the Livestock Revolution dis-
course, none of them performs a discourse analysis. 
Sociological discourse analysis is indeed a quite novel method in the emerging field of human-
animal studies.5 In contrast, other reviews of the animal-industrial complex are relatively promi-
nent and cover its social ramifications like traumatic work (Pachirat 2011), health issues (Gun-
derson 2012), hunger (Weis 2013b), violence to animals (Gunderson 2013), and, on a broader 
level,  sexism  (Adams  2000),  racism  (Kim  2015),  and  colonization  (Belcourt  2015;  Nibert 
2013),  including  intersectional  perspectives  (Cudworth  2011;  Deckha  2008).  Thus  far,  ap-
proaches from the areas of political ecology and political  economy are rare. Exceptions are  
Emel and Neo 2011, Winders and Nibert 2004, and, most importantly, Emel and Neo’s recent 
anthology on the “political ecology of meat” (2015) which, incidentally, inspired the title of the 
present  work.  Still,  though  Stanescu  (2011)  discusses  organic  meat,  and  Clark  (2012)  the 
5  Johnson (2012) and Stibbe (2001) contribute general investigations of the discourse on animals. The discourse of  
climate change and animal agriculture has been explored by Almiron and Zoppeddu (2015), Bristow (2011), Lee et 
al. (2015), and Whitley and Kalof (2014).
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“greening” of the factory farm, the sustainable intensification of livestock production has hith-
erto not been addressed in the field. 
A growing amount of studies investigate the animal industry’s environmental impact (compare 
Hallström, Carlsson-Kanyama, and Börjesson 2015; Steinfeld et al. 2006), however, to the best 
of the author’s knowledge, the effect on planetary boundaries has as of yet not been systemati-
cally assessed as in the present work.6 What is more, these publications generally do not prob-
lematize the situation of farmed animals so crucial for critical animal studies.7 Finally, none of 
the investigations cited here embed the animal-industrial complex in a wider critique of ecol -
ogy, sustainable development, and green capitalism as forms of societal control.8 This perspec-
tive on ecology structures the present discourse analysis and develops the notion of sustainable 
exploitation. 
1.4 Relevance
The emergence of human-animal studies, the discussion of the morality of eating animals in  
general (Foer 2009) (a discussion that has a longer history, but which has only recently entered 
the mainstream),  and the emerging debate on the ecology of consuming animal foods more 
specifically all demonstrate the subject’s upsurge in scientific popularity as well as the sociopo-
litical necessity of this research. 
The animal turn in academia represents a paradigm shift in the consideration of animals. This  
paradigm shift  is  accompanied by a  growing concern for animal welfare  worldwide (Benz-
6  One positive example is Pelletier and Tyedmers 2010. Nevertheless, there are signs of progress in that direction: in  
2016, the Stockholm Resilience Center, the “birthplace” of the planetary boundaries model, has co-initiated the 
“EAT Foundation” for a sustainable global food system (EAT Forum 2016). Additionally, Kahiluoto et al. (2014) 
have calculated planetary nutrient boundaries. Gill (2013) bases her calculation of optimal feed efficiencies on the 
concept of planetary boundaries.
7  Why “farmed” animals? In the animal-industrial complex, animals are de-animalized through language. This de-
animalization hides the inherent violence of animal production and renders it normal and acceptable (Hamilton and  
McCabe 2016, 346). Animal bodies are sold as “beef” or “pork,” not as “dead cows” or “dead pigs.” Farmed ani-
mals are considered natural capital, renewable resources that can be endlessly exploited. In point of fact, the term 
“livestock” concisely denotes how the animals are perceived: as literally living raw material, as “primary inputs.”  
Current research in animal production speaks of “ruminant meat systems,” “pork and poultry systems” (Wirsenius,  
Azar, and Berndes 2010, 637), or of “meat-producing species” (Fraser 2005, 25). Critical animal studies aim to dis -
mantle this instrumental language—and also the dichotomy of humans versus animals—by consistently replacing it 
with terms  deemed more accurate  or  just,  for  instance  “animals”  with “nonhuman animals,”  “livestock”  with 
“farmed animals,” or “meat” with “flesh” (Winders and Nibert 2004, 92). This thesis chooses a different strategy. It  
echoes the instrumental language in order to convey the dominant discourse, but also because it realistically mirrors  
the animals’ reduction to “living stock.” However, by periodically inserting unconventional terms like “farmed ani-
mals” or “flesh,” the discourse is opened up and reveals its brutality. 
8  The author’s own previous work on these issues include Boscardin and Bossert 2015; Boscardin 2017a; 2017b,  
and, in German, Boscardin 2015; 2016. Narayanan (2016) delivers an exceptional account of animals in sustainable 
development, albeit with a focus on religion. Earnshaw delineates sustainability theories (and policies) that reduce  
nonhuman animals to renewable resources as “exploitation-based sustainability” (Earnshaw 1999, 115).
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Schwarzburg and Ferrari 2016, 32; Cornish, Raubenheimer, and McGreevy 2016) and even sub-
stantial support for animal rights (Jamieson 2008, 182). However, there exists an opposite dy-
namic: more people continue to consume an ever-rising amount of animal protein. The quantity 
of exploited animals has reached a historic high: 69,468,244,528 individuals were killed for 
profit in 2013 (FAOSTAT 2016d). A comprehensive exploration of the Livestock Revolution 
under the new auspices of the animal turn is still missing, notwithstanding the growing contro-
versy about the industrial exploitation of countless beings for food.  What is more, such an in-
depth account of the historic and future expansion of animal production relativizes and adds 
context to the growing movement for animal protection. Finally, this dissertation queries the le-
gitimizations and necessity of brutally commoditizing animals overall. 
If the livestock sector almost doubles its output by 2050, not only the violence perpetrated on 
animals but also the ecological hoofprint will escalate. Among others, the animal industry is one 
of the biggest causes of contemporary anthropogenic climate change. Tackling the sector would 
be “an integral part of any solution to climate change,” according to the FAO (Gerber et al.  
2013, 83). The breadth of the issue stands in stark contrast to the almost complete lack of atten-
tion—let alone action—international institutions dedicate to  its mitigation (Twine 2010, 163). 
Neither the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio 2012 (Kissling and 
Singer, June 15, 2012), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, nor its 
twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties in Paris 2015 (COP21) charged the animal 
industry (Bailey, Froggatt, and Wellesley 2014, 7–9; Chellaney 2015). Contentiously, the indus-
trial sector, transportation, and electricity generation have all received regulatory attention while 
the livestock industry has been entirely exempted (Ripple et al.  2013,  3;  Rosin and Cooper 
2015, 315).9 In addition, the public generally does not link food to global warming, and places 
high social, cultural, and personal value on eating meat (Macdiarmid, Douglas, and Campbell 
2016).  In any case, the immense ecological and climate hoofprint stays—willingly or unwill-
ingly—overlooked, which makes its examination even more pressing.
Above and beyond, the fossilist animal-industrial complex devours a gigantic amount of land, 
water, energy, fertilizer, and feed grains. At the same time, the number of people suffering from 
hunger and malnutrition has spiked in times of economic crisis, and the emergency is only an-
9  The FAO report Livestock Long Shadow confirms that “the environmental issues linked to livestock have not gen-
erally received an adequate institutional response—neither in developing nor in developed countries.” (Steinfeld et  
al. 2006, 4). The response by non-governmental organizations, especially environmental ones, is, with few excep -
tions, equally and astonishingly marginal (Laestadius et al. 2014), which has been interpreted in the documentary  
“Cowspiracy: The Sustainability Secret” (Andersen and Kuhn 2014). Possible reasons for the neglect by non-gov-
ernmental organizations are the fear of being accused of paternalism, of contravening societal commitments to the  
livestock industry, or of interfering with personal choices—although individual behavior has been a long-time focus 
of environmental campaigns (cases in point are taking shorter showers, car sharing, or saving energy) (Laestadius et  
al. 2014).
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ticipated to get worse. Nonetheless, the livestock sector continues to convert 920 million tons of 
cheap and healthy cereals per year into expensive animal commodities. The diversion of grains 
will augment with the spread of livestock industrialization and a concomitant decline of pas-
toralism. This sweeping structural change, on the other hand, threatens to drive out small-scale 
farmers which currently constitute the majority of the 1.3 billion people depending on livestock 
production worldwide. Finally, environmental racism and colonialism keep being produced and 
reproduced in the animal-industrial complex. 
These outcomes are not singular events but connected in a larger, complex context of the neo-
liberal control and capitalization of nature. Likewise, the system of sustainable animal exploita-
tion is not future-compliant, despite its green veneer. It undermines the very resources it de-
pends on. For Sumberg and Thompson, the Livestock Revolution is “one of the most powerful 
ideas to emerge in the area of food, nutrition and agricultural development over the last decade.” 
(Sumberg and Thompson 2013, 5). The time is now to think outside the box and challenge this 
idea. Ultimately, in depicting the destructive industrial meat regime, the thesis can e contrario 
foster innovative and unorthodox paths in the imagination of new, more sustainable ways of re-
lating to the more-than-human world.
1.5 Self-reflection and positionality
“There can, of course, be no apolitical scholarship.” 
(Mohanty 1984, 334).
Mohanty’s statement on the impossibility of a neutral or objective standpoint has not lost a bit  
of its gravity thirty years later. For certain, this conception of knowledge clashes with the posi-
tivist postulate of a clear separation between subject and object. The continuous interaction be-
tween researcher and research object (Anderson 2015; Russell 2015), however, demands a con-
sideration of the interest and contingency of any investigation. The importance of attending to  
one’s standpoint has particularly been accentuated in recent work on intersectionality (Bilge 
2013, 418). Yet, in many writings on the global food system, human-animal relations, and polit -
ical ecology, the reflection of one’s positionality and privileges remains, at best, relegated to 
footnotes. This paragraph subverts this custom and ponders on the circumstances of writing as a  
white, financially rich, able-bodied cis-woman holding a Swiss passport—in sum, to write from 
a  privileged Minority  World  perspective—about  the  transformation  of  (animal)  agriculture, 
mainly in the Majority World, led by the industrial meat regime that originated in the Minority 
World. 
7
“[A]ll privilege is ignorant at the core” (Rich 1986, 226, quoted in Sholock 2012, 705). Yet, a  
reflection of one’s own privilege and, from a global perspective, privileged choices can reduce 
the risk of moral and intellectual arrogance (Sholock 2012, 711).10 In this macro-level investiga-
tion it would be misinformed to denounce individuals for their consumption of animal products. 
It is much more instructive to scrutinize the structures in place which enable, encourage, and 
virtually enforce such a diet. Further, concentrating on an evolution that has its roots in the Mi-
nority World, in one’s own backyard—Switzerland being a paradigmatic case of livestock in-
dustrialization—is a constructive way to deal with one’s positionality. 
Therefore, the point of this work is neither to romanticize non-Eurosettler food cultures, nor to 
paternalistically decide for billions of people in the Majority World which diet or which way of  
life they should adopt. In reality, vegetarianism, for instance, is much more widespread in the 
Majority than in the Minority World. Moreover, it is not the point to negate or morally judge 
cultural change. Rather, the point is to show how it is the Livestock Revolution that denies the 
cultural difference and complexity of various regions in the Majority World by, on the one  
hand, discursively putting their societal development on a meaty modernization latter, and, on 
the other hand, by the structural chokehold of the industrial meat regime which is fostered by in-
ternational institutions, large corporations, as well as governments and exporting countries in 
the Minority World in need of new markets. 
Similarly, this account should not convey the impression of the Majority World as a victim 
without agency. The forms of resistance are manifold; for agricultural social movements, refer 
for instance to La Via Campesina 2015 or Lundström 2011. However, the focus of this disserta-
tion is  evaluating the dominant  Livestock Revolution  from the perspective  of  the  Minority 
World—from the belly of the beast—and not an investigation of counterhegemonic struggle. 
One issue of writing such a thesis as a vegan,11 instead of as a carnivore or vegetarian, is the 
awareness of the ubiquitous and relentless animal suffering in the livestock sector. 12 Such a mar-
ginal perspective engenders unconventional and engaged research questions and methods (com-
pare Anderson 2015).  Mohanty defines feminist  scholarship as “not  the mere production of 
10 Sholock (2012) elaborates a  “methodology of  the privileged” for white  feminists engaging in  anti-racist  and 
transnational feminist theory. She combines self-reflexivity, racial sedition, and epistemic uncertainty and produc-
tively draws on the self-doubt, emotional pain, and embarrassment engendered by one’s own racist bias.
11 Twine defines veganism as “a systemic and intersectional mode of critical analysis and a useful lived philosophy 
counter to anthropocentrism, hierarchy, and violence” (Twine 2012, 19). A specific form of an exclusionary vegan 
lifestyle ignoring societal injustice has been rightly accused of contributing to racism and classism; nonetheless, to  
delineate veganism as a solely white middle-class phenomenon is eradicating its Black and Brown history and  
practice (in a Eurosettler context, see Harper 2010a and Taylor and Fisher 2016). To continue this conversation,  
Greenebaum (2016) intersectionally deconstructs the notion of “vegan privilege;” Francione and Charlton (2015) 
accessibly counter the most common objections against veganism. 
12 Hribal (2010) and Cohen (2015) focus on animal agency and resistance.
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knowledge about a certain subject. It is a directly political and discursive practice in that it is 
purposeful and ideological.” She further calls it “a mode of intervention into particular hege-
monic discourses,” challenging “legitimate” and “‘scientific’ bodies of knowledge.” (Mohanty 
1984, 334 [original emphasis]). Similar to feminist scholarship, an intervention from a critical  
animal studies or animal liberationist perspective  addresses the systemic commodification of 
nonhumans and challenges legitimate bodies of knowledge. The goal of this discursive practice 
is to expose and confront the universalizing narrative of the Livestock Revolution in the tradi-
tion of “counter-storytelling.” The Revolutionary Anti-Authoritarians of Color define counter-
storytelling as “[w]riting that aims to cast doubt on the validity of accepted premises or myths, 
especially ones held by the majority” (2002, 5). Above and beyond, the investigation of the nu-
trition transition’s modernizing narrative endeavors “epistemological decolonization” (Quijano 
2007, 177), a critique of the “universal rationality” of the Eurosettler civilization. Quijano main-
tains: 
“Nothing is less rational, finally, than the pretension that the specific cosmic vision of a  
particular ethnie should be taken as universal rationality, even if such an ethnie is called  
Western Europe because this is actually pretend to impose a provincialism as universal-
ism.” (Quijano 2007, 177).
In sum, this dissertation scrutinizes the hegemonic Livestock Revolution discourse by contrast-
ing what is with what is being left out. It is a negative critique of the existing rather than an af-
firmation of alternative practices and thus might raise more questions than it answers. Notwith-
standing, this counter-storytelling discloses the profound impact the intensifying animal-indus-
trial complex has on animals, society, and the planet as a whole, an appraisal that can serve as  
an intellectual foundation for social/food justice, environmentalist, and animal liberation initia-
tives.
1.6 Organization of chapters
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Figure 1: Chapter scheme. 
As illustrated in the chapter scheme (figure 1), the thesis is ordered in three parts. After the in -
troduction, in order to understand the scope and significance of the Livestock Revolution, the 
first part lays out its wider context: the animal-industrial complex. Its most vital characteristics 
are presented in chapter two. The first section (2.1) exemplifies the political economy of meat,  
milk, and eggs. Farmed animals occupy center stage in the second section (2.2). The industry’s 
impact on planetary boundaries is described in section 2.3 and the societal aspects of animal 
production in section 2.4. This first part is an extensive literature and statistical review of the 
livestock industry: the Livestock Revolution has to be read against this background.
The second part provides the theoretical and methodological foundations of the discourse analy-
sis that follows in the third part. It commences with the third chapter on green capitalism. The 
first section (3.1) critically examines sustainable development and its trajectory towards ecolog-
ical modernization, and introduces the “mirror move” of naturalizing control and capitalism and 
controlling and capitalizing on nature. The second section (3.2) explores the first move of natu-
ralization, whereas the third section (3.3) deals with the second move of control and capitaliza-
tion. Lastly, the ecological contradictions of green capitalism and the current evasion of the en-
vironmental crisis are debated in section 3.4. This chapter has been elaborated in part as a litera-
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ture review, but it has been equally developed in a cyclical process with the data examined in  
the third part of the thesis, therefore the arrows that point in both directions. 
Chapter four elucidates the dissertation’s methods. The basics of discourse analysis, following 
Hajer (1995) and Keller (2013), are outlined in section 4.1. Section 4.2 then expounds on the 
methods applied in the study, a review of the concrete research steps, including a self-reflection, 
the sample (policy documents on the Livestock Revolution and sustainable intensification), and 
the instruments of analysis and interpretation, divided in a detailed and a structural analysis. 
Eventually, in the  third part, chapter five presents and critically surveys the discourse of the 
Livestock Revolution. It starts with an exploration of the Revolution’s rhetoric (5.1), its statis -
tics (5.2),  and alleged causes (5.3).  The mirror move of green capitalism then structures the 
analysis in part A and part B. Part A, on capitalization and control, investigates the solution for 
simultaneously meeting the supposed upsurge in demand and balancing its environmental ef-
fects—sustainable intensification (5.4). Section 5.5 then sketches the place of farmed animals in 
the Livestock Revolution. The dichotomy of demand and supply is elucidated in 5.6.  There-
upon,  part  B,  on naturalization,  encompasses  an analysis  of  the  Revolution’s  legitimization 
(5.7),  covering  modernization,  food  security,  poverty  alleviation,  as  well  as  environmental 
value. Finally, chapter six concludes the dissertation with a summary (6.1), the implications of 
its findings (6.2), an evaluation, and directions for future research (6.3). 
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PART I
2 THE ANIMAL-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
What is the animal-industrial complex? This rather knotty term is an adaptation of the term 
“military-industrial complex,” coined by former U.S. President Eisenhower and aims to sum up 
the  several  dimensions  and scales  of  the  animal  industry  (Noske  1989).  Sociologist  Twine 
(2012, 23) defines the animal-industrial complex as a
“partly opaque and multiple set of networks and relationships between the corporate (agri-
cultural) sector, governments, and public and private science. With economic, cultural, so-
cial and affective dimensions it encompasses an extensive range of practices, technologies, 
images, identities and markets.”
Hence, if we speak of the animal-industrial complex, every step in the production and consump-
tion process is included, and, as Twine explains, the sector does not only encompass business,  
but also cultures, religions, emotions, politics, and societal questions in general. 
The goal of this chapter is to provide an extensive overview over the most important aspects and 
consequences of the animal-industrial complex. The information from a broad literature review 
covers the political economy of the sector, the situation of farmed animals, the environmental 
repercussions according to the planetary boundaries model, and, finally, the societal aspects of  
animal production. 
2.1 Political economy
This first section of the chapter concentrates on the political economy of the sector. After a brief  
history of the complex, essential facts and figures on production and consumption, and the out-
put and input of industrial livestock systems are distinguished. Moreover, a short portrayal of  
the fishing industry is provided. From the perspective of a Minority World country in the early 
twenty-first century, the animal-industrial complex is embedded in financial interests and func-
tions as a capitalist enterprise. Accordingly, the overall purpose of the animal-industrial com-
plex is not the production of food or the satisfaction of basic human needs, but simply the maxi -
mization of profits. Mathias linguistically traces how throughout history livestock ownership 
has equaled wealth.  She draws on the etymological kinship of the two words in many lan -
guages: 
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“For instance  pecunia, Latin for money, is based on  pecu (livestock), as is  pecuaria, the 
Spanish word for animal husbandry. The Sanskrit word  pashu  meaning livestock has the 
same root and is related to paisa which means money. The Persian Hindi word mal means 
both livestock and goods. Vieh, the German word for livestock goes back to the Saxon fehu 
that refers to livestock as well as money and is also the root of the English word fee. The 
word  cattle is  related  to  capital  and the whole concept  of  paying interest  for  borrowed 
money was taken from livestock that was given on loan and reproduced in the meantime.” 
(Mathias 2012, iv [original emphasis]).13 
There is thus a certain historic consistency to the comprehension of farmed animals as capital 
and not  as  food.  This  monetary definition equally explains  the  reproduction of  the  violent, 
environmentally  degrading,  socially  deteriorating,  and  inherently  inefficient production  of 
animal protein. In the complex, “efficiency” is not measured in terms of satisfying caloric needs 
but rather in terms of pleasing shareholders. They are the yardstick with which the complex is 
measured. In times when economic output supersedes all other variables, it can actually be en-
lightening to beard the lion in his den and examine the same hard numbers and statistics. Even 
more so, as almost no benchmarks for the animal-industrial complex’s production, consump-
tion, profitability and externalities are known to the general public, despite its ubiquity. 
This pervasiveness is perceptible in the broad range of singular enterprises that the sector takes 
up, from feed producers, hatcheries, ranchers, pharmaceutical corporations, to slaughterhouses, 
governmental  inspectors,  packaging companies,  to  transnational  retailers,  marketing experts, 
stock  exchanges,14 nutritional  scientists,  state  departments,  restaurants,  and fast  food chains 
(Nibert 2011, 197). In fact, the state is a cornerstone of the animal industrial complex. It has 
agricultural and wildlife agencies, it sets the (legal) standards for rearing, confining, killing, and 
processing animal bodies, and it safeguards and subsidizes animal exploitation in farming and 
research  (Sanbonmatsu  2011b,  26)  (see  paragraph  “Subsidies  and  the  power  of  lobbies” 
2.1.4.3). By the same token, the animal rights movement is being disproportionately repressed 
all over the globe.15 
2.1.1 A brief history of the complex16
13 More specifically,  capita, the plural of the Latin word  caput for head,  designated “head of cattle” (Gunderson 
2013, 261).
14 The commodity futures live cattle, hogs, feeder cattle, or milk are traded at stock exchanges (barchart 2016; EFT  
2016).
15 Several countries have introduced sector-specific laws, such as the United States of America with the “Animal En-
terprise Terrorism Act” from 2006. The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act suggests the interpretation that the state  
favors protecting the interests of the animal industry over protecting the constitutional rights of its citizens (Torres  
2007, 72). For a more in-depth scrutiny on the criminalization of animal rights activists in the United States, see  
Loadenthal 2016; Potter 2011.
16 Sociologist Nibert (2011) provides a rich and critical history of the animal-industrial complex, especially in the 
United States.
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Whereas the livestock industry sells the consumption of animal protein and animal agriculture 
as  completely  natural and  even  innate  to  humankind,  these  are  very  peculiar  cultural 
developments in human history. Gunderson observes that in the entire history of the human 
species, “hominids have likely survived for over 99.9 percent of their existence without a single 
domestic animal” (Gunderson 2013, 261).17 A globalized form of meat production only started 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, when European countries such as Britain and Germany 
bought prodigious areas of land in South America, mainly in Argentina and Brazil. Thanks to 
refrigeration, the Europeans imported meat from the Americas and Australasia (Cudworth 2015, 
100). Factory farming as we know it today was designed around 1900 and fully developed in the 
1950s (Fraser 2005, 2).18 Thenceforth, the livestock sector underwent massive changes in terms 
of input and output, economic and political importance, geographic distribution, organization, 
and technology (Gunderson 2013, 259).19
In the United States in particular,20 the availability of meat was a “key ideological and cultural 
feature” post-World War I (Sanbonmatsu 2011b, 22).21 After the Second World War, the expan-
sion of the U.S. meat industry was triggered through the overproduction of grains and oilseeds  
(in particular corn, wheat, and soybeans), and subsequent state recommendations to alleviate 
this surplus via livestock production (Weis 2013b, 73; Winders and Nibert 2004, 76).  Large-
scale feed grain production was the basis of the Fordist, vertically organized mass-production of  
animals—with poultry production as its forerunner (Casey et  al.  2015,  259).  As geographer 
Jarosz writes: 
“Agro-industrial capitals fuelled the development and diffusion of the US model of grain 
production based upon capital intensive inputs, large-scale monocultures dependent upon 
synthetic fertilizers and pesticides and production destined for world markets and controlled 
by  nationally  based  agribusinesses  based  in  North  America  and  Europe”  (Jarosz  2009, 
2069).
The export of U.S. grain surplus, especially wheat, as food aid or as cheap exports to the Major-
ity World destroyed local agrarian economies and ruled out indigenous food staples like cas-
17 Refer as well to Smil (2011, 613) for the evolution of the human species and its impact on the biosphere. 
18 A terrifying novel on the working conditions in the stockyards in Chicago and the life full of hardship of Eastern 
European immigrants is The Jungle by Upton Sinclair from 1906.
19 Jarosz describes how munitions factories were converted into nitrate fertilizer factories. Hence, military technol -
ogy was directly remodeled as agricultural technology (Jarosz 2009, 2069). On the other hand, technology of the  
animal-industrial complex equally spread to other sectors: the moving lines of slaughterhouses were, among others,  
adapted for car production (Emel and Neo 2011, 69; Nibert 2011, 200; Sanbonmatsu 2011b, 22).
20 This thesis will  consistently apply the terms “United States” or “United States of America” and not  merely  
“America” to not  dismiss the other regions of the continent  (Martinez 2011;  Orbe and Harris  2013,  57).  The  
traditional  designation  “Turtle  Island”  by  the  Original  Nations  will  be  used  if  North  America  is  addressed  
(Newcomb 2011).
21 The slogan of the 1928 Republican presidential campaign was “A chicken in every pot … [a]nd a car in every  
backyard” (Sanbonmatsu 2011b, 22).
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sava, millet, beans, or yam (Jarosz 2009, 2069–70).22 Structural adjustment programs redirected 
those countries’ agricultural production to agro-exports like coffee, sugar, or cotton. To feed 
their people, these states became dependent on food aid and cheap food imports, namely heavily 
subsidized grain. Geographer Weis elucidates: 
“[t]his cheap food was celebrated by development planners and welcomed by recipient gov-
ernments as a means to help foster urbanization and industrialization (a key part of a general  
development policy ‘bias’ to urban areas), and served to commoditize food security, recon-
figure diets, and place new pressures on small farming livelihoods.” (Weis 2013b, 72).
Between 1970 and 1987,  the World Bank Group particularly fostered cattle operations with 
loans in Latin America (Nibert 2011, 203). Seemingly a contradiction in terms, agriculture was 
and is the main source of national income of the majority of the countries classified by the FAO  
as “Low Income Food Deficit Countries.” 75 percent of the people who dispose of less than two 
USD a day are food producers (Collins and Chandrasekaran 2012, 4). On the other hand, in the  
Minority World, meat, formerly a sign of wealth and only dined on during special occasions,  
turned into an everyday staple for the masses (Jarosz 2009, 2074–75). Weis’ concept of “meati-
fication” encapsulates the radical shift from the marginal role animal foods occupied in the hu-
man diet throughout history to these products’ current status as the cornerstone of most diets. As 
a result, while in the post-war diet in the Minority World, the consumption of meat became cen-
tral, cheap, and available to the multitude, the “free market approach to food security” severely 
undermined food security and food sovereignty in the Majority World (Weis 2013b, 67, 72).23 
In sum, the “modern” post-World War II food regime was based on industrialization, depen-
dence on oil, pesticides and fertilizers, and structural adjustment policies for the expansion of 
the animal-industrial complex enforced through the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank (Jarosz 2009, 2076). 
In the 1990s, food scandals and health concerns such as the BSE crisis shook the industry.24 In 
turn, new psychological and discursive means had to be applied to keep up the otherwise de-
clining demand for animal products in the Minority World. A new market for niche and luxury 
products was created, satisfying specialized, “savvy” consumers with merchandise like “or-
22 In the 1970s, the United States tied food aid for Latin American countries to the production of feed-grain for ex -
port (Nibert 2011, 204).
23 Food security is defined as “the ability of people to secure enough food on a regular basis for healthy and produc-
tive lives” (Delgado et al., 37). Food sovereignty, on the other hand, is “the right of all peoples to produce and con-
sume healthy and culturally appropriate food that has been produced through ecologically sound and sustainable  
methods. It enshrines people’s right to define, and own, their own food and agriculture systems and demands that 
those who produce, distribute and consume food be at the heart of food systems and policies, rather than markets or 
corporations” (Collins and Chandrasekaran 2012, 23). For a comparison of the discourses of food security and food  
sovereignty see Jarosz 2014.
24 BSE stands for bovine spongiform encephalopathy, also called “mad cow disease.”
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ganic meat” (compare paragraph 5.5.2) or “Kobe beef.” In this specialized sector, the industry 
tends towards horizontal organization, for example by outsourcing production to family farms 
(Sanbonmatsu 2011b, 23).
2.1.2 Facts and figures25
How did worldwide supply and demand evolve from 1961 until today? 26 In such an investiga-
tion, it  is crucial to differentiate production and consumption statistics. Whereas the bulk of 
meat production is mirrored in food consumption, a particular share of milk or egg production is 
used  for  non-food  purposes  such  as  feed  or  industrial  non-food  use.  Further,  a  significant 
amount of animal products  is  lost  or  wasted (compare footnote 107 on food loss and food 
waste). In addition, production can be used for export and will not translate into domestic con-
sumption. Likewise, national consumption can be increased through import (FAO 2011b, 27–
28). The split between production and consumption hence elucidates where the products stem 
from and where they are actually consumed. The animal-industrial complex is an unequal field 
for the power play of economic competition, and accordingly, the differentiation between pro-
duction and consumption elucidates who produces and who consumes, which regions provide 
goods for other regions, and which countries—and corporations—dominate the market. Again, 
livestock products should primordially be comprehended as capital, and not as food. 
2.1.2.1 Production
By weight, total world meat production has more than quadrupled from 71 million tons in 1961 
to 317 million tons in 2014, as illustrated in figure 2 (FAOSTAT 2016a). This tremendous up-
surge is mainly due to a rise in chicken meat production which has augmented tenfold. Beef  
production has doubled between 1960 and 2010 (Thornton 2010, 2854), and egg production 
roughly quadrupled (Weis 2013b, 67).
25 This paragraph builds on Boscardin 2017a, 2017b. 
The following sections are on animal agriculture. For aquaculture compare chapter 2.1.5.
26 The statistics provided by the FAO on its database FAOSTAT start in 1961.
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Figure 2: World meat production by weight from 1961 to 2014.
Data from FAOSTAT (2016a).
As outlined in chapter 2.1.1, the Minority World has pioneered the mass slaughter of animals 
for food production. Yet, in 1995, the Majority World surpassed the Minority World in the pro-
duction of meat for the first time in history (compare figure 3). At this moment, the “centre of  
gravity” of meat production shifted from the Minority World to the Majority World, and this in-
volved a shift  in climatic regions,  from temperate to tropical  and sub-tropical,  more humid 
spheres, too (Steinfeld 2004, 20; Steinfeld and Chilonda 2006, 3).27 
   
27 In more detail, 50 percent of beef, 41 percent of milk, 72 percent of lamb, 59 percent of pig meat and 53 percent of 
poultry were produced in the Majority World in the year 2000 (Herrero et al. 2009, 112). 
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Figure 3: Meat production in so-called “developed” and “developing” countries, 1970-2004. 
Reprinted from “Old players, new players,” by Henning Steinfeld and Pius Chilonda, in  Anni McLeod 
(ed),  Livestock report 2006 (p. 3), 2006, Rome: FAO. Copyright 2006 by FAO. Reprinted with permis-
sion.
A similar rearrangement is taking place for milk production. The Minority World still produces 
more milk, but the production is stagnating, while production in the Majority World is express-
ing a steady and significant growth, as demonstrated in figure 4. 
   
Figure 4: Milk production in so-called “developed” and “developing” countries, 1970-2004. 
Reprinted from “Old players, new players,” by Henning Steinfeld and Pius Chilonda, in  Anni McLeod 
(ed),  Livestock report 2006 (p. 3), 2006, Rome: FAO. Copyright 2006 by FAO. Reprinted with permis-
sion.
Nonetheless,  the  stagnation in  the  Minority  World and growing production in  the  Majority 
World should not conceal the former’s dominance. In 2009, the United States, Australia, New 
Zealand, Argentina, Canada, and Western Europe together accounted for twelve percent of the  
world population, yet produced 34 percent of global meat production by volume, and issued 68 
percent of world meat exports. On the other hand, the population of South and Southeast Asia 
and Africa represented almost half of the world, yet accounted for less than sixteen percent of 
total meat production (Weis 2013b, 68). 
In addition, the simplistic division in Minority and Majority World hides regional and national  
differences. An astronomic rise in meat production and consumption is happening in East and 
Southeast Asia (Allievi, Vinnari, and Luukkanen 2015, 146). The region is responsible for half 
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of global pork production, almost all of which is provided by China  (Gerber et al. 2013, 62). 
China is definitely an exceptional country in the unequal cartography of meat.  It is home to 
roughly a fourth of the world’s population and produces a third of the world’s meat. Production 
in China increased 31-fold in the period between 1961 and 2009 (Weis 2013b, 68), and it deliv-
ered 57 percent of the total increase in meat production in the Majority World from 1980 until  
2002 (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 16). China is equally home to the largest dairy farm in the world. In 
2015, Chinese and Russian companies built a compound exploiting 100,000 dairy cows in Mu-
danjiang City in north-east China. The megaproject, worth 241 million USD, is three times big-
ger than the largest U.S. dairy farm, and fifty times bigger than the leading farm in the United 
Kingdom (Rotorua Daily Post 2015).28 
India is another remarkable case of the animal-industrial complex’ expansion (Gautam, Dalal, 
and Pathak 2010). Already in 1998, the country surpassed the United States as the world’s big-
gest milk producer (Steinfeld and Chilonda 2006, 3). India accounted for 23 percent of the total  
growth in milk production in the Majority World from 1980 until 2002 (Steinfeld et al. 2006,  
16). In addition, India recently outstripped Brazil as the biggest beef exporter in the world, de-
spite the fact that Brazil’s meat production rose by a factor of 11 between 1961 and 2009 (Weis 
2013a, 86–87; 2013b, 68). In view of this evolution, India could soon surpass the United States 
as the world’s biggest beef producer.  The so-called “pink revolution” in India is particularly 
surprising  as  the  country  is  known for  religiously  venerating  cows.  However,  India’s  new 
slaughterhouses  mainly  process  buffalos.  India’s  great  ruminant  population  and  diets 
traditionally loaded with dairy products fostered the rise of the country’s dairy industry. Mean-
while, the sector continues to undergo changes: whereas smallholders still provide the majority 
of  the products,  they are  being trained in intensification,  new feeding practices and animal  
health. Simultaneously, foreign investments and multinational corporations are taking over the 
market. Agribusiness particularly targets Indian chicken production (Heinrich Böll Foundation 
and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 10, 40). Steinfeld and Chilonda interpret this develop-
ment not as “organic”, but as discontinuous, and explain: 
“as soon as urban markets develop, investors step in, often with no previous association 
with livestock production, and establish industrial type units and associated processing and 
marketing methods.” (Steinfeld and Chilonda 2006, 9).29
2.1.2.2 Killed animals
28 The milk is destined for export to Russia, which was placed under economic sanctions by the European Union due 
to its role in the Ukraine conflict and in response banned European Union food products. The 100,000 hectares  
needed for feed production are supposedly mainly provided by Russia (Rotorua Daily Post 2015).
29 An in-depth examination of the global weight of transnational corporations follows in chapter 5.6.
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All those dead numbers and dry country statistics hide the circumstance that the real producers 
of animal protein are not primarily geographic regions but live animals. In 2013, more than 69 
billion nonhuman land animals were killed for food production. These sentient individuals were 
raised, exploited and ultimately slaughtered in order to sell their eggs, milk, particular organs, or  
mere flesh.  The rather  inconceivable number  of  69 billion beings encompasses  61.2 billion 
chickens, 2.9 billion ducks, 1.4 billion pigs, 1.2 billion rabbits, one billion sheep and goats, 0.7 
billion fowl, 0.6 billion turkeys, 0.3 billion cattle, 70 million rodents, 4.8 million horses, 2.6 
million camels, and countless other individuals (FAOSTAT 2016d).30 
It is instructive to compare the increase in animal killings over the last decades with the growth 
of the global human population. In 2013, the latter comprised 7.1 billion individuals (FAO-
STAT 2016b). This corresponds to a “killed animals / live humans” ratio of almost 10:1. In 
1961, the number of slaughtered farmed animals was eight billion, and the human population 
around three billion, resulting in a “killed animals / live humans” ratio of roughly 3:1. Whereas 
the human population more than doubled from 1961 to 2011, the total of slaughtered animals in-
creased more than eightfold.31 The assessment of the biomass of all terrestrial vertebrates in ta-
ble 1 gives another idea of the literally extraordinary weight of the animal-industrial complex. 
Table 1: Biomass of wild and domesticated animals, 1900 and 2000, estimated in million metric tons 
of carbon. 
Year Humans
Wild terrestrial mam-
mals
Domesticated animals 
(including pets) Total
Elephants Cattle
1900 13 23% 10 17% 3 5% 35 60% 23
40
%
58
100
%
2000 55 30% 5 3% 0.3
0.2
%
120 67% 80
44
%
180
100
%
Note. Adapted from “Harvesting the Biosphere: The Human Impact,” by Vaclav Smil, 2011, Population 
and Development Review 37 (4), p. 619. Copyright 2011 by John Wiley and Sons. Adapted and reprinted  
with permission. 
30 The 2013 figure is slightly higher than the total killings in 2012 (plus 1.98 percent), with a particular growth in  
killed pigs (plus 3.95 percent), chickens (plus 2.33 percent), and cattle (plus 1.33 percent). The exact numbers are 
69,468,244,528 slaughtered farmed animals in 2013, and 68,115,243,382 in 2012 (FAOSTAT 2016d).
31 As for the different species, the chicken population increased more than fivefold, and the goat population more 
than threefold. The buffalo and pig population doubled, and the cattle population, somewhat surprisingly, only in -
creased by a factor of 1.5 (MacLachlan 2015, 28).
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Table 1 compares the biomass of humans, wild terrestrial, and domesticated animals in 1900 
and 2000,  estimated in  million metric  tons  of  carbon (Smil  2011,  619).  Total  biomass  has 
tripled,  and  domesticated animals  now represent  67 percent  of  all  terrestrial  vertebrates  by 
weight. Human biomass has grown from 23 to 30 percent. Most strikingly, the biomass of wild 
terrestrial mammals has shrunk from 17 to mere three percent. Elephants, for example, once  
constituted five percent of total biomass. Nowadays, they have almost been wiped out from the 
globe. The current biomass of cattle is 267 times bigger than the one of elephants. 
2.1.2.3 Consumption
The enormous increase in production and the meatification of diets after the Second World War 
have triggered a tremendous upsurge in per capita consumption of animal foods. While in 1961, 
the world average per capita consumption was 23 kilograms of meat and 5 kilograms of eggs, in  
2011, five decades later, the average consumption was 42 kilograms and 10 kilograms respec-
tively. Hence, both meat and egg consumption roughly doubled in five decades (Weis 2013b,  
67). Nevertheless, these average figures again conceal the fact that the geography of meat is  
highly uneven. In the Majority World, the yearly mean consumption of meat is 16 kilograms per 
capita (FAO 2011b, 5).  In the Minority World, per capita consumption of meat and milk is  
roughly three times higher (Steinfeld and Chilonda 2006, 3). 
Country statistics provide a more differentiated statistical picture: In the United States, people  
consume on average 118 kilograms a year, in Italy, 87 kilograms, in South America 78 kilo-
grams, in China, 58 kilograms—which is the half the U.S. consumption –, in Africa 19 kilo-
grams,  and  in  India  4  kilograms  (FAOSTAT  2016c).  The  stark  and  sometimes  diametric 
changes in consumption in the Majority and Minority World from 1970 to 2002 have been cal-
culated by Steinfeld and Chilonda (2006) as illustrated in table 2. 
Table 2: Meat and milk consumption in the Majority and Minority World, 1970-2002. 
Majority World Minority World
1970
198
0
1990
200
2
197
0
1980
199
0
2002
Annual per caput meat consumption 
(kg)
11 14 19 29 65 75 82 80
Annual per caput milk consumption 
(kg)
19 23 27 31 122 99 92 93
Total meat consumption (million met-
ric tons)
29 47 74 139 70 88 103 105
Total milk consumption (million metric 82 119 167 256 307 346 372 343
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tons )
Note.  Adapted  from  “Old  players,  new players,”  by  Henning Steinfeld and  Pius  Chilonda,  in  Anni 
McLeod (ed),  Livestock report 2006 (p. 3), 2006, Rome: FAO. Copyright 2006 by FAO. Adapted and 
reprinted with permission.
Whereas in 1970, annual per capita meat consumption was 11 kilograms in the Majority World, 
it was 65 kilograms in the Minority World, a difference of factor 5.9. For milk, the relationship 
in 1970 was 6.4: people in the Majority World consumed 19 kilograms of milk per capita, and 
122 kilograms in the Minority World. In 2002, 32 years later, annual meat consumption per  
capita in the Majority World rose from 11 to 29 kilograms, and annual milk consumption per 
capita from 19 to 31 kilograms. This was translated into a surge of total meat and milk con-
sumption of 29 to 139 million metric tons and of 82 to 256 million metric tons, respectively  
(Steinfeld and Chilonda 2006, 3). 
Although the Minority World still accounts for the major part of global meat consumption, the 
trend is negative. Land has become scarce in the Minority World, feed and energy have become 
costlier. The business of beef in particular does not have good prospects. In point of fact, the sit-
uation is being reported as “dramatic.” In the United States, meat consumption has dropped by 
almost ten percent between 2007 and 2012.  The demand appears to be satiated. Further, con-
sumers are concerned by repeated food scandals, health crisis, low meat quality, and animal  
welfare violations.  The Minority World reaction to those stagnating sales figures is to (vio-
lently) take the bull by its horns. It invests in new markets in the Majority World and not only  
exports its meat consumption, but also meat production patterns (Heinrich Böll Foundation and 
Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 10–17, 46).32 
Domestic consumption is chiefly augmenting in China, India, and Brazil.  Brazil’s yearly per 
capita meat consumption increased from 28 kg to 73 kilograms between 1961 and 2009; in 
China, it increased from four to 59 kilograms (Weis 2013a, 86–87; 2013b, 68).  Chinese con-
sumption patterns have changed dramatically in the last five decades; for millennia, people ate 
meat once a year.  And despite the lactose-intolerance of the majority of Chinese people, con-
suming dairy produce is likewise gaining popularity (Rotorua Daily Post 2015). Still, the growth 
in  consumption  predominantly  affects  middle-  and  upper-class  urban  consumers  (Schneider 
2014, 617). At the same time, according to a report by Public Radio International in 2013, veg-
anism is a growing trend in China. Today, 50 million people—four to five percent of the popu-
lation—are vegetarians, which outnumbers the 20 to 30 million vegetarians living in the United 
States (Magistad 2013).  The traditionally vegetarian country India equally faces a tremendous 
32 Compare also Sanbonmatsu 2011b, 23; Twine 2012, 14.
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increase in meat consumption, especially as chicken and fast food meals are popularized, partic-
ularly among the young (Farrell 2002; Steinfeld and Chilonda 2006, 9). Though religious and 
cultural norms demand a strictly vegetarian diet, the urban upper classes have begun to turn  
away from vegetarianism and follow the Minority World carnivorous trend, which is regarded 
as a status symbol (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 49). 
2.1.3 Industrialization: Output
The tremendous rise of production and consumption figures discussed above was only feasible 
via a correspondingly drastic growth of industrialized production (Heinrich Böll Foundation and 
Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 12). Which are the characteristics of industrial systems, how 
does the corporate landscape look like in the animal-industrial complex, and what kind of output 
in terms of bodies and species do industrial livestock operations generate?
2.1.3.1 Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
Nowadays, industrial livestock systems are prevalent not only in their countries of origin, Turtle 
Island and Europe, but also in parts of the Majority World: in East and South  Asia, Oceania, 
Latin America, and the Near East (Nardone et al. 2010, 63–64; Steinfeld 2004, 22). 
Industrialized production is to be distinguished from the other two main livestock production 
systems: grazing or pastoral systems, and mixed crops livestock systems (Nardone et al. 2010,  
63–64). Pastoral systems are located in Africa, Asia, Australia, and in some parts of the Ameri-
cas and Europe. They utilize three billion hectares of arid pasture and provide around 20 percent  
of global ruminant meat production (Herrero et al. 2009, 112). Nonetheless, the future of pas-
toral systems is unclear. According to FAO experts, they “will increasingly provide ecosystem 
goods and services that are traded” (Thornton 2010, 2861)—this transferal will be discussed in 
more depth in chapter 5.6.5. Integrated crop-livestock systems are mixed systems which are to 
be found in Central Africa, India, South and North America, and Central and Eastern Europe, 
covering 2.5 billion hectares of land. They account for 90 percent of global milk production, 40 
percent of egg production, and 70 percent of ruminant meat production (Nardone et al. 2010, 
63–64).33 Yet, in the last decades, industrial systems grew exponentially and today account for 
77 to 79 percent of world’s pork, poultry meat and egg production (Herrero et al. 2013, 20889,  
cited in MacLachlan 2015, 32).34 A more detailed (and conservative) account is offered by Nar-
33 See also Wright et al. 2012, 1010–11. 
34 Between 1981/83 and 1991/93, industrial systems grew 4.3 percent, mixed farming systems grew 2.2 percent, and 
grazing systems 0.7 percent (Seré and Steinfeld 1996, quoted in Steinfeld 2004). This means that industrial systems 
grew twice as much as mixed systems and six times as much as grazing systems (Delgado et al. 1999, 17).  The 
FAO-report Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options maintains in 2006 that industrial systems 
provide 80 percent of total sector growth (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 278).
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done et al., maintaining that 70 percent of poultry meat, 55 percent of pig meat, and 60 percent  
of eggs are produced in industrial systems (2010, 63–64).35 
Industrial systems are completely transforming the sector. Basically, industrialization comprises 
intensification,  corporate  consolidation,  regional  concentration,  and  the  exploitation  of 
economies of scale36 (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 20). More specifically, intensifica-
tion means intensified livestock and feed production, an amplified use of technological means  
and genetics, and, in sum, a shift from small-scale, backyard, or mixed-system production, to  
factory farms. The technical term for factory farms is Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation 
(CAFO). Animal geographers  Emel and Neo define CAFOs as “the concentration of live ani-
mals (pigs, poultry or cattle), manure, and urine to small spaces where feed is brought in” (Emel  
and Neo 2011, 67). In the United States, a medium-sized CAFO consists of 500 livestock units,  
which means 50,000 chickens or 2,000 pigs (EPA 2017).37 Other terms for factory farms are In-
dustrial  Livestock  Operation (ILO)  (Weis  2013a,  1)  or  “landless”  system.  The  designation 
“landless” refers to the fact that in such systems, less than ten percent of the dry matter fed to  
farmed animals is produced on the farm (Thornton et al. 2009, 115). Hence, with CAFOs, meat 
production has been decoupled from feed production. Correspondingly, the location of a factory 
farm only depends on available feed concentrates, on water and land resources for waste dis-
posal, and on production cost (Emel and Neo 2011, 74; FAO 2011b, 31; Sneeringer 2009, 126). 
Infrastructure and access to the market are other decisive factors. In Europe, for instance, the re-
gions near the port of Rotterdam, the most important access-point to soybeans and soybean 
meal, are hubs of chicken and pig production (Idel and Reichert 2013, 144).38 For sociologist 
Schneider,  the  separation of  livestock from feed production corresponds to  a  metabolic  rift 
(Schneider 2014, 615, 625).39 Slingenbergh, Hendrickx, and Wint even deem the disconnection 
from the land between the CAFO, crop land, the processing industry, and the market “the most  
peculiar feature about animal production” (Slingenbergh, Hendrickx, and Wint 2002, 32). 
35 Once more, China has an exceptional record: 90 percent of its chickens are raised in CAFOs (Heinrich Böll Foun -
dation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 40). 
36 Economies of scale are defined as “cost reductions realized through expanding the scale of operations” (Costales,  
Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 21). In other words, the production cost per piece of output decreases with increasing 
output, namely, with mass production.
37 In the animal-industrial complex, animals are counted in livestock units. The livestock unit coefficients are region-
ally different. The conversion factors are highest in Turtle Island where one cow corresponds to 1.0 livestock unit. 
In other OECD countries, they are 0.90 for cattle, 0.10 for sheep, 0.25 for pigs and 0.01 for poultry. In South Asia, 
conversely, the units are 0.50 for cattle, 0.10 for sheep, 0.20 for pigs and 0.01 for poultry (FAO 2011a, 37). 
38 Those areas, namely the Netherlands, Denmark, northern France and northern Germany, have additionally benefit-
ted from European Union agricultural investment assistance to set up the production sites (Idel and Reichert 2013,  
144). Furthermore, the geographical separation of production and consumption, and thus terrestrial extension of the  
animal-industrial complex, are fueled by the low costs of transport (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 76).
39 The  metabolic  rift  divorces  productive  from  consumptive  activities,  and  human  cycles  from natural  cycles 
(Schneider 2014, 615, 625).
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Besides, the regional concentration means that millions of live or dead animals are being trans-
ported all over the globe (Emel and Neo 2011, 69). Between 1961 and 2007, the global trade of 
meat has multiplied nine-fold, and the global trade of milk five-fold (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and 
Ran 2011,  2).  Multilateral  and regional  trade  agreements  are  gaining  importance (Steinfeld 
2004, 36).40 The biggest soy importer remains China,  importing 56 percent of the global soy 
volume (Emel and Neo 2015, 1; FAOSTAT 2014d; Schneider 2014, 624). The European Union 
with its low tariffs on oilseeds has a high level of soy imports, too, mostly from Latin America 
(Idel and Reichert 2013, 143).  In contrast, Argentina is the biggest soy exporter, followed by 
Brazil (FAOSTAT 2014e). New Zealand is the biggest dairy exporting nation, followed by the 
European  Union,  with  the  major  exporters  being  Germany,  France,  and  the  Netherlands 
(Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran 2011, 2). 
2.1.3.2 Corporate consolidation
To compete in a sector with tight profit margins, the go-to strategies are increasing output while 
decreasing  input,  and  the  concentration  of  corporate  power  (Heinrich  Böll  Foundation  and 
Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 12–13).41 Corporate consolidation is ruling out smaller farms 
in favor of CAFOs, and whereas the factory farms are expanding in size, their total number has 
declined.  In  both  Canada  and Denmark,  from 1980 to  2001,  the  number  of  chicken farms 
plunged 80 percent (Fraser 2005, 25). In the United States, from 1980 to 2005, 90 percent of pig 
raisers lost their job, with the national pig population remaining constant (Carvajal and Castle,  
May 05, 2009; Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 10). In addition, 
from 1970 to 2014, the number of U.S. slaughterhouses diminished from almost 10,000 to less  
than 3,000 (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 14). Similarly, four 
corporations controlled 60 percent of the U.S. American poultry market in 2005 (World Bank 
2005, xi). The development shakes the Majority World, as well (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 
2006, 21). Already in 1996, ten vertically integrated companies provided 80 percent of poultry 
production in Thailand. These companies contract medium and large-scale producers to raise  
day-old chicks from their hatcheries and with their feed (Khan and Bidabadi 2004, 117). In the  
Philippines, 80 percent of the broiler market is controlled by six corporations that are united in 
40 Trade agreements on animal products concern food safety, animal welfare, environmental protection, or corporate  
legal rights. Food safety issues include the use of food and feed additives, or of genetically modified organisms. 
The Agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) of the World Trade Organization, for instance, al -
lows countries to develop their own food safety standards, provided they offer scientific backing. This standard is  
interpreted by some as protectionism by the Minority World (Steinfeld 2004, 36). Another economic battle is being 
fought between the United States and the European Union. While the former pressure the latter to lift its ban on  
ractopamine, a feed additive to enlarge the development of lean meat in pigs and cows, the United States, fearing 
BSE contamination,  restrict  beef imports from the European Union because of its allowance of feed additives  
sourced from ruminants (in other words, the European Union allows feeding live cows with dead cows, in contrast 
to the United States) (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 18–19).
41 This development is hitting not only animal farming, but agriculture in general (Holt Giménez and Shattuck 2011,  
111).
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one association (World Bank 2005, xi). Consolidation takes place in the Chinese poultry sector, 
as well. From 1996 to 2011, only 25 percent of the initial broiler farms were left (MacLachlan  
2015, 35). In fact,  China, as well as countries in Central and Eastern Europe represent “gold 
mines” for multinational meat conglomerates; family farms are being converted into huge meat 
factories (Emel and Neo 2011, 69). 
Who rules the corporatist landscape in the animal-industrial complex? The world’s largest meat 
company (by sales)  is  JBS SA,  a multinational  corporation with headquarters in São Paulo 
(Emel and Neo 2015, 8). JBS has become the world’s biggest beef, lamb, and mutton producer, 
and the world’s chief chicken and leather processor. The giant has the capacity of processing the 
colossal amount of 81,500 cows and 13.8 million birds per day (JBS 2011, 37–39). This comes 
to 29.7 million cows and 5.037 billion birds per annum (pigs and other animals excluded). In the 
past years, JBS acquired units of the U.S.-based TysonFood (one of the biggest poultry produc-
ers in the world), Smithfield, Cargill Pork, and the poultry producer Malfrig. The multinational 
meat conglomerate tripled its net revenue from R$ 54.7 billion in 2010 to R$ 162.9 billion in 
2015  (JBS  2011,  14)42,  surpassing  food  giants  like  Danone  or  Unilever  (Heinrich  Böll 
Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 12), which merited a raised credit rating by 
three major rating agencies (JBS 2011, 14). In the United States, the acquisition of Cargill Pork 
allowed JBS USA Pork to daily process 89,500 hogs in just five “pork processing units” (JBS 
2011, 45). This equals on average 17,900 slaughtered hogs in one facility per day. In 2015, JBS 
counted 227,168 employees in over 15 countries, almost doubling its workforce from 2010 (JBS 
2011, 33, 2011, 78).
Another example of corporate consolidation in the complex, and of the increasing influence of 
China, was the 2013 acquisition of  the U.S.-based company Smithfield, the  world’s principal 
pig producer (by sales), by Shuanghui, China’s major meat processor by company value. The 
rise of Smithfield went hand in hand with the decline of small hog farms in the United States  
noted  above  (Carvajal  and Castle,  May 05,  2009).  Acquiring the U.S.  competitor  gave  the 
Chinese company credibility, production technology, and farms in the United States that raise 
15.8 million hogs per year. In China, Shuanghui owns eight slaughterhouses that can process 
113,000 pigs per day (Emel and Neo 2015, 8–9). The acquisition of Smithfield “was the largest-
ever  acquisition by a  Chinese company of  a U.S.  asset.”  The group has  subsequently been 
renamed to WH Group (MacLachlan 2015, 35).
The ever-increasing concentration is, however, a risky business. Increased risk of health and 
economic crisis, but also volatile feed prices, especially with rising speculation and biofuels,  
42 In 2010, R$54.7 billion equalled 32.9 billion USD. In 2015, 162.9 billion R$ equalled 48.4 billion USD.
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constitute some of the downfalls of concentration, against which corporations are trying to pro-
tect themselves with insurances tailored to the sector’s needs  (Heinrich Böll Foundation and 
Friends  of  the  Earth  Europe  2014,  12–13).  Yet,  for  Weis,  the  systemic  problems  of 
industrialized animal production are simply “overpowered” (Weis 2013b, 76).
2.1.3.3 Bodies and species
Not only the animal factories grow, the animals themselves and their “output” get bigger as  
well. In corporatist jargon, referring to livestock units, this is called a higher “offtake per unit of 
stock” (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 24). Between 1960 and 2010, the average carcass 
weight of beef cattle and chickens has increased by 30 percent. The slaughter weight of pigs has  
increased by about  20 percent  (Thornton 2010,  2854).  The breeding industry in  the  United 
States achieved even higher averages. In the time span between 1945 and 2001, the average 
broiler weight increased by 60 percent, from 1,4 kilograms to 2,3 kilograms; and time until the 
average broiler reaches her or his market weight has been halved (Gunderson 2013, 263). In the 
1970s, the average pig in the United States weighted 67 kilograms; today, she or he weights 
around 100 kilograms (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 10).  
The pigs reach their slaughter-weight when they are less than six months old (Idel and Reichert 
2013, 144). 
The global average amount of milk “produced” per cow and the amount of eggs produced per  
chicken have augmented by roughly 30 percent between 1960 and 2010 (Thornton 2010, 2855). 
In the extreme case of the United States, though, through breeding and replacing other breeds 
with Holsteins, productivity more than quadrupled in those five decades (Shields and Orme-
Evans 2015, 365) (the importance of genetics will be further examined in paragraph 2.1.4.2).43 
Finally, U.S. laying hens lay around 300 eggs per year (Idel and Reichert 2013, 145). 
The industrialization in the complex altered the prevalence of the exploited species, too. The 
biggest modification is the new predominance of monogastric over ruminant animals. Nowa-
days, the “top three” animal groups accounting for 90 percent of global livestock production by 
volume are, in order of importance, pigs, poultry (including a vast majority comprised of chick-
ens, but also ducks, geese, and turkeys), and cows  (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 75–76; Weis 2010, 
139). Why have monogastric species overtaken ruminants? Pigs and chickens are “good feed 
converters,”  they have  a  smaller  environmental  impact,  faster  reproduction  cycles,  and  can 
(forcibly) be confined in very small space, saving cropland and pasture (Delgado et al. 1999, 17; 
43 In more detail, in 1944, a population of 25.6 million dairy cows produced 53.0 billion kilograms of milk, each cow 
giving 2,074 kilograms yearly. In 2007, however, the U.S. dairy sector produced 84.2 billion kilograms of milk in  
2007 with a population of 9.2 million cows, resulting in a milk yield of 9,193 kilograms per individual cow (Shields 
and Orme-Evans 2015, 365).
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MacLachlan 2015, 31). The production of one kilogram of beef needs three times more land 
than the production of a kilogram of chicken or pig meat, and the greenhouse gas emission of  
cattle is seven times larger than that of the chicken and pig industries (Shields and Orme-Evans  
2015, 372). The chicken industry is also the sector with the biggest potential for economies of  
scale, as it is the “most easily mechanized”.44 Moreover, chickens are the species whose con-
sumption is not restricted by the major world religions (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 17–18). Boosted 
by all these advantages, the monogastric sector keeps growing. In South Asia, the number of 
killed chickens will increase by the factor seven by 2050. In India, the consumption is expected  
to rise tenfold, mainly in urban areas. Globally, the production of poultry is expected to aug-
ment  by  25  percent  in  the  decade  between 2010 and 2020 (Heinrich  Böll  Foundation  and 
Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 40). All those characteristics and the large extent of the sector  
lead Schneider to define livestock production not as a food regime, but as  an  industrial meat 
regime, as industrial meat—as well as milk or eggs—is not for food, but “for politics, class and 
capital” (Schneider 2014, 614, 628).
2.1.4 Industrialization: Input
To produce this output of several hundred million tons of dead bodies and secretions, the indus-
try necessitates feed, genetics, pharmaceuticals, and financial and political support. This input is  
sketched in the following paragraphs. 
2.1.4.1 Feeding capital
Before these billions of animals are killed, they have to be raised and fed.  As expounded above, 
livestock was traditionally produced where there was locally available feed. Farmed animals 
roamed on pastures, consumed crop residues, or household waste. This sort of fibrous feed can-
not be consumed by humans and hence did not compete with human food in principle (Costales, 
Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 23). Industrial animal production, conversely, relies on feed grains: 
the protein-rich diet contributes to a faster weight gain (Delgado et al. 1999, 20; Steinfeld et al. 
2006, 12). This is a radical change in feed management. Today, a massive flow of crops is used 
as  animal  feed.  The  most  important  grains  used  as  animal  feed  are  maize,  wheat,  barley,  
sorghum and oats (FAO Commodities and Trade Division 2002). Weis frames the entanglement 
of the animal-industrial complex with feed production as the “industrial grain-oilseed-livestock 
complex.”45
44 Sectors with high labor intensity, like dairy production, are less apt for economies of scale, and often depend on 
cheap family labor (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 21–22; Steinfeld et al. 2006, 17).
45 Weis recounts it almost poetically: “The industrial grain-oilseed-livestock complex is the dominant system of agri-
culture across the temperate world, and is spreading to significant parts of the tropics. Its landscapes can be likened  
to islands of concentrated livestock within seas of grain and oilseed monocultures, with soaring populations of a 
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Out of the total estimated global cereal utilization in 2016/17,46 amounting to 2,564 million tons, 
920 million tons or 35 percent were deployed as feed, whereas just a slightly higher amount—
1,105  million  tons,  or  43  percent—was processed  as  human food  (FAO 2016f).47 And  the 
amount designated for feed is augmenting: in 2011/12, 33.7 percent of the total cereal produc-
tion was used for feed and 45.3 percent for food (Makkar 2013). Nowadays, more than half of 
the global maize and 85  percent of the global barley harvest directly end up in feed troughs 
(Heuzé et al. 2015; Weis 2010, 140).48 As industrialized production is growing much more than 
mixed system or pastoral production (consider section 2.1.3), this portion will undoubtedly mul-
tiply in the next decades. In addition, monogastric production is propagating much faster than 
ruminant production; the industrial nourishment of chickens, for instance, consists almost exclu-
sively of cereals and oil seeds (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran 2011, 4).  A look at the share of 
crops used for feed in the Minority World is instructive: In the European Union, 60 percent of 
the cereal harvest goes into feed troughs, whereas in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, only 
10 to 15 percent of cereals are used as feed—yet (Fritz 2014, 5). 
In 2000, Delgado et al. (2000, 7) calculated and projected the cereal use for feed for the two pe-
riods 1992/94 and 2020, for the Minority and Majority World, for China, and for the world to-
tal, as illustrated in figure 5. Cereal use was expected to grow everywhere. Still, whereas it was  
supposed to grow by 17 percent in the Minority World from 1992/94 to the year 2020, from ap-
proximately 442 to 519 million tons, it should more than double in the Majority World—from 
194 to 409 million tons. China would use 178 million tons of cereals as feed by 2020, an in-
crease by 143 percent compared to the 73 million tons used in 1992/94. Total use of cereals as 
feed in the world was projected to climb from 636 million tons in 1992/94 to 928 million tons in 
few livestock species reared in high densities, disarticulated from the surrounding fields. These islands of concen -
trated livestock and seas of monocultures are then rearticulated by heavy flows of crops such as corn/maize, barley,  
sorghum, soybeans, and rapeseed/canola cycling through animals. This disarticulation and rearticulation is medi-
ated by an array of technologies, inputs, and large corporations, and marked by the loss of large volumes of usable  
nutrition.” (Weis 2013a, 8).
46 Global cereal production in 2016 is forecasted to be 2,577 million tons (FAO 2016f).
47 The  remainder  is  deployed  for  industrial  production  such  as  biofuels,  sweeteners,  starches,  or  for  brewing 
(FAO Commodities and Trade Division 2002). The numbers stem from the FAO Cereal Supply and Demand Brief 
of the 8th of December 2016 (FAO 2016f). Unfortunately, this brief is not archived; the homepage solely displays 
the newest brief. Nevertheless, the reports on “Crop Prospects and Food Situation” of the past years can be re -
trieved on (FAO Trade and Markets Division 2017). The animal industrial complex’s competition for feed versus 
food and the societal consequences will be debated in chapter 2.4.1.
48 The Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock, which will be examined in more detail in the fourth and fifth chap-
ter, reassures that cereals constitute less than ten percent of the global livestock feed basket: grass (39 percent), crop  
residues (26 percent), and agricultural by-products (8 percent) are the main elements of the farmed animals’ diet  
(Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2015a, 43). Nonetheless, if the Global Agenda considers this relatively 
small share of grains good news, then one should consider that those ten percent do indeed equal 35 percent of the 
global cereal utilization.
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2020. The projections were accurate, yet probably slightly conservative, as already in 2016/17, 
920 million tons of cereals were used as feed.
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Figure 5: Cereal use as feed, 1992/94-2020. 
Adapted from  “Responding to the ‘Livestock Revolution’—the case for livestock public policies,” by 
FAO, 2005, Livestock Policy Brief 1, p. 3. (http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/resources/en/pubs_sap.html#). 
Data from Delgado et al. (2000, 7).
And until now, only cereals were assessed: Oilseeds like soybeans are not included in the fig-
ures above. The main part of soybean production goes to farmed animals (Heuzé and Tran 2016; 
Weis 2013a). Soybeans are used as animal feed mainly in the form of soybean meal which is a  
by-product of oil extraction (Heuzé and Tran 2016).49 Feedipedia, an open access encyclopedia 
of animal feed resources set up by the FAO,50 specifies that soybean meal is “the most important 
protein source” for livestock, representing “two-thirds of the total world output of protein feed-
stuffs, including all other major oil meals and fish meal” (Heuzé, Tran, and Sadasivam 2015). In 
the United States, 98 percent of soybean meal lands in feed troughs (Weis 2010, 140).51 Soy 
production will continuously expand, especially in Brazil (OECD and FAO 2015, 4). The de-
mand for soy has been fueled by national bans of feeding slaughterhouse waste, and equally by  
the  incessant  expansion  of  aquaculture  (compare  paragraph  2.1.5.  on  the  fishing  industry) 
(Heuzé, Tran, and Sadasivam 2015). In total, the production of the two main feed crops maize 
and soy has grown more than four-fold and more than eight-fold, respectively, since 1961. Yet, 
49 Soybean oil is mainly used for human consumption (Heuzé, Tran, and Sadasivam 2015).
50 In collaboration with the Institut  National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), the Centre de coopération 
international  en  recherche  agronomique  pour  le  développement  (CIRAD)  and  the  Association  française  de  
zootechnie (AFZ).
51 Because of its status as a by-product, it is difficult to find reliable numbers on the percentage of global soybean  
harvest used for feed.
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thanks to increased productivity of the crops, the area occupied by maize and soy crops “only” 
doubled and quadrupled in these five decades (Weis 2013b, 68–69).52 In Latin America alone, 
the land dedicated to soy and maize has increased by 94 percent between 1980 and 2004. The 
crops are mainly deployed for concentrate feed production. In Sub-Saharan Africa, expansion of 
crop land for cereal production rose by 64 percent, in East and South East Asia by 15 percent  
(Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 24). 
2.1.4.2 Genetics and pharmaceuticals 
Another crucial trend in the sector is animal  genetics.  The expansion of industrialized animal 
production in the 1950s propelled breeding corporations (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends 
of the Earth Europe 2014, 24).53 The knowledge about animal bodies, pedigree, and value, once 
the specialty of experienced farmers, is now produced, governed, and sold by scientists and cor-
porations. This is particularly the case for pigs and poultry. Companies manage their genes and 
deliver “standard animals” to farms (Holloway and Morris 2008, 1712). New methods and tech-
nologies such as molecular genetics are on the rise and are deployed to breed for specific traits  
such  as  meat  quality  and  lower  environmental  impact  (Thornton  2010,  2858).54 One  such 
method is genomic selection: characterized by Holloway as the “geneticization” of breeding, it 
is a shift from the traditional “breeding by eye” according to aesthetical values (Holloway 2015, 
179).55 Genomic selection is considerably more accurate as traditional pedigree indexes and thus 
path-breaking for the “genetic improvement of livestock species”  (Calus 2010, 157). Through 
geneticization, farmed animals are completely reduced to their genes, their whole existence is 
genetically geared towards higher efficiency, farm output, and profit (Holloway 2015, 192). 
With this specialized and concentrated mass production, the genetic diversity of farmed animals 
has become very narrow. Out of the existing 8,000 livestock breeds, a quarter face extinction, 
while a mere handful of high-yielding breeding lines dominates the market. Those few standard-
ized, highly productive breeds are bred for the controlled environment of CAFOs with stable 
52 For both plants,  genetic modification is common. In 2008,  genetically modified soybeans occupied about 68  
percent of  the world soybean area (which equalled 65.8 million hectares).  The crops are mainly modified for  
herbicide-resistance.  Other  traits  are  salinity-  or  drought-resistance,  or  improved  nutritional  and/or  health  
characteristics (Heuzé and Tran 2016).
53 Selective breeding has been a practice since the domestication of nonhuman animals. Traditional breeding meth-
ods include cross breeding, within-breed selection, and breed substitution. With these methods, significant produc -
tion gains were made in pig and poultry species, and to a lower degree in dairy cows (Thornton 2010, 2858).
54 For a discussion of biotechnology in the animal-industrial complex, see Twine 2010 and Emel and Urbanik 2005, 
451.
55 The most important genetic techniques enhancing the “genetic quality” of the breeds are genetic markers and esti-
mated breeding values. Genetic markers are genetic material gathered in the animal’s hair or blood that is associ -
ated with specific, heritable traits. More than 50,000 markers have been assessed just for cows (Calus 2010, 158). 
Estimated breeding values are statistics on the “genetic value” of every individual animal and its progeny. The val-
ues encompass desired outcomes like growth, fat and muscle depth, and carcass and meat traits. Governments, agri -
cultural scientists and commercial agencies promote these two techniques as “the way forward” (Holloway 2015,  
180). 
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temperature, light, and moisture, standardized, high-protein feed, and pharmaceutical input (Ste-
infeld et al. 2006, 13; Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 23–25). 
In the U.S. dairy sector, for example, Holstein cows have a market share of 83 percent. 60 per-
cent of U.S. beef production stems from the breeds Angus, Hereford, and Simmental. Likewise, 
75 percent of the global pig meat in market shares stems from three pig varieties. The genetic  
material of these breeds is controlled, further developed, and marketed by a handful of global  
breeding corporations.56 Local breeds are being crossbred to respond to external intensification 
pressures (Thornton et al. 2009, 119–20). Hybrid lines are getting more important, too, mainly 
in the chicken and pig sector, both in the Minority and Majority World (Hoffmann 2005). As 
hybrid animals cannot reproduce, farmers depend on the suppliers for buying new chickens for 
every “production cycle” (Gura 2008, 3). The genetic erosion and the concomitant vulnerability 
of the specialized super-breeds are undermining food sovereignty (Heinrich Böll Foundation 
and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 25).
Concentration of breeds and intensification of production on such a scale are not possible with-
out pharmaceutical input, in particular antibiotics. They are administered to livestock in sub-
therapeutic doses for two reasons: first,  to overpower the hostile and draining conditions in 
CAFOs, and second, to promote growth  (Steinfeld 2004, 37).57 The continuous, low-dose ad-
ministration of antibiotics has become the normality in the global animal-industrial complex. In 
China, an estimated 100,000 tons are fed to livestock per annum. In the United States, where 
farmed animals ingest 80 percent of antibiotics sold nationally, 13,000 tons were administered 
in 2009 (Cassuto and Saville 2012, 192; Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Eu-
rope 2014, 26–27). If we consider the bigger picture, we end up with the rather absurd situation 
that antibiotics are fed to healthy animals in the Minority World, whereas livestock in the Ma-
jority World lack veterinary care.58
With intensification, the administration of antibiotics will also increase, but the practice is con-
tested (Steinfeld 2004, 39). The indiscriminate application of antibiotics has led to the creation 
of “superbugs,” deadly pathogens that are resistant to several antibiotic classes. Those mutated 
bacteria are spread through both global trade and manure, as this latter is washed into rivers and 
lakes. Such superbugs constitute a severe health threat and possibly the beginning of a “post-an-
tibiotic era” (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 26-27). Already 
56 Likewise, breeding companies control the four big breeds in the aquaculture industry, namely rainbow trout, At-
lantic salmon, tilapia, and tropical shrimp (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 24–25)  
(read more on aquaculture in chapter 2.1.5).
57 Pigs that are fed antibiotics need 10 to 15 percent less feed to reach their market weight (Heinrich Böll Foundation  
and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 26–27).
58 Farmed animals in the Majority World suffer from a wide range of epidemic and endemic disease agents (Stein-
feld 2004, 39). In the Minority World, diseases have a 17 percent share of total animal production costs, in the Ma -
jority World, they account for more than 35 percent (Chen and Yada 2011, 588). 
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in 1997, the World Health Organization recommended prohibition of sub-therapeutic adminis-
tration to livestock, as well as regulation and phasing out of other sub-therapeutic medications  
such as growth hormones (Thornton 2010, 2860). In 2006, the European Union banned the use 
of antibiotics as a growth promoter as well as the use of growth hormones; still, the amount of  
antibiotics fed to animals did not decrease significantly (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends 
of the Earth Europe 2014, 26–27; Thornton 2010, 2860).
2.1.4.3 Subsidies and the power of lobbies
The value of global livestock production systems is estimated at 1.4 trillion USD (Thornton 
2010,  2853)  which constitutes  40 percent  of  the  global  agricultural  gross  domestic  product 
(Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2015b).59 In the Majority World, animal agriculture’s 
share of the agricultural gross domestic product is 33 percent; in the Minority World, it repre-
sents 53 percent (Thornton 2010, 2853). Nevertheless, without governmental support, most no-
tably exorbitant subsidies, the industry would be in decline. Such state financial incentives are 
often significantly higher for animal foods than for plant-based foods (Machovina, Feeley, and 
Ripple 2015, 426). In 2012, the OECD members subsidized the production of beef and veal  
with an estimated 18 billion USD, 15.3 billion USD went to milk production, 7.3 billion USD 
were spent for pig meat, 6.5 billion USD for poultry, 2.3 billion USD for soybeans, 1.5 billion 
USD for egg production, and 1.1 billion USD for sheep (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends 
of the Earth Europe 2014, 20). This totals an estimated 51.8 billion USD in OECD subsidies for 
the animal-industrial complex for one year. In the European Union, subsidies amounted to 190 
USD per individual cow in 2014; in China, they totaled 47 USD per pig in 2012 (Bailey, Frog-
gatt, and Wellesley 2014, 9). In addition, the policy and institutional frameworks in many coun-
tries favor large-scale corporations. These privileges include tariff or fiscal incentives and ac -
cess to subsidized credit (World Bank 2005, 5). To illustrate, the European Union’s subsidies al-
lowed Smithfield (now Shuanghui), the biggest producer of pig meat in the world introduced 
above, to further its expansion and displace small-scale farmers in Eastern Europe and in Africa  
(Jarosz 2009, 2074).60 
This benevolent attitude of governments toward the animal-industrial complex is no accident. 
The political influence of the livestock conglomerates is considerable. One illustration are the 
steps taken by the meat lobby before the Climate Change Summit COP21 in Paris 2015 which 
59 Nonetheless, in 2005, the global livestock sector constituted only 1.4 percent of the world’s gross domestic prod-
uct (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 268).
60 The arrival of Smithfield in Romania lowered the prices for pork and decimated the number of pig raisers by 90  
percent in a few years (Carvajal and Castle, May 05, 2009, quoted in Mathias 2012, 1). The giant meat producer 
raises 600,000 pigs a year in Romania, and gets approximately 30 Euro per pig in yearly subsidies. Add to this  
300,000 Euro in cropland subsidies, and 200,000 Euro funding for new European Union states in the year 2008, and 
you end up with a total of 18.5 million Euro (Carvajal and Castle, May 05, 2009).
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were summarized on “GlobalMeatnews.com” (Rowe 2015). The sector feared that the Summit 
would agree on climate change targets that threatened livestock production. Hence, Huang, sec-
retary general of the International Meat Secretariat, an organization representing the meat indus-
try on an international level (including at the FAO, the World Trade Organization, and in the 
Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock, compare 4.2.2.2.2), recognized the need for national 
meat sectors to “liaise closely with their home governments to ensure the sector did not have 
unrealistic targets thrust upon it” (Rowe 2016). Huang added:
“Our industry is not doing enough to tell its own story. By not talking about what we do to  
combat climate change we make ourselves an easy target for articulate groups.” [original 
emphasis].
The solicited “close liaison” apparently worked:
“Agriculture was the only sector to be specifically mentioned in the final agreement. In Arti-
cle 2 of the accord, countries sign up to ‘increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse im-
pacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions de-
velopment, in a manner that does not threaten food production.’” (Rowe 2015 [original em-
phasis]). 61
The addendum of “in a manner that does not threaten food production” shows the influence of 
the livestock industry at the Paris roundtable, and it is critical in view of the massive contribu-
tion of the sector to climate change. Scurlock, chief energy and renewables adviser at the UK’s 
National Farmers’ Union, seems to be content with the victory at the Paris roundtable: 
“That’s the bit we can wave at our governments if they look to introduce measures that  
make the industry unprofitable.  Agricultural emissions are fundamentally different from  
other sectors. There is no prototype for a genetically modified ruminant that does not pro-
duce methane. You can minimise, but you can’t abolish the emissions.” [original emphasis].
Commercial alternatives to animal products that undeniably have a much lower ecological foot-
print  (see chapter 2.3) have been reportedly threatened and persecuted by lobbies,  with the  
backing of governmental agencies.62 
61 The Article 2 of the climate change accord mentioned here fosters the exchange of technological know-how be -
tween the Minority and Majority World and funding of technological innovation in the Majority World. Scurlock,  
chief energy and renewables adviser at the UK’s National Farmers’ Union, remarked: “‘There’s a recognition that,  
sooner or later, we are going to have to share our technology with others. There’s no gain in us rearing low-meth -
ane cows if China’s industry has appallingly high rates of methane.’” (Rowe 2015 [original emphasis]).
62 Such alternatives like plant milk or “vegan eggs” have been fought with legal persecution, banning of market ac -
cess, patent restrictions, or outright personal intimidation of the companies’ founders (The Associated Press 2015;  
Thielman and Rushe, September 03, 2015).
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2.1.5 The fishing industry
For reasons of scope, the fishing industry is not assessed in detail in this account of the animal-
industrial complex. Nonetheless, some of its features and trends are strikingly similar to those of  
animal agriculture and are thus worth considering. 
The fishing industry consists of two branches: fisheries and aquaculture. Mood (2010, 72) esti-
mates that 0.97 to 2.7 trillion wild fish are caught each year.63 The specific number of individual 
fish is impossible to estimate, because the statistics only list tons of catch. Like in the animal-in-
dustrial complex, industrial fleets dominate the business, and industrially caught fish has be-
come a “globalized commodity” (Pauly and Zeller 2016, 2). Mansfield enumerates five charac-
teristics of the ongoing industrialization of the fishing industry: first, the enormous scale of fish-
ing, including the big vessels, the advanced technology, and multinational corporations. Second, 
the global commodity chains, prioritizing wealthy consumers of the Minority World. Third, in-
dustrialization has been encouraged as a form of “development and modernization” by national 
governments  and  intergovernmental  organizations  like  the  World  Bank.  Forth,  as  a  conse-
quence,  small-scale  fishers  are  being ruled out.64 Fifth,  industrial  fishing causes overfishing 
which is  particularly challenging for coastal communities (Mansfield 2011, 84). According to 
FAO reports, 61 percent of global fish stocks were fully exploited in 2014, and 29 percent were 
overexploited (Kolding et al. 2016). Mansfield expresses this circumstance as follows: 
“harmful industrial fishing is the purposeful outcome of ongoing efforts to foster a western, 
capitalist model of development, and this capitalist model of development brings with it 
new pressures to continue to expand fishing effort even if this leads to degrading the very 
resource on which the industry depends.” (Mansfield 2011, 85).
The second branch of the fishing industry is aquaculture. Aquaculture has multiplied its “yield” 
tenfold since 1980 (Weis 2013a, 19) and currently produces almost half of the globally con-
sumed  dead  fish,  crustaceans,  mollusks,  and  other  marine  individuals  (FAOSTAT  2015).65 
Strikingly, aquaculture constitutes the “fastest growing animal food sector in the world” (Mans-
63 This number is based on FAO average numbers from 1999-2007 in global fisheries capture of 77 million tons (il -
legal fisheries and by-catch not included; see equally FAOSTAT 2015; Weis 2013a, 19). Recently, a team of au -
thors scrutinized FAO data, suggesting that Moody’s estimate of 0.97-2.7 trillion fish was too conservative (Pauly  
and Zeller 2016). The authors’ calculations reconstruct a global catch of 130 million tons, which declined sharply to 
around 109 million tons in 2010. This represents an overall quantitative difference of 53 percent. The FAO underes-
timated small-scale fisheries, recreational fishing, illegal fisheries, and discarded bycatch (Pauly and Zeller 2016,  
1–2).
64 Worldwide, 180 million people are involved in the fishing industry, including 44.9 million fishers. 85.5 percent of 
the fishers are based in Asia, and 9.3 percent in Africa. In the Minority World, fishing firms recruit personnel from  
abroad (UNODC 2011, 13–14).
65 For 2014, the numbers were 93 million tons of individuals captured while 74 million tons of individuals were 
killed in aquaculture, summing up to a total of 167 million tons (FAOSTAT 2015). For an overview over the US 
aquaculture industry, refer to Daniels and McKinney 2015.
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field 2011, 87). By 2023, it is expected to supply more than half of the total fish consumption 
(OECD and FAO 2015, 4). In sum, the trend of intensification and substantial rise in production 
is dominant in aquaculture, as well. However, Keyzer et al. state: 
“intensification of the production will lead to the same problems witnessed now in intensive 
livestock production: high feed intensity, problems with animal health, and environmental 
hazards, such as pollution of the environment through emissions and by animal medication 
such as antibiotics” (Keyzer et al. 2005, 198). 
Paradoxically, aquaculture is equally contributing to overfishing. Why? Aquaculture produces 
both herbivorous and carnivorous fish. Carnivorous, predatory species are fed with wild fish 
(Tveterås and Tveterås 2010). To produce one “unit” of such “cultivated,” carnivorous fish, like 
salmon or trout, four to five times more wild fish are required as feed (Keyzer et al. 2005, 198).  
In total, almost 20 percent of global fish production are fed to carnivorous fish species in aqua-
culture  (UNODC  2011,  15). Keyzer  et  al.  forecast  the  carnivorous  production  to  expand 
(Keyzer et al. 2005, 198) which will contribute to an escalation of the biophysical contradictions 
of the fishing industry.
2.2 Animals and violence
“The  livestock  sector  provides  primary  inputs  (raw  milk,  live  animals,  etc.)  to  the 
agricultural and food industry where value adding activities multiply the value of these raw 
materials.” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 268).
“In short, industrialized livestock production is a system in which the chronic suffering and 
acute physical pain of animals are cast outside the realm of rational consideration, instead 
managed by environmental  and bodily manipulations,  with scientific,  technological,  and 
managerial  ‘improvements’  ‘measured  solely  by  profitability’  (Mason and  Singer  1990, 
41).” (Weis 2010, 147).
These two quotes could not be more dissimilar, yet,  they delineate the same subject matter:  
animal production. The first citation stems from the FAO report Livestock’s Long Shadow: En-
vironmental Issues and Options, the second one from Weis’ paper on The Ecological Hoofprint 
and the  Population Bomb of Reverse Protein Factories. Both quotations illustrate that for the 
animal-industrial complex, animals are capital. Their wants and needs literally do not count. 
Imperative are the needs of capital (Clark 2012, 109). This circumstance gets apparent if one 
compares the reproduction, birth, short existence and death of farmed chickens, cows and pigs.  
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They are almost analogous, although these are highly diverse species with diverging ethological 
needs.
The previous pages have sketched out the political economy of animal protein. This chapter,  
conversely,  is  dedicated  to  the  actual  “manufacturers”  of  the  commodities  in  question:  the 
farmed animals. It covers the cruel conditions they have to endure in their short existence, in-
cluding specialized breeding which leads to a dumping of millions of animals’ bodies, “over-
powering” with pharmaceuticals, the animals’ slaughter, and the suffering inherent to capitalist  
animal production. 
2.2.1 Cruel conditions
For the animals, the animal-industrial complex is, first and foremost, expressed as unimaginable 
horror and violence, both on a quantitative and qualitative scale. Animal suffering has increased 
on par with the rise of industrialized, intensive animal farming (Gunderson 2013, 266). The total 
number of exploited and slaughtered animals has never been so high in history, and the power 
over the animals’ bodies has never been more total than today (Sanbonmatsu 2011b, 29). 66 The 
intensity of production affects the farmed animals physically and psychologically.67 As specified 
in paragraph 2.1.3.3, the average carcass weights of cattle, pigs, and chickens has increased by 
roughly 30 percent. In the Minority World, this percentage is even more elevated; in the United  
States, the  average broiler weight increased by 60 percent. Furthermore,  the broiler’s growth 
rate has more than quadrupled from 1957 to 2015. Nowadays, they reach their slaughter weight  
in less than five weeks. The average pig weight has risen by 50 percent in the United States, and 
pig litter size has increased from 7.10 in 1974 to 9.97 piglets in 2011. This proliferation equally  
led to a higher mortality of piglets.  In many countries, breeding sows are kept  in gestation 
crates, metal crates that are just slightly bigger than the sow herself. The crates do not allow the 
sow to turn around. Her movement is extremely inhibited and she is fed concentrates instead of 
a high fiber diet, resulting in higher resting heart rates, stress, boredom, and behavioral anom-
alies or stereotypies. Examples are head-waving, drinker pressing, bar-biting, tail-biting or vac-
uum chewing. Further,  the sows suffer from chronic hunger because of their restricted diet,  
which is aimed at preventing fat deposition in their confined state The slatted floors cause foot  
and limb injuries, especially in piglets (Shields and Orme-Evans 2015, 367, 373). 
In this day and age, the unnatural, rapid growth of the farmed animals’ bodies cannot be borne 
by their fragile bones, weak organs, and joints, inducing a wide range of chronic illnesses and 
66 This occurs in spite of animal welfare legislations or the increasing awareness for animal rights, making the 
changes achieved by the animal protection movement appear purely symbolic or cosmetic (Sanbonmatsu 2011b,  
29).
67 This should not suggest that non-intensive animal husbandry does not affect animals. The topic will be addressed  
in paragraph 5.5. 
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injuries. Spending their whole “life” standing or laying in their own excrements (provided they 
are granted enough space to lie down), especially chickens suffer from lameness,68 ammonia 
burns on their eyes, legs, and breasts, and from respiratory diseases. A study by Danbury et al.  
2000 (quoted in Gunderson 2013, 263) “objectively” demonstrates that those sentient beings ex-
perience constant pain. The researchers offered broilers “normal” feed and feed that contained  
analgesics. The broilers consistently selected the latter, seeking relief from their suffering. Addi-
tionally, broiler chickens undergo metabolic diseases like sudden death syndrome, or ascites. In 
sudden death syndrome, birds experience acute heart failures, sudden convulsions and wing-
beating and are eventually found dead, lying on their backs. Ascites is associated with the inca-
pability of lung and heart  to deliver  enough oxygen to the fast-growing body (Shields and 
Orme-Evans 2015, 368).69 
As stated before, the milk yield per individual cow rose globally by 30 percent; in the United 
States, it quadrupled.  The occurrence of mastitis, a painful infection of the udder and teats, is 
positively correlated with milk yield, and one of the leading reasons for culling (Shields and 
Orme-Evans 2015,  366).  Furthermore,  cows suffer  from respiratory diseases,  lameness,  and 
from hoof lesions (Rule et al. 2005, 9649; Weis 2013a, 116–20). The ruminants could live more 
than fifteen years, yet in industrialized systems in the Minority World, their average lifespan is 
six years (Shields and Orme-Evans 2015, 375). Considering that they have to deliver roughly  
10,000 liters during one lactation period, their premature death is understandable (Idel and Re-
ichert 2013, 145).70
All farmed animals have to suffer from incarceration, lack of space, crowdedness (or isolation),  
being kept in darkness for extended periods, sensory deprivation, malnutrition, noise, stress, 
transportation,71 and so on. Those factors result in psychological trauma, self-mutilation, and 
cannibalism (Benz-Schwarzburg and Ferrari 2016, 30; Nibert 2011, 207; Weis 2010, 146). The 
ethological needs of animals, including spreading their wings, nesting and privacy while laying 
eggs or giving birth, are continuously compromised. Moreover, some of the animals’ physical 
characteristics are inconvenient for the industry, whether for questions of space, higher risk of 
cannibalism among farmed animals, elevated danger for workers, or preferences regarding meat 
68 Approximately 30 percent of broiler chickens suffer from lameness. Other conditions are tibial dyschondroplasia 
(a skeletal disease that inhibits the tibial cartilage to ossify), spondylolisthesis (a slippage of one vertebra relative to 
another), and even rupture of the gastrocnemius tendon (a part of the calf muscle) (Shields and Orme-Evans 2015, 
367–68).
69 Additionally, breeding hens are feed restricted to prevent them from suffering from the above-mentioned diseases.  
This restriction leads to chronic hunger, boredom, aggression, pacing, and pecking at objects (Shields and Orme-
Evans 2015, 368). 
70 A lactation period is the timespan between two calvings; for the industry, this time span is ideally as short as bio-
logically possible, which is around twelve months (Idel and Reichert 2013, 145). 
71 As pointed out in the paragraph on industrialization (2.1.3), the growing trade in livestock products and the meta-
bolic rift in the animal-industrial complex entail longer transportation times.
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quality and taste, and are therefore brutally removed. For example, hens are de-beaked, cows  
are dehorned, the piglets’ tails are docked and their teeth severed, male piglets are castrated. All 
these mutilations are generally performed without anesthetics (Gunderson 2013, 263–65). 
Intensification often implies also less human workforce responsible for an ever-increasing num-
ber of animals. In general, individual veterinary care is not provided, health is a topic just at the  
herd or flock level. This is not surprising if one imagines that one sole employee can be respon-
sible for 8,000 pigs per day. The consequence is that animals who are sick will go unnoticed and 
have to suffer until they die. The picking-up of dead chicken is described as being “one of the 
main daily tasks” of a worker at an industrial grow-out broiler facility (Shields and Orme-Evans 
2015, 372–74).
2.2.2 Specialization until worthlessness
The highly-specialized branches of animal production take their toll.  Two different breeding 
lines have developed for species exploited for both their  meat  and their eggs or their milk, 
namely, chickens and cows. Chickens are separated into broilers and laying hens; cows into 
dairy cows and “beef cattle.” Fifty years ago, this was not the case. To illustrate, chickens have 
been mainly reared for their eggs, not for their meat. Today, the broiler industry is a fast-grow-
ing industry, with its own breeds that are poles apart from the physiognomy of a layer hen 
(Gunderson 2013, 263–65). The repercussions of such selective breeding are that the male off-
spring in the egg and dairy industry, incapable of producing eggs or milk, is useless. Hence, all 
male chicks, unusable in the laying hen industry, are annihilated in hen hatcheries—yearly hun-
dreds of millions of them are gassed, trashed, or chaffed out of their economic worthlessness 
(compare paragraph 2.1.4.1 on “hatchery by-product”)  (Gunderson 2013,  263;  Weis  2013a, 
112–13). Young male calves, so-called “surplus calves” (Gerber et al. 2013, 26), similarly use-
less in the dairy industry, are sold to slaughter after around eighteen weeks of existence (Gun-
derson 2013, 264). Another condition in the rearing of the animals, linked to those specialized 
breeds, is the ceaseless (artificial) impregnation of the female farmed animals. Artificial insemi-
nation is the norm in the industry, since copulation has become physically impossible for tur-
keys, broiler chickens, and for the majority of pigs, too. Dairy cows, once they deliver their chil-
dren, are commonly almost immediately separated from them (Gunderson 2013, 263–65; Weis 
2010, 146).
2.2.3 Overpowering
In the United States, more than fifty percent of all pigs are kept in operations that consist of  
more than 5,000 pigs. More than half of layer hens are kept in operations that comprise more 
than 100,000 birds (Casey et al. 2015, 259), and 99 percent of layer hens are reared in facilities 
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with 10,000 chickens or more (Weis 2010, 140). As demonstrated in subsection 2.1.4.2, factory 
farms can only perpetuate this violent and excruciating enterprise with the massive usage of an-
tibiotics,  feed additives,  chemical  pesticides,  and disinfectants  (Gunderson 2013,  263).  This 
“overpowering” (Weis 2013b, 76) is a cruel experience for the farmed animals. 
The administration of growth hormones has resulted in animal welfare concerns such as lame-
ness, foot problems, horn overgrowth, or reduced fertility. An alternative is disrupting the myo-
statin gene to increase muscle growth (Laible 2009, 132). An already existing breed with a mu-
tated  myostatin gene is the breed Belgian blue. These animals have a natural mutation of the 
myostatin gene which leads to uninhibited muscular growth, resulting in an increase of muscular  
masses and fibers. For meat production, the breed is valued for the “higher dressing percentage” 
and “tenderness” of the flesh (Colombino and Giaccaria 2015, 163, 174). However, the calving 
difficulties of these breeds lower their economic competitiveness (Laible 2009, 132).
β-adrenergic agonists, a growth-promoting medication fed to cattle, has been observed to cause  
behavioral change and higher death rate among cows. Pigs that are administered β-adrenergic  
agonist ractopamine hydrochlorides suffer from aggression, hoof lesions, and difficulties walk-
ing and standing. Recombinant bovine Somatotrophin (rbST) is a growth hormone administered 
to cows to boost milk yield. The drug is associated with an increased risk of mastitis (Shields 
and Orme-Evans 2015, 370–71).
2.2.4 Killing
The killing of the farmed animals is managed in the most efficient, fastest, and cheapest way 
possible, with the animals paying the price for it. Many beings are slaughtered while still con-
scious because processors chose the most economical killing methods. In the electrical stunning 
of chickens,72 for example, low current is applied instead of more expensive, higher current 
(Gunderson 2013, 263–65; Nibert 2011, 208). Higher current that would more “effectively” kill 
the birds also induces hemorrhaging and bone breakages. Both have economic penalties: the 
first decreases meat quality, the latter complicates carcass processing (Higgin, Evans, and Miele 
2011, 186). If insufficiently stunned, the conscious birds, shackled upside down, witness how 
their jugular veins are cut and how they are transported into scalding water to have their feathers  
removed (Morin 2016, 6). Nor does captive bolt stunning of cattle73 always suffice to render the 
72 For more information on poultry stunning see Berg and Raj (2015). At the end of their existence, laying hens are 
“disposed of” or converted into biogas (Gunderson 2013, 264; Massé, Talbot, and Gilbert 2011).
73 Captive bolt  stunning of cattle was invented in 1903.  The stunning of smaller animals like pigs,  sheep,  and  
chicken was commercialized and advanced through electric stunning techniques in the beginning of the twentieth  
century. It made the work of the slaughterer much safer and easier and reduced the “needless” suffering of the ani-
mal. The insight into how electric stunning could produce such a state of unconsciousness was gained in the “medi-
cal” procedure of electric shock treatment (Higgin, Evans, and Miele 2011, 177).
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animal unconscious. The fast processing pace in slaughterhouses occasions careless stunning.  
The worker often does not apply sufficient power, or shoot from the correct angle or at the right 
spot. The cow is then cut into pieces while still cognizant (Morin 2016, 6). 
2.2.5 Systemic violence
It  is  imperative  to  note  that  the  culprits  of  those  horrors  are  not  a  handful  of  malicious 
slaughterhouse workers, some avaricious corporations, or even the lack of law enforcement. The 
capitalist system itself is geared towards profit maximization which will always happen on the 
backs of the animals (and of the employees, as well, as will be elaborated in paragraph 2.4.4)  
(Gunderson 2013, 267). Animal suffering is inscribed in capitalist production. In order not to 
lose customers, the complex tries to disguise this fact with cosmetic animal welfare policies. 74 
The primary motive for such policies is reducing non-compliance (compare the paragraph on in-
strumentalizing animal welfare 5.5.2).  For instance, animal mothers should be stopped from 
screaming for their babies after their separation. To reach this goal, the industry has begun to in-
vestigate methods of ablating the animals’ anterior cingulate cortex, the region of the brain re-
sponsible for emotions, which would turn them into numb machines (Terhaar 2012, 68).75 In 
sum, not only do animals have to exist inside factories, surrounded by machines, they also have 
to be functional like machines and ultimately have become machines themselves (Sanbonmatsu 
2011b, 24–25). 
2.3 Ecological hoofprint: Crossing of planetary boundaries 
Compared to the environmental repercussions of animal agriculture and its use of grain for fod-
der (namely 35 percent of the global harvest), fracking or the production of biofuels look like 
Disneyland fantasies. Even the FAO asserts that “[u]ltimately, if left unchecked, environmental  
degradation may threaten not only economic growth and stability but the very survival of hu-
mans on the planet.” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 6).76 This chapter illustrates the ecological hoofprint 
of the animal-industrial complex with the planetary boundaries-model.77 In 2009, and with an 
74 One example of such welfarist whitewashing is the previously mentioned corporation JBS,  the world’s biggest 
beef,  lamb, and  mutton producer,  and the world’s chief chicken processor,  with daily processing capacities of 
81,500 cows and 13,8 million birds (see chapter 2.1.3.2 on JBS). In its 2015 annual report, JBS assures that every  
single animal is slaughtered in line with “animal wellbeing guidelines” (JBS 2011, 76–81). In addition, JBS claims  
to respect the “five freedoms,” a formalization of five aspects of farmed animal welfare: “1. Freedom from fear and  
stress; 2. Freedom from hunger and thirst; 3. Freedom from discomfort; 4. Freedom from pain and illnesses; and 5.  
Freedom to express normal behavior” (JBS 2011, 60). 
75 Shriver (2009) investigates the ethics of genetically creating “knockout animals.” Refer as well to his New York 
Times article “Not Grass-Fed, but at Least Pain-Free” (Shriver, February 19, 2010).
76 An insightful new publication on the issue is Raphaely and Marinova 2016, entitled “Impact of meat consumption 
on health and environmental sustainability.”
77 The planetary boundaries-model has faced scientific (Blomqvist, Nordhaus, and Shellenberger 2012) as well as 
political criticism. From the scientific side, it is contested that environmental change is always non-linear, that ev-
erything is connected, or that the extinction of some species necessarily affects an ecosystem, among others. On the 
political side, it is claimed that such boundaries should be the object of a collective, societal discussion. Their defi-
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update  in  201578,  environmental  scientists  identified and quantified a set  of  nine “planetary 
boundaries” within which humanity can continue to live for generations to come (Rockström et  
al.  2009;  Steffen et  al.  2015),  compare figure  6.  Crossing these boundaries  engenders  irre-
versible environmental changes.
nition  depends  on  societal  priorities  (for  instance,  why  is  biodiversity  valuable?),  and  is  therefore  normative  
(Rayner 2013). Environmental problems always have a social component. Global standards for local problems can 
seem senseless; for instance, while some countries are using too much fertilizer, other countries desperately need  
more. To politically discuss a boundary on a local level would be much more significant (Pielke 2013).
The planetary boundaries team has responded to the criticism, for instance, their 2015 update operationalizes local  
boundaries (Steffen et al. 2015). In terms of politics, the team states that whereas the exact boundary position was a 
social choice, “the range is based on an Earth System analysis” (Rockström 2015). Galaz from the Stockholm Re-
silience Centre affirms that the boundaries “can be quite powerful political constructions that mobilize political ac-
tion.” Similarly, Liverman, coauthor of the planetary boundaries paper, asserts that limits can inspire “redistribution 
and innovation” (Lalasz 2013). But more fundamentally, the team explains that it is not their aim to locate a culprit,  
or to dictate the direction of societal change (Steffen et al. 2015, 736). Quite politically, they declare that their  
framework does not 
“take into account the deeper issues of equity and causation. The current levels of the boundary processes, and the 
transgressions of boundaries that have already occurred, are unevenly caused by different human societies and dif -
ferent social groups. The wealth benefits that these transgressions have brought are also unevenly distributed so -
cially and geographically. It is easy to foresee that uneven distribution of causation and benefits will continue, and  
these differentials must surely be addressed for a Holocene-like Earth-system state to be successfully legitimated  
and maintained.” (Steffen et al. 2015, 1259855–58).
This thesis uses the planetary boundaries model as a tool of discussion and illustration of the environmental impact  
of the livestock industry because, while it is true that the relationship between human activities and the biosphere is 
to be determined on a local level and in a collective way, the model nevertheless reminds us of the all-encompass-
ing global dimension. It makes explicit that the Earth is a closed, finite system, that endless growth is impossible,  
and that there is an urgent need for change. The model firmly and unequivocally posits the biosphere as “the basis  
for human wellbeing” (Rockström 2015), and, as such, in the center of politics.  Further, the model’s multidimen-
sionality and broad international acceptance champions its shortcomings. 
It is imperative to clarify here that the author’s own, first exploration of the issue is by no means exhaustive. This  
assessment might also differ from other investigations depending on the data they rely on. An in-depth analysis  
from natural science experts would be a precious contribution to the ongoing debate. Besides, the majority of the 
cited studies do not reflect the author’s own stance on animal agriculture.
78 The update includes, among other elements, the introduction of  a two-tier framework; the establishment of re-
gional boundaries for biosphere integrity, biogeochemical flows, land-system change, and freshwater use; the quan-
tification of one regional boundary for atmospheric aerosol loading; and the identification of two “core” bound-
aries: climate change and biosphere integrity (Steffen et al. 2015, 736). 
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Figure 6: Planetary boundaries.
Reprinted from “Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing planet,” by Will Stef-
fen et al., 2015,  Science 347 (6223), p. 736. Copyright 2015 by The American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science. Reprinted with permission. 
The “safe operating space” is marked by boundaries “for anthropogenic perturbation of critical Earth-sys-
tem processes.” The buffer between the boundary and the threshold accounts for uncertainty (Steffen et  
al. 2015, 1259855-1).
The nine boundaries are climate change, change in biosphere integrity (biodiversity loss and 
species extinction),  stratospheric ozone depletion,  ocean acidification,  biogeochemical  flows 
(phosphorus  and nitrogen  cycles),  land-system change,  freshwater  use,  atmospheric  aerosol 
loading,  and the introduction of novel  entities.  Four out  of the nine planetary boundaries—
namely, climate change, change in biosphere integrity, land-system change, and biogeochemical 
cycles—have already been crossed due to anthropogenic influence, with the animal industry as  
one of the main causes. 
2.3.1 Climate change
The contribution of animal production to climate change is  particularly alarming.  However, 
what exactly is understood by “climate change” or “global warming?” The Intergovernmental  
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), perhaps the most respected international scientific authority 
on climate change, assesses global warming in terms of global mean surface temperature change  
by the end of the twenty-first century. The chosen reference period is the pre-industrial period 
of 1850 to 1900. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has calculated four emission 
scenarios, or Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs): RCP 2.6, RCP 4.5, RCP 6.0 and 
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RCP 8.5.79 The lowest emission scenario RCP 2.6, in which global warming would unlikely ex-
ceed two degrees Celsius, is getting ever more unrealistic to achieve. For the scenario RCP 4.5,  
warming will exceed two degrees Celsius with medium confidence. In the two scenarios RCP 
6.0 and RCP 8.5, the global mean temperature will exceed two degrees Celsius with high confi-
dence (IPCC 2014b). 
Limiting global warming to two degrees Celsius is a widespread consensus. What does an in-
crease of two degrees Celsius of the global mean temperature signify? It is important to bear in 
mind that those two degrees are a mean value. In some areas, warming will be much higher than  
two degrees Celsius; likewise, warming is higher over land than over oceans. Climate zones will  
be shifting: for example, subtropical zones will expand to the Mediterranean, southern Africa,  
the southern United States, and South America (Hansen et al. 2013, 6–7). This entails adverse 
conditions for agriculture, such as floods, droughts, and salinity (Fish, Winter, and Lobley 2014, 
53). In particular, in Turtle Island, Northern Europe, the Mediterranean basin, and Northern and 
West-Central Asia, warmer temperatures of one to two degrees Celsius will negatively influence 
crop production. However, the Majority World will be most affected. Yield losses due to heat 
and drought in the tropics and subtropics will be around 10 to 20 percent by 2050, and even  
higher in some regions (Nardone et al.  2010).  The situation will  be drastic in Sub-Saharan  
Africa (Thornton et al. 2009, 114).
Wild animals will be forced to adapt: in point of fact, three-quarters of marine species have al-
ready moved their habitat poleward (some up to 1000 kilometers); half of terrestrial species 
have shifted their ranges poleward (up to 600 kilometers) and upward (400 meters). If global  
mean temperature is warming 2.9 degrees Celsius, 21 to 52 percent of all species are projected  
to go extinct.  Shifting climate zones are equally threatening to indigenous communities and 
their way of life, bound to a specific land. In the Arctic region, shorelines are eroding, sea ice  
and tundra melting. The melting arctic ice is a particular threat because it entails sea level rise 
and the break-up of the white Arctic thermal shield.80 For Hansen et al., it is a question of time 
when global coastlines start to be submerged, affecting hundreds of coastal cities, and hundreds  
of millions of people (Hansen et al. 2013, 1, 6-7). Finally, climate change does not only entail  
warming, but also an escalation in extreme weather events like hurricanes or droughts (IPCC 
2014b).
79 The numbers 2.6, 4.5, 6.0, and 8.5 stand for different radiative forcing values (in Watt per square meter) by 2100  
relative to the reference value. RCP 2.6 corresponds to an atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration of 421 parts 
per million (ppm), RCP 4.5 for 538 ppm, RCP 6.0 for 670 ppm, and RCP 8.5 for 936 ppm (IPCC 2014b).
80 The white ice has an important function in reflecting sunlight. Once broken up, the dark water absorbs the light, 
and warms up, which advances global warming. This melting will spur long-lasting and irreversible reactions. The  
sea level can rise by several meters (Hansen et al. 2013, 1, 6-7).
44
What role, then, does the animal-industrial complex play in climate change? The industry is re-
sponsible for 14.5 to 51 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions (Gerber et al. 2013; Good-
land and Anhang 2009).81 Although the exact percentage varies from study to study, even the 
conservative estimate of 14.5 percent surpasses the emissions of the global transport sector and 
of the United States: the complex emits 7.1 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalents per annum 
(GtCO2e) (Gerber et al. 2013, xii), while the emissions of the transport sector in 2010 were 7.0 
GtCO2e (IPCC 2014a, 7–8).82 The total emissions of the United States were 6.1 GtCO2e in 2011 
(Bailey, Froggatt, and Wellesley 2014, 4). In addition, animal farming emits 80 percent of total 
agricultural emissions (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 112).83 In terms of the planetary boundary “climate 
change,” the animal industry had a share of 52 percent of the suggested safe operating space for 
greenhouse gas emissions in the year 2000 (Pelletier and Tyedmers 2010, 18372).84 
Three greenhouse gases dominate the sector’s emissions. The biggest impact, namely 44 per-
cent, is from methane gas (CH4). Methane is mainly created in enteric fermentation (namely, the 
digestive process), manure, and rice feed. The exploitation of livestock, particularly ruminants, 
is actually the principal source (40 percent) of anthropogenic methane emissions (Jarosz 2009, 
2073; Ripple et al. 2013, 2). Nevertheless, this enormous contributor is relatively neglected, de-
spite the fact that the potential to rapidly reduce the radiative forcing of methane is particularly 
significant.85 The second largest contribution is from nitrous oxide (N2O) (29 percent), a gas 
which is formed from manure and the (over-)application of nitrogen as fertilizer on crop fields . 
The third component of emissions is, finally, carbon dioxide (27 percent). The gas stems mainly  
from land-use change and the use of fossil fuels (Ripple et al. 2013, 2).
Accordingly, not every production stage in the animal-industrial complex emits the same gas or 
the same amount of it. Feed production and processing account for 45 percent of total emis-
sions, enteric fermentation from ruminants for 39 percent, manure storage and processing for 
ten percent. Transport and processing of animal foods account for the remainder (Gerber et al.  
2013, xii). Still, the emissions of diverse livestock products vary greatly: beef accounts for 41 
81 The emission percentages are calculated in carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e).
82 The IPCC calculates 49 (±4.5) GtCO2e total global greenhouse gas emissions for 2010. These are split in the en-
ergy supply sector (35 percent, 17 GtCO2e), in agriculture, forestry and other land use (24 percent, 12 GtCO2e, net 
emissions), in industry (21 percent, 10 GtCO2e), in transport (14 percent, 7.0 GtCO2e) and in buildings (6.4 percent, 
3.2 GtCO2e) (IPCC 2014a, 7–8).
83 However, the calculation of the contribution of agriculture to global emissions varies according to the inclusion of  
variables. One estimate is 17-32 percent (Bellarby et al. 2008, quoted in Pelletier and Tyedmers 2010). The IPCC’s  
estimate is 10-12 percent, however, the IPCC does not account for land conversion effects (Pelletier and Tyedmers 
2010).
84 Pelletier and Tyedmers (2010) work with the planetary boundaries assessment of 2009 (Rockström et al. 2009).  
The safe operating space is limited by the boundary value of an atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration of 350 
parts per million, with a zone of uncertainty ranging to 550 parts per million (Rockström et al. 2009). This corre -
sponds to a global warming of two degrees Celsius over the pre-industrial level (Steffen 2012).
85 Methane has a shorter atmospheric lifetime than carbon dioxide (Ripple et al. 2013, 2).
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percent of total emissions, cow milk for 20 percent, pig meat for nine percent, and poultry meat  
and eggs for eight percent respectively (Gerber et al. 2013, xii). The exploitation of ruminants  
thus has the most significant carbon output, and within the ruminant group, emissions from cat-
tle are substantially higher than emissions from sheep, goats, or buffalos (Ripple et al. 2013, 2).
The mammoth “climate hoofprint” is ever more problematic as there is widespread evidence on 
much more ecological, healthy, and cheap plant-based alternatives. Hallström et al. provide the 
first systematic review of English peer-reviewed studies on the environmental impact of dietary 
change from 2005 to 2014 (Hallström, Carlsson-Kanyama, and Börjesson 2015). According to 
the fourteen reviewed studies,86 the shift to a vegan diet has the largest benefits in terms of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and land use demand, with reductions up to  50 percent of 
the reference value.87 
Ripple et al. (2013) show that the greenhouse gas hoofprint of beef and other ruminant meat is  
on average 19 to 48 times higher than the footprint of vegetal meat substitutes or pulses. Though 
meat from monogastric species such as pigs or chickens has a relatively low hoofprint, it is on 
average still three to ten times greater than the one of plant foods (Ripple et al. 2013, 3). And 
even the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states in its Fifth Assessment Report that 
most plant-based foods have a substantially smaller carbon footprint than animal foods (Smith 
et al. 2014, 839).
2.3.2 Change in biosphere integrity
The animal industry is the single largest cause of species extinction and habitat loss (Machov-
ina, Feeley, and Ripple 2015). The complex erodes biodiversity through various and mutually 
multiplying forms on a local and global scale. It reduces, fragments, and completely destroys 
habitats  of  wild  animals  through  either  direct  or  indirect  environmental  degradation  (Weis 
2013a, 19). Direct impact includes deforestation for grazing or crop land, the application of fer-
tilizers and pesticides, competition between feed crops and native plants and between livestock 
and wildlife, as well as transmission of livestock diseases to wildlife, and finally, grazing, tram-
pling, and defecation by farmed animals (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Eu-
rope 2014, 23; Herrero et al.  2009, 118). Indirect impact includes climate change—globally 
generated yet locally noticeable –, water and air pollution, overfertilization, and changes in bio-
86 The fourteen studies are Arnoult et al. 2010; Aston, Smith, and Powles 2012; Berners-Lee et al. 2012; Fazeni and  
Steinmüller 2011; Hoolohan et al. 2013; Meier and Christen 2013; S. Pathak et al. 2010; Risku-Norja, Kurppa, and 
Helenius 2009; Saxe, Larsen, and Mogensen 2013; Temme et al. 2013; Tukker et al. 2011; van Dooren et al. 2014; 
Vieux et al. 2012. With the exception of the Indian investigation (Pathak et al. 2010), all publications scrutinize Eu-
ropean diets.
87 The environmental impact of processed meat alternatives like tofu or tempeh has been investigated in several stud -
ies, see Hallström, Carlsson-Kanyama, and Börjesson 2015, 7.
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geochemical cycles. Species that are not able to adapt to changed conditions have to migrate or  
will simply perish (Weis 2013a, 20). 
2.3.3 Land-system change
Checking the boundary land-system change, livestock systems cover virtually inconceivable 45 
percent of global land surface (Thornton, Herrero, and Ericksen 2011, 1). The majority of this 
area is used for grazing (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014b, 6). This makes the an-
imal-industrial complex the largest land user on Earth (Herrero and Thornton 2013, 20880). In 
regard to agricultural land, and not land surface, the complex occupies 78 percent of all agricul-
tural area  (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014b, 6; Steinfeld et al. 2006, 74). The 
boundless spatial extent of the animal-industrial complex is particularly worrisome as its spread 
does not match its productivity. The complex, with its four-fifths of agricultural land, yields in 
terms of global consumption, a quarter of proteins, and a mere 13 percent of calories (Global 
Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014b, 2). The gigantic extent of the industry prompts even 
more questions as a nutritious vegan diet would reduce land use by up to 50 percent (Hallström, 
Carlsson-Kanyama, and Börjesson 2015, 3).
Almost half of global land surface has not always served as pasture or cropland. In 1850, only 
fourteen percent of all land was cropland and pastures (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran 2011, 4).  
In the past century, great areas of land and forests have been cleared and “indulged” by the ani-
mal-industrial complex. Cattle ranching in particular is responsible for 65 to 80 percent of Ama-
zon deforestation (Emel and Neo 2011, 70; Herrero et al. 2009, 114). In view of this massive ex-
tent  of  the livestock industry,  Schneider developed the thought-provoking concept  of  “meat 
grabbing” in reference to already established term “land grabbing” (Schneider 2014, 614).88 
The land used for industrial livestock and feed production is completely degraded after a certain 
period (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 31).89 Besides, existing 
pastures are often overgrazed, entailing desertification and biodiversity loss (Deutsch, Lanner-
stad, and Ran 2011, 4). Nonetheless, the conversion of new land into cropland or pasture cannot 
go on forever. Land is a limited resource. As Europe and the United States have already con-
88 Schneider defines the meat grab as follows: “Meat grabbing describes actually existing land deals undertaken for 
industrial meat production, either directly in the form of animal housing and stocking (confined animal feeding op-
erations, or CAFOs), or indirectly in the form of monocrop grain and oilseed production for livestock feed. Meat  
grabbing is also a concept for analyzing the relationships between industrial meat regimes, food security politics  
and the global land rush, relationships which have not yet been sufficiently considered in research or in policy. By  
focusing on the ways in which these relations are obscured in food security narratives, the politics and disposses-
sions that drive meat grabs and the uneven distribution of their socio-ecological implications, the concept adds 
complexity and further specifies the categorization of food-related land deals” (Schneider 2014, 614).
89 Researchers suspect heavy machinery is one major culprit, among others, in the reduction of the content of organic  
matter in the soil (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 31).
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verted much of its grassland, savannah and scrubland into agricultural land, they engage in a 
“virtual land trade” by feeding themselves on the produce of the Majority World.90 In 2010, the 
European Union has imported soybeans grown on  approximately 16 million hectares, out of 
which 12.8 million are located in South America (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the 
Earth  Europe  2014,  30–31).  Taking  account  of  these  numbers,  the  calls  for  grassland  and 
ecosystem protection issued by the Minority World—a topic to be explored in depth in sections 
5.4 and 5.7.4—seem cynical. The Minority World has already destroyed a large share of its re -
sources and now asks the Majority World not do to so in its own interest. 
2.3.4 Biogeochemical flows
Animal agriculture is the main driver of nitrogen91 and phosphorus92 cycles in agriculture and 
the primary user worldwide of reactive nitrogen as fertilizer (Sutton et al. 2011b). Pelletier and 
Tyedmers calculate a share of 63 percent of global reactive nitrogen mobilization for the animal 
industry for 2000 (Pelletier and Tyedmers 2010, 18372).93 If one considers the gigantic area oc-
cupied by the complex, these figures are probably a bit more comprehensible. Yet, the intensifi-
cation of animal production has led to a disruption of the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles for  
two reasons (FAO 2011b, 31; Herrero and Thornton 2013, 20880). First, the separation of feed 
production and animal production (the metabolic rift, see section 2.1.3) prompts a massive over-
abundance of manure—literally heaps of shit—near CAFOs, and requires artificial fertilizer for  
crop fields in other places (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 
31).94 In other words, there are nutrient concentrations in some areas and nutrient deficits in  
other areas (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran 2011, 7; Herrero and Thornton 2013, 20880). The lo-
90 Approximately 28.5 percent of European grassland, savannah and scrubland have been converted into pasture and  
cropland. In the United States, a slightly higher amount of land, 30 percent, is pasture and cropland. In Africa, 24.5  
percent have been converted, and in Asia, only 7.5 percent (own calculation based on Heinrich Böll Foundation and 
Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 31).
91 Nitrogen gas is a natural element of the Biosphere and can be fixated by plants. In the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the German chemists Haber and Bosch invented the synthetic fixation of atmospheric nitrogen (N2), hence-
forth called the Haber-Bosch process. The Haber-Bosch process converts atmospheric, unreactive nitrogen into its  
reactive form (NR). This reactive form encompasses the forms nitrogen oxide (NOx), nitrous oxide (N2O), ammonia 
(NH3), and nitrate (NO3) (Sutton et al. 2011b, 160). Reactive nitrogen is used as chemical fertilizer. In principle, an 
unlimited amount of nitrogen can be fixated through the synthetic process; however, the procedure itself is energy-
intensive and costly. Still, the amount of synthesized nitrogen fertilizer has increased from 10 million to 80 million  
tons between 1960 and 1980 (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran 2011, 7–8). This anthropogenic fixation has doubled 
global rates of total nitrogen fixation which primarily comprises biological fixation by bacteria in plants (Sutton et  
al. 2011b, 160).
92 Phosphorous is a key fertilizer for crops. Yet, in contrast to nitrogen, phosphorus is a non-renewable, limited re -
source (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran 2011, 8), and its access is increasingly difficult and costly (Kahiluoto et al.  
2014, 17). Phosphorus is either absorbed in plants, or gained by mining phosphate rock. Between 1960 and 1980, 
phosphate mining has increased from approximately 35 million tons to 150 million tons (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and 
Ran 2011, 7).
93 In a less conservative estimate,  Liverman states that 80 percent of global nitrogen production are deployed for 
meat production (Lalasz 2013).
94 The annual damage related to reactive nitrogen in the EU27 countries ranges between 70 and 320 billion Euro  
(Brink and van Grinsven 2011, 513), which exceed the total profit made in EU agriculture (Heinrich Böll Founda-
tion and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 20).
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cal nutrient surplus is not being recycled: globally, more than 80 percent of nitrogen and phos-
phorus applied as fertilizers are lost due to inappropriate manure management  (Deutsch, Lan-
nerstad, and Ran 2011, 7). Second, industrial livestock systems deploy more fertilizer-intensive 
oilseeds as feed, instead of feed gained from pastures (Bouwman et al. 2013, 20882; Hedenus,  
Wirsenius, and Johansson 2014, 85).
What happens to overabundant nitrogen and phosphorus? Nitrogen returns to its gaseous or sol-
uble ion form and moves to the atmosphere or to water bodies. Too much nitrogen in the atmos-
phere forms nitrous oxide which contributes to climate change (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran 
2011, 7). Phosphorus is accumulated in soils, but erosion precipitates run-off into water bodies.  
The two elements then impact the ecosystem. Nutrient overload in water bodies provokes eu-
trophication, toxic algae bloom, and, ultimately, anoxic bottom waters. Additionally, overfertil-
ization of the land contributes to its incapacity to filter rainwater and, eventually, to land ero-
sion.  Lastly,  nutrient  overabundance is  one important  origin for  habitat  loss  (Heinrich Böll  
Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 20–22).
The present conversion rate of nitrogen exceeds its planetary boundary excessively. The animal 
industry’s share of the safe operating space for reactive nitrogen mobilization was 117 percent  
as of 2000 (Pelletier and Tyedmers 2010, 18372). To return to the safe operating space, the con-
version rate of nitrogen would have to be reduced by 75 percent (Pelletier and Tyedmers 2010,  
18372; Rockström et al. 2009). For phosphorus, the boundary is around a tenth of the present 
phosphorus flow; however, the estimates largely differ here. A return within the boundaries 
while continuing current diets and agricultural practices would reduce the available calories per 
capita and day by over 90 percent. In contrast, a shift to a vegan or vegetarian diet and reduc-
tions in food waste (compare footnote 107) would liberate a significant amount of calories lost 
in animal production (Kahiluoto et al. 2014, 16–19).  Environmental physicist Sutton and his 
colleagues comment in the journal  Nature that “[i]f Europeans obtained all their protein from 
plants, only 30% of the crops grown currently would be needed, reducing nitrogen fertilizer in-
puts and the associated pollution by 70%” (Sutton et al. 2011b, 161).95 To understand this evalu-
ation, it is helpful to compare the grams of nitrogen needed to obtain plant-based versus animal-
based calories:  The production of one megacalorie of rice, wheat, or potatoes necessitates one 
gram nitrogen.96 Conversely, producing one megacalorie of dairy, poultry, pork or eggs requires 
three grams of nitrogen, and one megacalorie of beef even demands 19 grams of nitrogen (Eshel  
et al. 2014, 11998). In consequence, environmental scientist Bouwman et al. call livestock pro-
duction “inherently inefficient” compared to crop production (Bouwman et al. 2013, 20886). 
95 The insights led Sutton and other authors of the European Nitrogen Assessment (Sutton et al. 2011a) to craft the  
“Barsac Declaration” for a reduced consumption of livestock products (NinE et al. 2011).
96 One megacalorie is equivalent to 1,000 kilocalories.
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2.3.5 Ocean acidification
Ocean acidification is primarily caused by the increase of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
which is then dissolved in sea water (Raworth 2012, 17), yet also by nutrient overabundance 
(Eshel et al. 2014, 11996). As pointed out above, industrial livestock operations have broken the 
nutrient cycles, they store immense amounts of waste in tanks and lagoons, and excessively ap-
ply slurry and manure on fields. Discharges and agricultural run-off pollute the groundwater and 
streams (FAO 2005, 6). Thereupon, nitrogen and phosphate nurture micro-organisms in the wa-
ter and foster algae bloom. Those algae, plants and bacteria significantly reduce the oxygen con-
tent of the water. Fish and other animals can barely survive. Hence, such overfertilization and 
concomitant ocean acidification create ocean “dead zones” (hypoxic zones)—among others, in 
the Mississippi River Basin, the South China Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Baltic Sea, along the 
Spanish coast, and the Italian Adria (Emel and Neo 2011, 73; Heinrich Böll Foundation and 
Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 22). 
2.3.6 Freshwater use
With respect to the boundary freshwater use, the complex consumes a third of global freshwater  
resources yearly. This water is almost completely applied in feed production (Mekonnen and 
Hoekstra 2012, 3232; Steinfeld et al. 2006, 131, 167–68). The remainder is used to water the an-
imals and to process the dead ones (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran 2011, 5). 
The water use of the sector depends significantly on the production system. In extensive grazing 
systems, water use can be as low as zero liters per animal per day. However, in an industrial pig  
production system, for example, the water consumption is 125 liters per animal per day (Thorn-
ton et al. 2009, 117–18). This stark difference is broken down in the average caloric calculation 
that one megacalorie in form of cereals necessitates 500 liters of water on average, whereas one  
megacalorie in form of industrial meat necessitates 4,000 liters of water on average (Schneider 
2014, 615). Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2011; 2012) have calculated the water footprint of crops 
and animal products displayed in table 3.
Table 3: Typical values for the volume of water required to produce common foodstuffs.97
 
Foodstuff Quantity Water consumption, liters
Cow meat 1 kg 15,415
Sheep meat 1 kg 10,412 
Pig meat 1 kg 5,988
Butter 1 kg 5,553 
Chicken meat 1 kg 4,325 
97 Average values for 1996-2005.
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Eggs 1 kg98 3,267
Cheese 1 kg 3,178 
Rice 1 kg 2,497 
Bread 1 kg 1,608 
Milk 1 l99 1,020
Apples 1 kg 822 
Potatoes 1 kg 287 
Cabbage 1 kg 237 
Tomatoes 1 kg 214
Note. Adapted from “Global Food: Waste Not, Want Not,” by the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 
2013,  p.  12,  https://www.imeche.org/policy-and-press/reports/detail/global-food-waste-not-want-not. 
Copyright  2013  by  the  Institution  of  Mechanical  Engineers.  Reprinted  with  permission.  Data  from 
Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2011; 2012).
As shown, meat has an extremely high water footprint. Ruminant meat is the most water-inten-
sive foodstuff, with 15,415 liters for a kilogram of cow meat. The production of one kilogram of 
pig meat needs 5,988 liters, and 4,325 liters are necessary for the same quantity of chicken  
meat. Eggs and dairy require less water than meat, yet much more water than cereals, fruit, and 
vegetables. One kilogram of rice requires 2,497 liters, and the same quantity of potatoes merely 
requires 287 liters. Tomatoes have an extremely low water footprint with 215 liters of water per  
kilogram. 
The exceptionally large water footprint of the animal-industrial complex is not only an issue per 
se: withdrawing water also depletes the groundwater. Moreover, deforestation for crop land and 
pasture and changing land management practices, such as heightened grazing pressure, increase 
run-off formation (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran 2011, 5). Last but not least, according to the  
FAO report Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options, the complex is “per-
haps the leading source” of water pollution in the Minority World (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 267): it  
contaminates rivers and streams with pesticides (United States: 37 percent of the pesticides ap-
plied), with heavy metals (England and Wales: 40 percent of copper applied), with antibiotics 
and other  drug residues such as hormones,  and coliform bacteria (Emel and Neo 2011,  72; 
Sneeringer 2009, 125; Steinfeld et al. 2006, 167–68).
2.3.7 Other boundaries
98 The calculation for one kilogram eggs is based on the assumption that one egg weights on average 60 grams.
99 One liter of milk weights on average 1.02 kilogram.
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The three remaining boundaries are atmospheric aerosol loading, stratospheric ozone depletion, 
and the introduction of novel entities.100 These boundaries are either not of particular signifi-
cance for the animal-industrial complex, or lack relevant research. In addition, some boundaries, 
like the introduction of novel entities, have until date not yet been quantified, and the contribu-
tion of animal agriculture remains to be assessed. 
Little can be said about the boundary of novel entities. Novel entities are defined as “new sub-
stances, new forms of existing substances, and modified life forms that have the potential for  
unwanted geophysical and/or biological effects” (Steffen et al. 2015, 736). The animal industry 
releases or disposes of several noxious substances, like hydrogen sulfide and ammonia, airborne  
particular matter (inter alia, fecal matter and skin cells) and volatile organic compounds (Emel 
and Neo 2011, 71; Raworth 2012, 17).  Such novel entities comprise radioactive and organic 
compounds, and heavy metals like mercury or lead. Pesticides and chemical pollutants, as en-
docrine disruptors, affect the behavior of small vertebrates and invertebrates—in other words,  
they modify life forms with unforeseeable consequences (Coghlan 2004).
2.4 Societal aspects
The ecological repercussions of the animal-industrial complex outlined above,  including the 
devastating aftermaths of climate change, have a far-reaching influence on people’s lives. Pri-
marily,  they  affect  the  Majority  World,  what  has  prompted  the  concept  of  “environmental  
racism” (DeMello 2012b, 275). In the following, the focus is on the direct and indirect adverse 
effects of the exploitation of natural resources, the gigantic area and the colossal inputs like en-
ergy, water, and fertilizers the animal industry requires, and the violence it perpetuates. These 
effects include hunger and water-stress, colonization, climate injustice, brutal work conditions, 
and health issues. 
2.4.1 Hunger and water-stress101
Metaphorically speaking, farmed animals are “reverse protein factories” (Lappé 2010): about 90 
percent of calories are lost in the conversion of plant into animal matter (Godfray et al. 2010,  
100 Atmospheric aerosol loading is a consequence of burning fossil fuels and biomass. Fine particles are released in 
the air and disturb global rainfall patterns; acid rain kills fish and degrades forests as well as crops; humans suffer  
from respiratory diseases (Raworth 2012, 17).
101 The European Environmental Agency (2016) defines water stress as occurring “when the demand for water  
exceeds the available amount during a certain period or when poor quality restricts its use. Water stress causes  
deterioration of fresh water resources in terms of quantity (aquifer over-exploitation, dry rivers, etc.) and quality  
(eutrophication, organic matter pollution, saline intrusion, etc.).”
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816; Machovina and Feeley 2014).102 Section 2.1.4.1 (“Feeding capital”) summarized that ap-
proximately 35 percent of global cereal production, more than half of the global maize and 85 
percent of the global barley harvest, and the bulk of soybean production end up in feed troughs. 
In a conservative estimate, figure 5 in section 2.1.4.1 showed that cereal use for feed in the Ma-
jority World is expected to more than double by 2020 compared to 1992/94,  from 194 to 409 
million tons, and that by 2020, almost half of the global feed-grains (409 out of globally 928 
million tons) are deployed in the Majority World.103 With almost one billion people chronically 
suffering from starvation, and an additional billion mal-nourished (FAO 2016d; UNCTAD 2013, 
iii), this deployment of edible crops is sheer murder. In 2002, cereals (including rice) made up 
55 to 70 percent of the diet of people in the Majority World (FAO Commodities and Trade Divi-
sion 2002). The majority of people are themselves agricultural laborers or small farmers (UNC-
TAD 2013, iii), but counterintuitively, as elaborated in paragraph 2.1.1, many countries of the  
Majority World are net food importers.104 Structural adjustment programs, trade liberalization, 
the reduction of subsidies for domestic production, and a switch from local staple crops to cash  
crops for the global market eroded local food security, not to speak of food sovereignty. Addi-
tional factors are protectionism and heavily subsidized exported goods from the Minority World 
(Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 44–45; Jarosz 2009, 2077).105 
Jarosz reasons that
“the food crisis is a predictable outcome of an oil-dependent feedgrain-livestock complex 
supplying a meat-centric diet for those who can buy it. This complex contributes substan-
tially to climate change and is framed by neoliberal development policies, which deepen the 
commoditization of food, monetize food security and leave the world’s people vulnerable to 
periodic food price spikes.” (Jarosz 2009, 2065).
Already today, the world could theoretically be fed with current levels of cereal production 
(Holt Giménez and Shattuck 2011, 112).106 Furthermore,  approximately one third of all pro-
duced food is either lost or wasted (Small and O’Broin 2015, 173).107 Hunger is thus not only a 
102 Compare also the article “Redefining agricultural yields: from tonnes to people nourished per hectare” by Cas -
sidy et al. (2013).
103 MacLachlan maintains that 36 percent of total cereal feed grains are cultivated in the Majority World (MacLach -
lan 2015, 31).
104 Out of the 79 so-called “Net Food Importing Developing Countries” (NFIDCs), some nations have to import  
about 30 percent of their cereal consumption (Fritz 2014, 8–9).
105 For more information on growing inequality worldwide refer to Jarosz 2012.
106 Remarkably, according to an Oxfam report, just one percent of the current global food supply suffices to cover 
the caloric needs of the thirteen percent of the world’s population undergoing hunger (Raworth 2012, 5).
107 Food losses are products lost in the production process. Losses could be reduced by improving storage, harvest,  
processing, or distribution. Food waste means that products are wasted at the consumption stage. Whereas food 
losses mainly occur in the Majority World, food waste primordially takes place in the Minority World. In Sub-Sa -
haran Africa, South and Southeast Asia, per capita consumer waste is six to eleven kilogram a year, while in Turtle 
Island and Europe, the average consumer wastes 95 to 115 kilograms a year. The food that is thrown away in the  
Minority World (220 million tons) is almost as much as the entire net food production of Sub-Saharan Africa (230  
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problem of production, but a much more complex problem of distribution: hunger is a political  
issue.108 
To put matters into perspective, it helps to compare the use of grains for biofuels and for feed. If 
biofuels are objectionable, then animal feed equally is, insofar as it is the conversion of grains, a  
cheap and healthy food, into flesh, videlicet, a very expensive commodity for a societal elite. In 
2009, 16 percent of global corn production was converted into biofuel (Locke et al. 2013, 52), 
whereas 60 percent ended up in feed troughs (FAO Commodities and Trade Division 2002). In 
the same year, less than one percent of global wheat production has been used for biofuels  
(Locke et al. 2013, 52), while 17 percent was fed to farmed animals (FAO Trade and Markets  
Division 2009). And the animal-industrial complex often paves the way (or, literally, clears the 
forest)  for the production of biofuels.109 In sum, it  can be assumed that feed production for 
farmed animals is directly competing with food production for humans, and indirectly by de-
grading natural resources (Steinfeld 2004, 35)—and that this antagonism will sharpen in the fu-
ture: Demand for feed grains and their prices are projected to rise. “As a result, progress in re-
ducing malnutrition is projected to be slow,” so the almost cynical observation of the Interna-
tional Livestock Research Institute expert Thornton (Thornton 2010, 2856). 
What about water? Animal agriculture devours a third of global freshwater resources yearly 
(Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2012, 3232; Steinfeld et al. 2006, 131, 167–68). Agriculture in total  
consumes 70 percent, industries deploy 20 percent, and households consume only 10 percent of  
freshwater (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 28). As demon-
strated in paragraph  2.3.6, the production of animal-derived food requires significantly more 
water resources than plant-based food (Pimentel and Pimentel 2003). On average, producing 
one megacalorie in form of cereals necessitates eight times more water than one megacalorie in  
form of industrial meat (Schneider 2014, 615). Future intensification of the complex will entail 
million tons). Fruit, vegetables, roots and tuber have the highest share of lost and wasted food (namely 45 percent),  
20 percent of beef is lost or wasted, which is equivalent to 75 million cows. Further, 20 percent of dairy products,  
35 percent of fish, and 574 billion eggs are lost or wasted (Small and O’Broin 2015, 172–75).
108 Holt Giménez and Shattuck detect the related corporate food regime at the heart of the food crisis. They observe  
how, simultaneously with the advent of this food regime, the number of people suffering from hunger increased  
from 700 million in 1986 to 800 million in 1998 and spiked at one billion in times of the economic crisis (Holt 
Giménez and Shattuck 2011, 112).
109 Weis argues with regard to biofuels: 
“In 2007, amidst rising food prices, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food described the agrofuel  
boom as a ‘crime against humanity’. That year, roughly 100 million tons of grain (mostly maize) were converted to 
ethanol, and modest amounts of soybeans and rapeseed were converted to biodiesel […]. The same year, almost 10  
times as much coarse grain, soy, and rapeseed were used as feed, the products of which were consumed dispropor-
tionately in wealthy countries and by wealthier people within industrializing countries. Although this disparity be-
tween feed and fuel is closing fast, and it would be hard to overstate the economic, social, and environmental impli -
cations of the agrofuel boom on a world scale, at the same time it should not overshadow the need to also challenge 
the older, similarly regressive, and still bigger flows of grains and oilseeds through industrial livestock.” (Weis 
2013b, 80).
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an additional drain on water resources (Thornton 2010, 2861). At the same time, 2.4 billion peo-
ple, a third of the world population, do not dispose of a sufficient amount of freshwater (Thorn-
ton et al. 2009, 117). Out of those 2.4 billion people, 1.1 billion people have no access to clean 
drinking water at all. By 2025, this figure will rise to 1.8 billion people (FAO Water 2013), and 
almost half of humanity will be concerned by water stress (UNEP 2016). 
2.4.2 Colonization and meat grabbing
From its very origins, the animal-industrial complex, now covering  45 percent of global land 
surface,  is entangled with colonialism  (Nibert 2013). Indigenous communities have been and 
are  being  expropriated or  violently  displaced  for  grazing and crop land (Nibert  2011,  204; 
2012b, 279). The Spanish colonizers introduced ranched animals in Latin America, and with 
them, zoonosis, which killed millions of indigenous people. In the nineteenth, twentieth, and 
twenty-first centuries, Native Americans were and are displaced and annihilated for the expan-
sion of ranching operations (Nibert 2011, 197–99).110 As Schneider illustrates with the “meat 
grab,” the local population is dispossessed of their land not only at the initial land deal, but also 
later on through all the externalities of animal production, like air, land, and water pollution  
(Schneider 2014, 626). It is not that plans for building factory farms or clearing of forests to 
grow feed would not encounter resistance (Emel and Neo 2011, 75). However, the battle of in-
digenous groups or peasant movements is and has often been silenced by powerful opponents 
(Winders and Nibert 2004). In South America, outright armed conflicts have erupted due to the 
livestock industry (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 33).111
2.4.3 Climate injustice
110 In the history of the United States specifically, the colonization of vast regions was coupled with animal farming. 
The Euro-settlers introduced domesticated cows, pigs, chickens, and other farmed animals (Powell 2014b, 19).  
Livestock agriculture occupied (and still occupies) the land of the indigenous inhabitants and destroyed their tradi -
tional agricultural practices. In the words of environmental sociologist Powell, “this system […] steals land from 
people in order to enact violence on other animals” (Powell 2014a, 30–31). Today, the minimal amount of reserva-
tion land granted to First Nations in the United States sums up to 22 million hectares, compared to 248 million  
hectares used for grazing farmed animals. In this figure, the land used to grow animal feed is not included. In  
Canada, three million hectares are designated to reservation land compared to 20 million hectares grazing land 
(Powell 2014a, 30–31). Belcourt, an indigenous decolonial critical animal studies scholar, portrays “settler colonial-
ism and white supremacy as political mechanisms that require the simultaneous exploitation or destruction of ani -
mal and Indigenous bodies” (Belcourt 2015, 3). Advancing a decolonial politics of space, he portrays factory farms  
as  “violent  colonial  geographies  wherein  the  animal  body  is  subject  to  surveillance  and  death  to  produce  
capital/commodity products and sustain carnivorous food cultures” (Belcourt 2015,  4). “[D]omesticated animal  
bodies,” according to Belcourt, have to be re-theorized “as  colonial subjects  that must be centered in decolonial 
thought.” (Belcourt 2015, 3 [original emphasis]). The situation on Turtle Island might be a specific one, still, it re -
mains emblematic for the ongoing violent and (neo-)colonial expansion of the animal-industrial complex. 
111 In return for the military’s initiative to expropriate land owners in Latin America for ranching and grain fields,  
according to Nibert (2011), the animal industry provides the military with subsidized animal foods and live animals  
for military operations. For Nibert, this is one illustration of the entrenchment of the military-industrial complex 
and the animal-industrial complex. Among his other examples are the invasions of the Roman Empire that built on 
the exploitation of horses, mules, and cows as food resources, or the recreational hunting industry as an exercise in  
both weapons training and killing, as well as dominion over nonhuman animals, all by generating considerable 
profits for the armaments industry (Nibert 2014, x). 
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As elaborated in paragraph 2.3.1, animal agriculture contributes more to global warming than  
the transport sector. In international climate negotiation, it has become clear that global warm-
ing will not be halted at two degrees Celsius by the end of the century. A rise in the mean tem -
perature of four to six degrees Celsius—not improbable for the two scenarios RCP 6.0 and RCP  
8.5 (IPCC 2014b,  11–12)—would engender an immense erosion of  agricultural  output,  and 
mass hunger and starvation (Sethness-Castro 2012, 14–15).112 The  International Organization 
for Migration estimates that by 2050, there will be about 200 million “climate refugees,” or “en-
vironmental migrants.” This amount equals the current approximation of international migrants 
worldwide (IOM 2014).113 DARA international,  a non-profit  organization evaluating disaster 
risk reduction, predicts that between 2010 and 2020, five million people die of the repercussions 
of climate change, and almost all of these deaths are supposed to occur in the Majority World 
(Sethness-Castro 2012, 25). 
For indigenous people, climate injustice is a continuation of colonialism; a so-called colonial  
déjà vu  (Whyte 2017). Settler-colonialism has manifested itself in containing and ultimately 
erasing indigenous lives, through the physical confinement and the destruction of their political 
and cultural  systems.  Global  warming and concomitant  rapid  environmental  change  can be 
viewed as just another manifestation of containment. Indigenous people experience threats to  
food security, water scarcity, relocation from historic homeland, as briefly mentioned in para-
graph 2.3.1, arctic sea ice loss, and permafrost thaw (Whyte 2017, 6). It follows that “[c]olonial-
ism, such as U.S. settler colonialism, can be understood as a system of domination that concerns  
how one society inflicts burdensome anthropogenic environmental change on another society” 
(Whyte 2017, 4).
2.4.4 Brutal work
Not only the socio-ecological impact, but also the working conditions in the animal-industrial  
complex are drastic. 114 The work itself is high-speed and risky (Boggs 2011, 73), the tempera-
tures are extreme, and the atmosphere is “noisy with the cries and reeking with the stench of an -
guished animals,” according to Weis (2010, 147). It follows that the animal-industrial complex 
112 Climatologist Anderson controversially judges that only ten percent of humanity, around half a billion people,  
would survive such a warming (Sethness-Castro 2012, 14–15).
113 Nonetheless, it can be noted that the UN-discourse on “climate refugees” tends to naturalize and depoliticize cli -
mate change (Methmann and Oels 2015).
114 For reasons of scope, the situation of workers in the fishing industry cannot be portrayed in detail. In a short as-
sessment, it appears that human rights violations are repeatedly documented. Overfishing and depleted fish stocks  
lead to longer periods at sea, going further afield, and even more destructive fishing methods. To keep costs low, 
fishing fleets exploit trafficked workers (EJF 2015, 4). Overfishing of their own local sea and the deprivation of  
their livelihoods can lead fishing communities to be recruited into criminal activities or slave labor. The slave  
workers on fishing vessels endure incredible hardship, and they face physical and sexual violence, torture, and mur-
der (UNODC 2011). 
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is one of the most dangerous industries in terms of occupational physical injuries (Winders and 
Nibert 2004, 89).
The toil is precarious and offers minimal pay, organization in labor units is almost non-existent 
(Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 14; Nibert 2011, 205).115 Gen-
erally, organization of the workers is rendered impossible through language barriers. Slaughter-
houses are organized along racial and class lines. The workers are frequently migrants with  
short-term contracts by work agencies (Hamilton and McCabe 2016, 333). Moreover, the com-
partmentalized work in abattoirs inhibits the employees from gathering and working together 
(McCabe and Hamilton 2015, 96), with some facilities being fully or almost-fully automated 
(Emel and Neo 2011, 79). What is more, sexual harassment is widespread in slaughterhouses, 
particularly targeting women* of color (Nibert 2011, 205). On top of that, the employees enjoy 
no social recognition: their work is considered “dirty” and hidden from public view (Heinrich 
Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 14). It is thus not surprising that in some 
slaughterhouses,  employee turnover is almost  a hundred percent  per annum (Emel and Neo 
2011, 74). 
Most troublingly, workers in the animal-industrial complex suffer disproportionately from psy-
chological trauma (McCabe and Hamilton 2015; Torres 2007, 45).116 The sheer number of ani-
mals and the fast pace with which they have to be handled or processed provoke an emotional 
distancing among the workers (Jacques 2015, 595; Taylor, Richards, and Signal 2013, 396). The 
traumatic work is associated with negative coping strategies like substance abuse (Baran, Rogel-
berg, and Clausen 2016).117 Similarly, it heightens the propensity for violence against the farmed 
animals which functions as a form of “catharsis,” as reported by respondents (Porcher 2011, 
quoted in Taylor, Richards, and Signal 2013, 396). In a quite disturbing study on the well-being 
of slaughterers at a South African commercial abattoir, the researchers observed numerous ac -
counts of sadness, shame, fear, anger, and trauma, resulting in recurring nightmares, shivering,  
and stress among the workers (Victor and Barnard 2016). The investigation explained that, after 
the initial adjustment phase at the facility, the workers developed an emotional detachment from 
their daily tasks. They experienced short temper, elevated aggression, and a lower frustration  
tolerance that prompt violence directed towards women,* children, and pets. As one slaughterer 
maintains:
115 In the United States, corporations purposefully inhibit unionization efforts through the relocation of slaughter-
houses to regions where workers’ rights are minimal (Nibert 2011, 205; Winders and Nibert 2004, 89). 
116 For an impressive ethnography on slaughterhouse work, see Pachirat 2011.
117 Workers in U.S.-slaughterhouses reportedly take drugs like speed or amphetamines to comply with the pace of  
conveyor belts (Torres 2007, 45).
57
“I can kick it if I want to because I kill cattle every day. Kick this dog or cat so that it flies 
just because you can, you don't worry see it feels like I must hurt this other animal.” (Victor 
and Barnard 2016, no page numbers).
Emotional suppression of the violence they inflict and witness includes a feeling of invincibil-
ity, as well. A second slaughterer boasts: 
“I am not afraid anymore. I’m killing thousands of cattle. You won’t tell me, I’m not scared 
of blood; I’m not afraid to slap you with my knife” (Victor and Barnard 2016, no page num-
bers). 
The extreme acts of violence inflicted or observed every day at the slaughterhouse trigger do-
mestic abuse (Eisnitz 2007). A study by Fitzgerald et al. indicates that “slaughterhouse employ-
ment increases total arrest rates, arrests for violent crimes, arrests for rape, and arrests for other  
sex offenses in comparison with other industries” (Fitzgerald, Kalof, and Dietz 2009, 158). Not  
only the occupation, but also the mere presence of a slaughterhouse in a region significantly 
heightens the number of total arrests, arrests for offenses against the family, and arrests for rape.  
This “spillover” of violence has been termed the “Sinclair effect,” referring to Sinclair’s 1906 
novel  The Jungle (compare footnote 18). In industries employing an equally high number of 
young (solo) males and precarized immigrants, like in horticulture, there is no similar effect on 
crime in the region (Jacques 2015). In mainstream media, and, too often, equally in the animal  
protection movement, the violence these workers perpetuate is not comprehended as a structural 
problem resulting from social inequality and their brutal and dreadful work, produced and re-
produced by the animal-industrial complex (compare also section 2.2 on animals and violence)  
but as an individual act of malevolent abuse.118 
2.4.5 Health issues
Health issues and animal agriculture are entangled in a wide array of ways. 119 They stretch from 
the production of feed to the production of animals to the consumption of their body parts (Gun-
derson 2012).
2.4.5.1 Feed production
118 Political scientist Pachirat has studied the exposure of five Black and Latino workers at a turkey slaughterhouse 
run by the U.S. corporation Butterball. In an undercover investigation by an animal welfare organization in 2012,  
these men were filmed committing animal abuse and charged in the aftermath. The CEOs of Butterball joined the  
public outrage and were quick in condemning the acts and demonizing the employees, but were never held respon -
sible (Pachirat 02.03.2015). The Huffington Post, among others, reported on the incident (The Huffington Post,  
February 16, 2012). 
119 Compare two recent publications on the issue of health and sustainability: Raphaely and Marinova 2016 and 
Tilman and M. Clark 2014.
58
The use of fertilizers and pesticides in feed production has multiple health effects. Nitrogen ox-
ide in the air is associated with cough, asthma, and other respiratory diseases. Nitrate in the  
groundwater can cause reproductive problems. Pesticides contaminate water and food and can 
cause poisoning, various cancers, and nervous system damage (Gunderson 2012, 55). In many 
countries of the Majority World, pesticides that are known to be carcinogenic are still applied to 
crop fields (O’Laughlin 2016, 32).120 The prevalence of such harmful substances in agriculture 
is again a marker of inequality.
2.4.5.2 Animal production
Residents near CAFOs are directly affected by air and water pollution. Industrial livestock oper-
ations favor the development of multi-drug-resistant bacteria in natural waters (West et al. 2011, 
473), for instance the antibiotic resistant bacterial pathogen Staphylococcus aureus. Q fever, a 
fewer caused by Coxiella burnetii, bacteria mainly found in sheep, goats, and cattle and trans-
mitted through manure, is positively associated with residing near an animal factory (Casey et  
al. 2015). Coliform bacteria and nitrate from liquid manure provoke human health problems 
such as gastroenteritis outbreaks (Sneeringer 2009, 126). In the complex, heavy metals like cop-
per, zinc, or iron are used as growth promoters, yet they are not fully absorbed by farmed ani-
mals and end up in drinking and recreational water (FAO 2005, 7; Gunderson 2012, 55). Air 
pollution, mainly through ammonia and hydrogen sulfide, results in respiratory illness, perinatal 
disorders, high infant mortality, and even spontaneous abortion (Emel and Neo 2011, 71; Rule  
et al. 2005, 9649; West et al. 2011, 473). CAFOs emit hazardous gases and dispose of toxic ani-
mal waste, and there is danger of asphyxiation near sewage lagoons (Cassuto and Saville 2012, 
192). Feelings of stress and anxiety are positively associated with residing near an animal fac-
tory, too (Casey et al. 2015; Gunderson 2012). As an interviewee of western Romania, home of  
Smithfield’s 40 new hog farms, put it, “We go crazy with the daily smell” (Carvajal and Castle,  
May 05, 2009).
It is not surprising that CAFOs are located in low-income regions where communities do not 
have a say in the economic development of their region. “[P]igs, poultry or prisons” oftentimes 
represent the sole economic choices of rural areas in the United States (Emel and Neo 2011,  
120 In Argentina, the world’s biggest soy exporter, the use of herbicides has increased eleven-fold in some regions  
since 1990. Local rural populations and peasants are suffering from miscarriages and birth defects. Cancer rates in  
these regions are over ten percent higher than the national average of 19 percent (Heinrich Böll Foundation and 
Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 33).
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75).121 In the United States, CAFOs are built in regions mainly inhabited by Blacks, Latin@s, or 
Asian Americans (DeMello 2012b, 275; Lenhardt and Ogneva-Himmelberger 2015).
Farmers  and workers  inside  the  factories  are  exposed to  a  number  of  hazardous  elements,  
among them pesticides,  dust,  solvents,  and  infectious  microorganisms.  Respiratory  diseases 
from organic dust are prevalent among staff, which often spends more than 40 hours weekly in 
the facilities (Kirkhorn 2001). These respiratory conditions include mucous membrane inflam-
mation  syndrome  and  bronchitis—70  percent  of  CAFO  employees  suffer  from  the  latter 
(Kirkhorn 2001, quoted in Cassuto and Saville 2012, 192).
Animal  production  and zoonosis  threaten public  health.  Emerging new zoonoses122 like  the 
H1N1 influenza virus (“Avian flu”), BSE,123 and the  Nipah virus have triggered major global 
health crisis (Steinfeld 2004, 36–37). Animals are the origin of 70 percent of all new human ill-
nesses.  The majority  of  these diseases  comes from wildlife  and is  transmitted by livestock 
(Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014b, 3).
2.4.5.3 Consumption
The unequal geography of meat corresponds to an unequal geography of health.124 As Gunder-
son (2012, 54) articulates referring to Walker et al. (2005): 
121 A historic parallel between the animal- and prison-industrial complex is the formation of rural “cattle towns” in  
the United States during the nineteenth century, and the “prison towns” of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  
Both complexes witnessed a sharp increase in inmates in the 1970s and 1980s, due to intensified agriculture on the  
one hand, and new drug laws and subsequent mass incarceration on the other. The location, aesthetics, architecture,  
and silence of slaughterhouses and prisons are equally similar (Morin 2016), and both are environmentally pollut-
ing (Panagioti/Earth First! Newswire 2015). Moreover, both the animal-industrial and the prison-industrial complex 
deprive individuals of their freedom. In an inspiring essay on the “carceral space” shared by both human prisoners 
and nonhuman animals, Morin (2016) draws parallels between the structural, psychological, emotional, and spatial  
similarities experienced by human and nonhuman inmates. The U.S. anarchist Rayson calls prisons “the kiss of  
death to a community. They bully the whole country […] with an unhealthy, deliberately ruinous, wasteful, oblivi -
ous, and punishing mindset. They also pollute pitilessly and ‘legally’ cut local deals so they can maraud over all ar -
eas, economically and culturally. I’m talking about all the industries, factories, prisons, animal farms, military cen-
tres—all of it.” (Rayson 2006, 248). In addition, human prisoners have to engage in direct forms of animal exploita-
tion, whether butchering animals or being forced to work on farms. Concurrently, nonhuman animals are used as 
therapeutic objects to “re-socialize” inmates (Twine 2012, 16–19). And as mentioned before, the state heavily crim-
inalizes animal rights activists. Yet, not only do human prisoners have to (violently) deal with animals in prison,  
they are also compared to violent animals. They are de-humanized and portrayed as “subhuman.” Such animaliza -
tion is a societal instrument that produces and reproduces domination and ultimately renders prisoners—like nonhu-
man animals—“disposable” (Morin 2016; Twine 2012, 16–19).
122 Traditional zoonosis are, among others, brucellosis or trichinellosis (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 23).
123 BSE affects humans as Creutzfeld-Jakob disease (Steinfeld 2004, 36–37).
124 In the United States, “[h]ealth disparities between Black and white Americans are one of the worst legacies of  
slavery and colonialism,” according to the social scientist Harper. She points to obesity, heart disease, and diabetes,  
and encourages the Black population to dismiss products that impair their health (Harper 2010c, 29). The rejection 
should be a means to decolonize their bodies from the animal-industrial complex and the health/environmental  
racism it causes (Harper 2010a).
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“one billion people are overweight or obese largely due to increased meat consumption (as 
animal products are the primary source of saturated fats) while one billion people are mal-
nourished due to reduced crop availability to sustain increased meat consumption for the 
wealthy.” 
The animal-industrial complex generates thus both obesity and hunger. Both physical states can 
be a  sign of  poverty.  So-called  “food deserts”  prevail  in  economically  poor  areas.  In  food 
deserts, healthy food like fruit and vegetables are scarce and expensive, whereas high-fat, pro-
cessed food is widespread and cheap (Jarosz 2009, 2075). In fact, obesity kills three times more 
individuals than hunger and has  been defined as “the world’s  number one health problem” 
(Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014b, 2). What is more, an elevated consumption of 
animal foods has been linked not only to obesity (Rivera-Ferre 2009, 96) but also to diseases of 
affluence such as high blood pressure, diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and certain forms of  
cancer (Herrero et al. 2009, 112; Nibert 2011, 207). In countries where meat consumption is in-
creasing, the prevalence of these illnesses rises as well (Walker et al. 2005). Finally, consumers  
of animal products are additionally affected by the use of hormones and antibiotics in the indus-
try (compare paragraph 2.1.4.2) (Jarosz 2009, 2075; Steinfeld et al. 2006, 140–42)—around 80 
percent of antibiotics in the United States is administered to livestock—and by the contamina-
tion of animal foods.125 
125 Product contamination is caused by inappropriate hygiene in the production process. Salmonella or E. coli bacte -
ria, for instance, are microbes that reside in the intestinal tract of livestock (Steinfeld 2004, 37).
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PART II
3 DEALING WITH DISTRACTIONS: GREEN CAPITALISM126
“There is only one thing bigger than Mother Nature and that is Father Profit” 
(Friedman 2008, 244, quoted in Kenis and Lievens 2015, 70).
After the overview of the animal-industrial complex, this chapter outlines the theoretical per -
spective of the thesis. Animal production is predicted to double by 2050. Production must be in-
tensified, but the environmental consequences must be curbed, as well. This is the Livestock 
Revolution narrative. How can this extraordinary equation be effected? The response is “sus-
tainable intensification.” Yet what does “sustainable” mean? This chapter starts with this ques-
tion then moves on to delineate the evolution of sustainable development discourse. First, it 
traces the transformation of this discourse into green capitalism. Green capitalism, in turn, is 
generally understood as implementing environmental measures and technologies in corporate 
policies, in other words, “green” economic growth.  Yet, this chapter introduces a theoretical 
model or, rather, move with which the societal character of the oxymoron green capitalism can 
be grasped more thoroughly. On the one hand, green capitalism is understood as a move toward 
the naturalization of control and capitalism, with control here meaning societal regulation and  
ordering mechanisms. On the other hand, green capitalism is a program meant to control and 
capitalize on nature. In a nutshell, it proposes a double effect or mirror move of naturalization 
and capitalization.127 The mirror move transforms debatable social questions into either indis-
putable biological facts, or apparently apolitical issues of technology or governance. This trick 
serves as a potent distraction from political conflicts, power structures, and the dangers of the 
ongoing environmental crisis itself.
3.1 From sustainable development to green economy
The evolution of the concept of sustainable development has been extensively studied and criti-
cized,128 and its definitions heavily debated. The vagueness of the term indeed allows for prob-
lematic interpretations (Luke 2006, 99).  For some scholars, sustainable development has be-
126 Such was the title of an activist-academic zine on the climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009 (Passadakis et al.  
2009).
127 Ecofeminist theorist Wichterich observes a similar trend and speaks of an “ecologization of the economy and an  
economization of nature” (Wichterich 2015, 72).
128 Compare Jamieson 1998; Robinson 2004; Sneddon, Howarth, and Norgaard 2006.
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come a “buzzword” (Lélé 1991; Rist 2014), a “floating signifier” (Laclau, see Tregidga, Milne,  
and Kearins 2011), or even the new “governmentality” (Luke 2005). In point of fact, compa-
nies, media, the state and other actors use—and perhaps abuse—the concept as they like. There 
are sustainable cars, sustainable economies, and even sustainable beef by McDonald’s (McDon-
ald’s 2017). One crucial document in the sustainable development discourse is the Brundtland 
Report (WCED 1987); nearly every concept of sustainable development created after 1987 is in 
one way or another based on the Brundtland-definition of sustainable development. This report 
identified poverty and “underdevelopment” as reasons for the environmental crisis and hence 
proposed  economic  growth  as  the  go-to  solution  for  poverty  eradication  and  the  crisis. 129 
Poverty was portrayed as a naturally occurring, apolitical phenomenon; its counterpart, wealth, 
was  not  further  problematized  (Rist  2014).  Ideologically,  the  report  aligned  sustainable 
development with neoliberal capitalism and its limitless growth (Peet, Robbins, and Watts 2011, 
7). 
This stands in stark contradiction to the 1972 Limits to Growth publication by the Club of Rome 
(Meadows et  al.  1972),  although the report  has been marked by a deep Malthusianism and  
systems  ecology  (Peet,  Robbins,  and  Watts  2011,  2;  Weis  2010,  131),  and to  the  radical 
environmentalism of the 1970s.  Banerjee observes a corresponding discursive shift  from the 
early, rather intimidating environmental sustainability demanding radical systemic change, 130 to 
a pleasant sounding, corporate sustainability that can be promoted, precisely measured, and, ul-
timately, achieved (Banerjee 2003, 163). The relegation of the ecological dimension of sustain-
able development and the spotlight on its economic dimension has reduced sustainable develop-
ment  to  rational  environmental  management  (Luke  2005,  232).  Therefore,  Luke  equals 
sustainable development to “sustainable degradation.” Sustainable development policies do not 
halt degradation; degradation is simply “measured, monitored, manipulated within certain toler-
ances” (Luke 2006, 99). For the animal-industrial complex and the Livestock Revolution, this  
thesis proposes the term “sustainable exploitation.”
Nowadays, numerous sustainable development theories and policies focus on the marketization 
of natural resources, on efficiency gains, recycling and on the strategy of “decoupling” of hu-
man activities from natural cycles (UNEP 2011).131 These policies suggest that the limits to 
129 For a critique on the sole focus on poverty, see Satterthwaite 2003.
130 A definition of sustainable development grounded in ecology has been proposed by ecological economist Daly: 
“Limit use of all resources to rates that ultimately result in levels of waste that can be absorbed by the ecosystem. 
Exploit renewable resources at rates that do not exceed the ability of the ecosystem to regenerate the resources. 
Deplete nonrenewable resources at rates that, as far as possible, do not exceed the rate of development of renewable 
substitutes.” (Daly 2007, 34).
131 Such theories are classified as so-called “weak sustainability” approaches. Weak sustainability encompasses the 
idea of  the possibility  of  replacing “natural  capital”  through other  forms of  capital  and relies  on neoclassical  
environmental economics; whereas in its contrasting approach, so called “strong sustainability,” it is assumed that  
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growth can be “expanded” through technological innovation, and, finally, that it is chiefly prof-
itability that must be sustained. Likewise, it is contended that sustainable development has been 
transformed  into  green  economy,  or,  more  comprehensively,  green  capitalism (Kenis  and 
Lievens 2015). 
3.2 Naturalizing control and capitalism
The first move of naturalizing societal control and capitalism is to establish a strategy that legit -
imizes a certain societal order. This strategy is the ontologization and biologization of hierarchy 
and power relationships. In our case of naturalization in green capitalism, biological models , 
“natural laws,” are directly applied onto human society, and vice versa (Biehl and Staudenmaier 
2011, 19–20). The social is “ecologized” (Hajer 2000, 264). The seemingly “neutral” and “sci-
entific” character of such ecological notions naturalizes and legitimizes abovementioned power 
structures in human society (Franklin 2011). Otherwise contingent and highly political situa-
tions of inequality are de-politicized which excludes a questioning of these “facts” and a subse-
quent struggle for alternatives.  It is forgotten that those exact same biological categories are, 
first and foremost, social ones. The biological and ecological disciplines have not evolved iso-
lated from society, as separate entities; they are continuously shaped by and adjusted to societal  
vicissitudes and norms. Accordingly, the relationship ecology/society goes both ways and is a 
rather dialectical one. This chapter first portrays the imperial and racist roots of the ecological 
discipline then elucidates examples of biological models used for society.132 Next, it introduces 
modernization theory, which imagines human societies as biological, plant-like organisms de-
veloping on a linear basis and culminating in the “modern” Euro-colonizer or Minority World 
civilization. It then sketches the relationship between modernity and coloniality, as well as how 
sustainable development conveys imperial notions. Finally, the environmental degradation of al-
leged human overpopulation is compared to the one caused by the “imperial mode of living.” 
3.2.1 The racist and imperial origins of ecology
A glance at the history of ecology illustrates the intertwinement of the social and the study of 
nature. Quite fundamentally, the history and concept of ecology itself is entangled with (Euro-
pean) fascism and imperialism.133 In the late nineteenth century, a specific synthesis of romanti-
cism, environmentalism, and nationalism blossomed in Germany.134 This ideology venerated the 
some parts of “natural capital” cannot be substituted through other capital.  An approach where one assumes that 
nothing of “natural capital” can be substituted through something else would be called “very strong sustainability” 
(Beckerman 1995; Daly 1995; Robinson 2004). 
132 Imperialism is here defined as “theories and practices developed by a dominant metropolitan center to rule dis-
tant territories, by force, by political means or by economic, social, and cultural dependence.” Most often a result of 
imperialism, colonialism “involves the establishment of settlements on outlying territories.” (Banerjee 2003, 146).
133 For a more detailed account of the history of the ecological discipline, see McIntosh 1985.
134 Today, environmentalism still merges with nationalist politics in Germany. Ecology has been a main proponent  
of the Far Right wing and of National-Socialism in Germany throughout the twentieth century with its emphasis on 
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land,  peasantry,  and “racial  purity,” and despised the urbanization and industrialization that 
caused “the decline of the race” (Biehl and Staudenmaier 2011, 15–18). The founder of modern 
ecology, German zoologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), was part of this movement that was in-
fluential for the rise of German national-socialism in the twentieth century.135 Haeckel stated 
that “civilization and the life of nations are governed by the same laws as prevail throughout na-
ture and organic life” (Haeckel 1876a, 11, quoted in Biehl and Staudenmaier 2011, 19). Early 
ecology should illustrate the familiarity  between civilization and nature: The spelling of the 
word “ecology” itself was, after extendedly debating the versions æcology, æecology, or öcolo-
gie aligned to the spelling of “economy,” hereby underlining the “correlation between nature’s  
and society’s economy” (Anker 2001, 1). 
The unholy alliance of nature conservation and racism took place in the United States, as well,  
where the creation of national parks was intrinsically linked to the destruction of Native lands 
for the “conservation of the Great Nordic race”—a conservation which was not a “matter […] of 
racial pride,” but “of love of country”, as Henry Fairfield Osborn, head of the New York Zoo-
logical Society and the board of trustees of the American Museum of Natural History, wrote.  
Wildlife conservation went hand in hand with eugenics; the nobility of nature and the “human 
race” were to be protected against the reproduction of the “paupers,” the physically “unhealthy,” 
or “Mediterranean” populations.136 U.S. romantic naturalist John Muir  and U.S. author Henry 
David Thoreau both understood “American greatness” as a  white nation, they both imagined 
white farmers as “symbolically native” and blissful to the land.137 Some four-legged “animal 
people”—megafauna—were to be preserved, while the actual Native Americans, the “dirty Indi-
ans,” were to be driven out and extinguished (Purdy 2015).138 In essence, nature in the United 
States is raced: it has “turned white” in the twentieth century, with the eradication of the First  
Nations, but “was very dark before that” (Kim 2015, 153–54).139 
“blood and soil” (Olsen 2000). 
135 Haeckel developed “monism,” a principle based on evolutionary theory, ecological holism, and völkisch ideology 
(Biehl and Staudenmaier 2011, 18).
136 Such pseudo-scientific arguments were advanced by Madison Grant, an early environmentalist and white su-
premacist, in his book The Passing of the Great Race, or The Racial Basis of European History  (Grant 1916), for 
which he was congratulated by Theodor Roosevelt,  a proponent of land conservation, and Adolf Hitler (Purdy 
2015).
137 In the nineteenth century, the land, nature, and wilderness were additionally regarded as healthy places where 
(heterosexual) masculinity could be perfected—in contradistinction to an intoxicated, polluted, and fast-paced ur -
ban environment that created crime, decadence, and homosexuality (Mortimer-Sandilands and Erickson 2010, 13–
15). 
138 Haeckel claimed: “Now, the mental differences between the lowest men and the animals are less than those be-
tween the lowest and the highest men” (Haeckel 1876b, 366). Hitler echoed this statement some decades later  
(Purdy 2015).
139 Political scientist Kim defines race as “a means of producing and disciplining different and inferior bodies” (Kim 
2015, 15) and thereby builds on Omi and Winant’s Racial Formation in the United States (Omi and Winant 1994). 
Sociologist of race Winant illustrates the contingency of race as a social category: 
“At its most basic level, race can be defined as a concept that signifies and symbolizes sociopolitical conflicts and  
interests in reference to different types of human bodies. Although the concept of race appeals to biologically based 
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In the British colonies, ecology was one strategy and scientific legitimation used to order and 
control “material and human resources” (Anker 2001, 2–3). Ecology thus has a distinctively im-
perial tradition (Anker 2005, 240).140 In the beginning of the twentieth century, the development 
of purebred animal breeding went hand in hand with political racism (Da Cal 1992) and the ide-
ology of “racial” and “class hygiene.” Class hygiene meant that the lower classes should be dis-
couraged to reproduce (Skabelund 2008, 356). This—albeit less apparently racist—misanthropy 
continues today in postulations of the problem of “overpopulation” (resonating with Ehrlich, au-
thor of  The Population Bomb of 1968). Whereas in the first half of the century, the prevalent 
“solution” was (forced) sterilization of the poor, the contemporary method is (forced) popula-
tion planning (Purdy 2015; Weis 2010, 132).
The connection between ecology and oppression is continued in current examples of environ-
mental racism. Environmental racism refers to the condition that groups who are discriminated 
against because of their race disproportionately suffer from environmental hazards, be it land-
fills, mines, pollution through resource extraction or factories, or the general consequences of  
climate change and environmental degradation (Pellow 2016, 2). Environmental racism in the 
animal-industrial complex has been exemplified in chapter two.
3.2.2 Natural and social systems
In the war-torn world of the first half of the twentieth century, ecology, a scientific mode of or-
dering nature and society gained popularity (Anker 2002, 612). A specifically successful con-
cept was the ecosystem.141 Ecosystem theory is a specific framing of nature as stable and that, if  
disrupted, it eventually returns to a certain kind of equilibrium. Whereas the concept of ecosys-
tem theory originated in the nineteenth century, it only gained popularity in the 1960s with the  
rise of systems analysis and computer science (Montague 2015; Müller 1997, 141). In the words 
of ecologist O’Neill, “Systems Analysis dealt with complex systems as interconnected compo-
nents with feedback loops […] that stabilized the system at a relatively constant equilibrium 
point.” (O’Neill 2001, 3275–76). The application of systems analysis to ecology (and therefore 
its evolution from a “soft” to a “hard” science) resulted in systems ecology. Systems ecology 
human characteristics (phenotypes), selection of these particular human features for purposes of racial signification 
is always and necessarily a social and historical process. There is no biological basis for distinguishing human  
groups along the lines of race, and the sociohistorical categories employed to differentiate among these groups re-
veal themselves, upon serious examination, to be imprecise if not completely arbitrary” (Winant 2000, 172 [original  
emphasis]).
140 Compare Anker’s work Imperial Ecology: Environmental Order in the British Empire, 1895-1945 (2001), and 
Ax et al.’s Cultivating the colonies: Colonial states and their environmental legacies (2011).
141 An ecosystem is defined as “a unit comprising a community (or communities) of organisms and their physical  
and chemical environment, at any scale, desirable specified, in which there are continuous fluxes of matter and en -
ergy in an interactive open system.” (Willis 1997, 270 [original emphasis]). 
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compared nature to a machine. This helped to deal with the complexity of nature: to reduce 
complexity, some factors were being ignored or de-emphasized using computer modeling, simu-
lations,  and applied mathematics  (Willis  1997,  269).  Furthermore,  as  the public understood 
what a machine was about, the application of systems analysis helped to explain natural phe -
nomena (O’Neill 2001, 3275–76). Concretely, the central goals of systems ecology were (and 
are) the prediction of ecological change and emergent properties, predicting responses to distur-
bance, and testing theories of ecosystem (self-) organization (Montague 2015).142 
After several decades using the hypothesis, ecosystem theory has progressively become criti -
cized within ecology and has been called a “myth” (O’Neill 2001) or a “fantasy” (Curtis, June  
09, 2011).143 From the social sciences, the ecosystem concept has, not surprisingly, faced criti-
cism as well. Why? Systems analysis, the computer science and therefore innately human enter-
prise, was not only applied to ecology. It was equally used to understand human society as a 
natural system. Two of the founding principles of ecosystem theory were cybernetics and hier-
archy theory. Society turned into an ecosystem: a hierarchically structured, self-regulated entity 
with a natural order and equilibrium.144 After the Second World War, cybernetics forecasted so-
cietal upheavals and pre-calculated such “feedbacks” in order to better answer and pacify upris-
ings (Müller 1997, 142–43). Once the societal order was disturbed, so the theory, it had to be re-
established and brought back to equilibrium by countering the shocks. 
142 One origin of applied ecosystem research in the United States was military research to produce “self-sufficient  
closed ecological systems” for bunkers, submarines, and spaceships. In a loop, the findings from this “cabin ecol -
ogy” were applied to “Spaceship Earth” (Anker 2005, 239–40). Cabin ecology was for example used in the adven-
turous creation of “Biosphere 2” in Arizona of 1991 (Anker 2005, 240; Curtis, June 09, 2011).
143 Two ecological criticisms of ecosystem theory are that it assumes, first, spatial closure, and second, balance. 
First, an “ecological whole” is empirically difficult to define, and ecological situations are constantly changing. It is  
hence unclear where an ecosystem begins and ends, in space and time. Second, there is no consensus about the pur-
ported “balance” of ecosystems because there is a lack of any precise quantitative yardstick. Claims about balance 
are always imprecise: Shrader-Frechette declares that “there may be some sort of stability or balance for a given  
species within a certain spatial scale, but not for other species, or not within another such scale,” moreover, “there  
is no universal level (across species, populations, or communities) at which some balanced or stable whole exists” 
(Shrader-Frechette 2001, 308–9). In fact, if ecosystems are analyzed by a species list, the ecosystem with the short -
est—impoverished—list will be the most “stable.” The notion of stability, hence, becomes blurred; over time, every 
ecosystem will get unstable. The analysis thus depends on the scale of time and space (O’Neill 2001, 3277). Conse -
quently, recent research in ecology has abandoned the model of balance and equilibrium in favor of a more dy -
namic approach to nature, studying change, shifts, and complexity (Botkin 1990; Lidström et al. 2016, 25). In gen -
eral, the scientific discipline of ecology, studying living beings and their relationships with the environment, is, due  
to its broadness and all-encompassing nature, imprecise and not predictive (Shrader-Frechette 2001, 304). Historian 
of science Kingsland defines ecology as ‘the study of patterns in nature, of how those patterns came to be, how they 
change in space and time, why some are more fragile than others’ (Kingsland 1995, 1)” (Shrader-Frechette 2001,  
304). Ecological problems are very complex; they are constantly evolving and involve uncertainty and numerous  
parameters. Basic ecological terms like “species” or “community” are necessarily vague. Every ecological situa-
tion, every biological element is unique (Besek and McGee 2014, 77; Shrader-Frechette 2001, 310–11). 
144 As a matter of course, competing paradigms to grasp “nature” have existed throughout space and time. For in-
stance, sociologist Franklin describes how the notion of an ordered, stable “ecosystem” stands in opposition to  
Aboriginal perspectives on land and nature. Aborigines use the notion of “landscape” whose shape, species, and  
number of inhabitants are in constant change, thus lacking a normative perspective of how a landscape is supposed  
to look like or be composed of (Franklin 2011, 213–14; Warren 2007, 434).
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One corresponding case in point of systems ecology discourse in society is resilience theory and 
“resilient populations” in face of climate change.145 International Livestock Research Institute 
expert Thornton writes for instance that  actions are needed that “increase or restore resilience 
where this is threatened” (Thornton et al. 2009, 114).  However, models like “resilient popula-
tions” transport the image that catastrophes like droughts or inundations are simply “natural  
shocks,” and that order will be re-established. The responsibility looks neutral, and the effect as 
well. Concepts like resilience thus hide societal struggles, ever-changing power dynamics, and 
inequality (Hornborg 2009, 252).
A final example of systems ecology and the entanglements of society and ecology are “invasive 
species.” Its fixation on pristine nature, purity, and nationalism bears a striking resemblance 
with the brown origins of ecology. Invasive species are generally defined as “nonnative species 
that have detrimental effects on ecosystems and/or economies” (Tuminello 2013, 502). The in-
vasive species debate is at its core about control: it is dominated by the fear of a “noncompliant  
nature,” of nature not providing anymore the raw material for the extractivist economy (Kim 
2015, 152). The argument thus accentuates the “social nature” of species (Franklin 2011, 196 
[original emphasis]).146 The non-compliance of invasive animal or plant species is transferred to 
the undesirability of human “invaders:” The seemingly unbiased, ecological debate on invasive 
species serves as a naturalization of nationalist and racist campaigns against human immigrants 
and immigration as such. Human migrants are thus animalized, and nonhuman invasive species 
are racialized (Kim 2015, 153).147
145 The planetary boundary authors define resilience as the “capacity of the Earth system to persist in a Holocene-
like state under changing conditions” (Steffen et al. 2015, 1259855-2).
146 The hybridity of the category of “species” itself adds to the controversy of defining invasive species. The tradi-
tional “fertility argument”—if two subjects can reproduce, they constitute a species—does not apply to a number of 
species that can reproduce with members of other species. Further, such a definition relies on a problematic “repro-
centric” mindset: a species’ “success” is measured in its capability to reproduce. “Healthy” habitats are those where 
by definition heterosexual reproduction is flourishing. When species engage in erotic activities without reproduc -
tion, the habitat must be unhealthy, contaminated. Although the world is full of non-reproductive sex, it is “fre -
quently read as a sign of ecological decline”—a remainder of the nineteenth century where homosexuality was seen  
as a degeneracy caused by environmental factors such as urbanization and industrialization (Mortimer-Sandilands  
and Erickson 2010, 10–11).
147 Depending on their positive or negative impact on the economy, native species can become nonnative and inva-
sive (Tuminello 2013, 502); conversely, profitable non-native species can become “naturalized” (Franklin 2011,  
213–14). The “charisma” and beauty of species also plays a role in their naturalization; examples for such natural-
ized species are deer or trout (Franklin 2011, 213–14), and wild horses and boars in the United States (Tuminello 
2013, 502). The designation of invasive species depends very fundamentally on whether species “behave” or not,  
whether they conform to human expectations or economic plans (Besek and McGee 2014, 89). Migrants are com-
pared to “invasive species” that threaten the health of local ecosystems, occupy their niches, drive away its “right-
ful” inhabitants, “socially pollute” (Olsen 2000, 74), and, eventually, destroy them. In reality, the “more economi-
cally threatening a species is perceived to be, the more deeply it is racialized” (Kim 2015, 155). Unmistakably, the  
analogy is made to a disruption of the “natural” societal order and its legitimate members. “In the same way that  
ecology matches the right organisms to a given ecosystem, nationalism matches the right people to the right terri -
tory” (Franklin 2011, 198). The “nationalist fantasy” of native animals contains national legitimacy as land owners, 
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3.2.3 Modernization theory and development
“Historical change cannot be linear, one-directional, sequential, or total.” 
(Quijano 2000, 554).
The ecologization of the social and the naturalization of dominion equally manifest in sociologi-
cal theory. The modernization theory of the 1960s (Rostow [1960] 1991) provided such a reduc-
tionist, plant-like account of society. Modernization theory postulates a linear development of 
all human societies that culminates in the “modern” Euro-colonizer, or Minority World, civi-
lization. In this perspective, countries of the Majority World are still “developing” and must 
make up for lost time on their way to the top. The reasons for their “underdevelopment” are said 
to be internal, endogenous factors like “traditional” political structures, inner conflicts, insuffi-
cient integration into the world market, and so on. It is the “noble duty” of the Minority World 
to  support  these  countries  in  their  “development”  through investment  in  key industries  and 
transfer of know-how. 
Modernization theory might be academically outdated, but still lurks today in global politics  
and, unsurprisingly, in development policies. The whole idea of development itself implies that 
there is one unique, universal direction for all human societies to grow and “ripen” (Rist 2014).  
The specific and separate historic path of the Minority World is then labeled “development” and 
applied onto other countries to blame them for their “underdevelopment” (Mohanty 1984, 352–
53). This unidirectional evolutionism was an important feature of colonial relations, too. Europe 
was and is comprehended as the final stage, the culmination of the evolution of civilization, ac-
cording to the sociologist Quijano (Quijano 2000, 542):
 
“the  Europeans  persuaded  themselves,  from the middle of  the  seventeenth  century,  but 
above all during the eighteenth century, that in some way they had autoproduced them-
selves as a civilization, at the margin of history initiated with America, culminating an in-
dependent line that began with Greece as the only original source. Furthermore, they con-
cluded that they were naturally (i.e., racially) superior to the rest of the world, since they 
had conquered everyone and had imposed their dominance on them” (Quijano 2000, 552).
it reinforces national values, and transports that “others” are not welcome (Franklin 2011, 197–99). Nature is por -
trayed as part of the (white) nation (Kim 2015, 153; Lidström et al. 2016, 25).
69
Any non-European culture is relegated to a form of “ignorant, uncivilized past,” or “state of na-
ture” (Quijano 2000, 552–53).148 The superiority of the European colonizers was underpinned 
and naturalized via the social construct of race (Quijano 2000, 534–35).149 
Modernity is thus closely interconnected with coloniality. Latin American subalternists under-
stand coloniality and modernity as “two sides of a single coin” (Grosfoguel 2004, 327; Ramnath 
2011, 29–30)—especially as modernity maintains itself through constant primitive accumula-
tion processes in former colonies (Assis Teixeira and Rocha Franco 2015). Quijano’s “colonial-
ity of power” (2000) encapsulates the colonial nature of modernity. Today, the “core zones” of 
the capitalist world system (Wallerstein) still dovetail with predominantly white societies, and 
racial/ethnic  hierarchies  are  constitutive  of  the  global  division  of  labor  (Grosfoguel  2004, 
320).150 In addition to the colonial aspect, Hornborg grasps modern development as a “spatially 
restricted process of capital accumulation” which in modernization theory is just passed off as 
temporal difference (Hornborg 2009,  245). It  is not perceived as “here” in terms of a local  
specificity, but as “now” in terms of a chronological universality. With this move, inequalities  
in societal space are defined as different stages in time (Hornborg 2009, 256).151 
3.2.4 Imperial sustainable development
“In the early phases of colonization, the white man’s burden consisted of the need to ‘civilize’ the non-white peoples 
of the world—this meant above all depriving them of their resources and rights. In the latter phase of colonization, 
the white man’s burden consisted of the need to ‘develop’ the Third World, and this again involved depriving local 
communities of their resources and rights. We are now on the threshold of the third phase of colonization, in which 
the white man’s burden is to protect the environment—and this too, involves taking control of rights and resources 
148 As a matter of fact, for Quijano, the dualisms “primitive-civilized, magic/mythic-scientific, irrational-rational, 
traditional-modern” can all be linked to the Europe/not Europe dualism (Quijano 2000, 542). In addition, these du-
alisms feed into the current, Eurocentric developing/developed distinction (Winant 2000, 174).
149 Taken all together, these elements—evolutionism, dualisms, and naturalization of power differences through race
—are constitutive for Eurocentrism (Quijano 2000, 552–53). In Blaut’s terms, the dominant Eurocentric view of the 
centre (Europe) versus the “otherwise sterile periphery” is the “colonizers model of the world” (Blaut 1993, cited in  
Evren 2012, 314).
150 Current discussions of a “post-colonial,” “decolonial” or “post-racial” world (Harper 2010b, 20) obscure the con-
tinuation of racial and colonial hierarchies (Grosfoguel 2004, 320). According to Winant: “Despite the enormous 
vicissitudes that demarcate and distinguish national conditions, historical developments, roles in the international 
market, political tendencies, and cultural norms, racial differences often operate as they did in centuries past: as a  
way of restricting the political influence […] of all those at the bottom end of the system of social stratification”  
(Winant 2000, 182).
151 More generally, anarchist decolonial scholar Ramnath defines modernity as 
“The expansion of the rationalized state, functioning through mechanisms of surveillance, policing, discipline: gov-
ernmentality exercised through bureaucratic enumeration and management of populations, resources, and so on;  
and the recognition of such a state as one unit among a mutually reinforcing system of units; The incorporation of 
more and more goods, commons, natural resources, land, water, labor, time, space, minerals, crops, genetic infor -
mation, cultural materials, raw materials, manufactured/processed products into the logic of a global capitalist econ-
omy, subject to quantification as alienable and exchangeable commodities on the world market rather than local use  
values; An exponential increase in technology, industrialization, scientificity—especially with regard to communi-
cation and transport—and the fossil-fuel-based energy regime” (Ramnath 2011, 28–29).
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[…]. The salvation of the environment cannot be achieved through the old colonial order based on the white man’s 
burden. The two are ethically, economically and epistemologically incongruent” 
(Mies and Shiva 1993, 264–65, quoted in Banerjee 2003, 143).
Mies and Shiva draw a line from colonialism, development, to environmental protection. Hence,  
the theme of imperialism is detectable not only at the roots of modern (white, affluent) environ-
mentalism but also in contemporary environmental politics, such as the view of sustainable de-
velopment as a universalist, white “savior fantasy” (Franklin 2011, 195). The impartial charac-
ter and universalism of the environmental discourse  hides its political aspect.  Environmental 
conservation is almost always a form of control (Peet, Robbins, and Watts 2011, 28); it de-
mands an authority who decides what should be conserved, and how. This authority is, today, 
most often the (colonial) state, granting property rights to itself, or to individuals and corpora-
tions. Consequently, conservation can lead to more corporate power over resources (Peet, Rob-
bins, and Watts 2011, 27–31). Similarly, sustainable development serves as a way of managerial 
control of the Majority World (Baker 2007, 301–2). The Minority World, with its environmen-
tal regulations, passes both as the green avant-garde and as a yardstick for the “bad pupils” in  
the Majority World, according to modernization theory. It is perceived as necessary to regulate,  
control, and redirect the dealing with nature in the Majority World along the lines of this shining 
green example—ultimately, in favor of green capitalism. For post-development theorists, 152 sus-
tainable development is an attempt to sell old wine in new bottles, masking the failure of the de-
velopment concept with appealing, green adjectives (Morse 2008, 343).153 “The Third World, 
still in need of development, now needs to be told how to develop sustainably” (Banerjee 2003,  
174). Although most colonies are officially abolished, the colonizer/colonies relationship is per-
petuated in “North/South,” “developed/developing,” and likewise in sustainability discourses 
and practices. For Banerjee, commonalities of coloniality and sustainable development are “the 
domination of physical space, reformation of the natives’ minds (particularly in terms of knowl-
edge systems and culture), and incorporation of local economic histories into a Western per-
spective.” Sustainability relies on a colonial mindset, either by the picture of the “pristine na-
ture” that  must  be conserved,  or  the “savage wilderness” that  must  be tamed and managed 
through Minority World technology. The physical space is governed by such diverse practices 
like biodiversity management, ecotourism, or eucalyptus plantations absorbing carbon dioxide 
(Banerjee 2003, 148). In the Minority World, on the other hand, biodiversity has been severely 
decreased, among others via the drainage of European wetlands in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
152 The post-development movement generally critiques the top-down, hierarchical discourse on development, the 
colonial gesture of rich nations to influence and, again, rule over “developing countries,” and the failure of develop-
ment to eradicate hunger, install social justice, etc. as such (Morse 2008, 341–42).
153 Sustainable development is yet another form of Minority World hegemony, “nice sounding words and ideals, but 
in fact nothing more than business as usual given that ‘progress’ equates to consumerism, industrialization and in-
evitable pollution.” (Morse 2008, 343).
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centuries in order to get rid of malaria (David Simpson 2011, 18); biodiversity management, the 
securing  of  the  remaining  genetic  resources,  thus  ultimately  accommodates  the  Minority 
World’s interests (Doyle 1998, 776–77). Conservation projects have, in some cases, been per-
petuating such a colonial environmentalism; for instance, the establishment of many national  
parks or reserves by urban Euro-settler elites has expropriated and expelled its original inhabi-
tants (Peet, Robbins, and Watts 2011, 27).154
3.2.5 “Unsustainable” population versus Imperial mode of living
Environmental discourse continues to include not only imperial, but also the “class hygiene”  
and  Malthusian  arguments  mentioned  above.  “Unsustainable”  human  overpopulation  and 
poverty are depicted as causes for environmental degradation (Hajer 2000, 263; Lélé 1991; Pas-
sadakis et al. 2009). Nonetheless, the contention against population growth relies on an error of 
category. Between 1820 and 2010, humanity grew by a factor of 6.6. Meanwhile, carbon diox-
ide emissions rose by a factor of 654.8: 
“David Satterthwaite juxtaposed rates of population growth to rates of emissions growth in 
the quarter-century between 1980 and 2005, and found that numbers tended to rise fastest 
where emissions grew slowest, and vice versa (Satterthwaite 2009). The rise of population 
and the rise of emissions were disconnected from each other, the one mostly happening in 
places where the other did not—and if a correlation is negative, causation is out of the ques-
tion. A significant chunk of humanity is not party to the fossil economy at all: hundreds of  
millions rely on charcoal, firewood or organic waste such as dung for all domestic purposes. 
Satterthwaite concluded that one-sixth of the human population ‘best not be included in al-
locations of responsibility for GHG emissions’ (Satterthwaite 2009, 547–50). Their contri-
bution is close to zero. Moreover, 2 billion people, or nearly one-third of humanity, have no 
access to electricity” (Malm and Hornborg 2014, 65). 
In conclusion, what is decisive is not necessarily the number of people but their way of produc-
tion and consumption. 20 percent of the global population consumes 80 percent of the world’s 
resources. Still, poverty is seen as the number one threat to the environment, as the primary 
cause of degradation. “The poor” are portrayed as a globally homogeneous category (Doyle 
1998,  776),  and affluence and industrialization are seldom problematized.  Banerjee draws a 
154 Those forms of environmental protection have been labeled “environmentalism of the rich” (Avila-Garcia and 
Sánchez 2012). Avila-Garcia and Sánchez describe how conservation and biodiversity “protection” mainly occur  
for the benefit of tourism and private investors and do not “structurally disturb the logic of capitalist accumulation.”  
(Avila-Garcia and Sánchez 2012, 54). The “environmentalism of the poor,” conversely, has a very different aspect 
(Guha 2000; Martinez-Alier 2002): it is about resistance, a struggle for survival, for the protection of land against 
corporate projects, pollution, and aggressive biopiracy. Banerjee almost cynically describes the environmentalism 
of the rich as—after having elegantly exported the extraction of raw materials, nasty industries, and concomitant  
degradation to the Majority  World—being concerned with aesthetics,  protecting some endangered species  and 
beautiful beaches to sunbath on (Banerjee 2003, 158–59).
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comparison between slash-and-burn agriculture, which is often condemned, whereas huge tim-
ber companies are applauded for “sustainable” initiatives. The talk of “global sustainability” de-
flects criticism of the biggest emitters and the most wasteful industries and globalizes the re-
sponsibility for environmental  degradation (Banerjee 2003,  157–59).  Like this,  the Majority 
World is bearing the dangers and costs of ecological degradation, while the Minority World  
profits from it (Bullard and Müller 2012, 59). Malm and Hornborg rectify the relationship be-
tween greenhouse gas emissions and population:
“as of 2008, the advanced capitalist countries or the ‘North’ composed 18.8% of the world 
population, but were responsible for 72.7 of the CO2 emitted since 1850, subnational in-
equalities uncounted. In the early 21st century, the poorest 45% of the human population ac-
counted for 7% of emissions, while the richest 7% produced 50%; a single average US citi-
zen—national class divisions again disregarded—emitted as much as upwards of 500 citi-
zens  of  Ethiopia,  Chad,  Afghanistan,  Mali,  Cambodia  or  Burundi  (Roberts  and  Parks 
2007).” (Malm and Hornborg 2014, 64).155
The political ecologists Brand and Wissen have theorized this inequality as the “imperial mode 
of living” which they define as “dominant patterns of production, distribution and consumption” 
rooted in the “everyday practices of the upper and middle classes” of the Minority World and 
Majority World. The mode of living is imperial because it appropriates labor power, resources, 
as well as ecological sinks of the Majority World (Brand and Wissen 2012, 548). A product of 
geopolitics, trade, corporate strategies, and globalized definitions of a “good life,” the imperial 
mode of living has become normalized and even linked to societal progress (Brand and Wissen 
2012, 549). This acceptance and normalization hide the violent character of the imperial mode 
of living, as it is directly entangled with the “imperiled life” of the Majority World (Sethness  
2010).  Truly  imperial,  the  lifestyle  is  conquering  the  Majority  World,  in  particular  China,  
Brazil, and India. For Brand and Wissen though it is a matter of time until the clashes of the fos -
silist forms of production and consumption with the ecological limits of the Biosphere become 
more virulent and violent (2013, 690).
3.3 Controlling and capitalizing on nature
“How long before bottled fizzy water is reframed as Carbon Capture & Storage?” 
 (Haynes 27.08.2015).
155 Finally, people disposing of large economic and cultural capital who think of themselves as “environmentally  
conscious”—the LOHAS so to say –, in reality have a bigger ecological footprint than people with lower economic  
and cultural capital and no self-ascribed “green consciousness” (Brand and Wissen 2012, 552). LOHAS stands for  
“Lifestyles of Health and Sustainability.”
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“Making America the world’s greenest country is not a selfless act of charity or naïve moral indulgence. 
It is now a core national security and economic interest” (Friedman 2008, 23). 
“What could be more patriotic, capitalistic, and geostrategic than that?” 
(Friedman 2008, 203, cited in Kenis and Lievens 2015, 70).
Green capitalism’s second mirror move is to control and capitalize on nature. The following  
section scrutinizes the theoretical underpinning of this move: ecological modernization theory,  
the green version of its predecessor, modernization theory. The section then outlines the basic 
features of ecological modernization, the corresponding model of “neoliberalizing nature,” the 
perception of nature as a market, and finally, approaches the application of ecological modern-
ization in agriculture: sustainable intensification. 
3.3.1 Ecological modernization theory
Ecological modernization is a social theory from the 1980s with a political agenda arguing for a 
viable and even profitable combination of environmental  conservation and economic profit. 
This arrangement is fostered through voluntary regulations and new technologies (Hajer 2000, 
248; 2015, 61). Here, societies of the Minority World are placed on top of a linear, societal de-
velopment because of their “advanced” industrial environmental protection.156 Sustainability is 
framed as a problem of inefficiency which can be solved with a technological fix (Birch, Levi-
dow, and Papaioannou 2010, 2898). In this eco-modernist discourse,  insufficient industrializa-
tion, technological innovation and growth are the root cause of the ecologic dilemma. Conse-
quently, the ecological crisis—which reportedly has been caused by extractivist growth and in-
dustrialization—must be counteracted with even more of the same (Hajer 2000, 254). Hajer 
summarizes five core elements of ecological modernization: 
“(1) it believes “decoupling” of economic growth from environmental degradation is 
possible; (2) it regards environmental degradation as a problem of collective action, to 
be overcome by coordination and better incentive setting; (3) it makes environmental 
damage calculable hence it seeks to allow for an analysis of costs and benefits of envi-
ronmental  pollution; (4) it  seeks to internalize environmental  costs into mainstream 
calculations, whether that is on the level of business and corporations or in terms of 
the analysis of macro-economic performance, thus ‘greening the economy’; (5) it has a 
firm belief in the potential of technological and social innovation.” (Hajer 2015, 61–62 
[original emphasis]).
156 Moreover,  these (neither  transparent  nor  disinterested)  “green” production standards in  the Minority  World  
broaden the gap between corporations in the Majority World that are unable to comply with these environmental 
regulations (Redclift 2005, 217).
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The Environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis is an example of ecological modernization theo-
rizing. The curve represents environmental degradation as an inverted U-shaped curve relative  
to affluence. It states that the early stages of development and economic growth are marked by 
environmental degradation; nonetheless, with rising affluence, nature becomes a “luxury good” 
that will be protected. Empirical studies actually show that the Environmental Kuznets curve  
can apply to a local context, if it is, for example, a matter of air pollution. However, on a global 
scale, economic growth in fact aligns with environmental degradation. This is because a country 
simply externalizes  its  production sites  and waste  to  other  nations;  and predominantly,  this 
transfer goes from the Minority to the Majority World. In consequence, a country never gen-
uinely reduces, but in contrast exports its environmental effects (Besek and McGee 2014, 82–
83). Indeed, the resource consumption of the Minority World has steadily grown since the mid-
1980s. Resource extraction in the Minority World itself has diminished. Conversely, the import 
of resources from the Majority World, and the export of its waste to the Majority World have  
multiplied (Brand and Wissen 2013, 697). This relocation of environmental hazards in “clean” 
production schemes to other,  more powerless places disqualifies the Environmental  Kuznets 
curve.157 
Regardless of this externalization, ecological modernization argues that it is not only possible to 
solve the environmental crisis with innovation, management, and economic growth, it is even a 
win-win situation (Hajer 2015, 61). This striking reflection can perhaps be summarized with the 
revised saying that you can “have your cake and eat it” (Szerszynski 2000, 130). Ecologic regu-
lations  are  now even expected to enhance economic productivity,  fostering innovations  and 
business opportunities and thus being an engine for growth (Hajer 2000, 248–49).  Public-pri-
vate partnerships are more and more important; the crisis of multilateralism (as apparent in cli-
mate  change  negotiations)  has  conferred  leadership  opportunities  upon  the  business  sector 
(Wichterich 2015, 72). The new “corporate social responsibility” departments of corporations 
(and non-governmental organizations) install “flanking measures” for the “community”—ser-
vices that were, it is understood, formerly provided by the state, and that are expected to miti-
gate environmental degradation (Birch, Levidow, and Papaioannou 2010, 2900; Castree 2008a, 
142, 147).
3.3.2 Neoliberalization of nature
Presenting itself  as the  only developmental path (Pepper 1998,  3),  ecological  modernization 
furthers not only an economic agenda, but a social and environmental project, as well (Hajer 
2000, 257). It is a rationalization and technicization of ecology, converting it from a social issue 
157 Besides, efficiency gains in production are generally neutralized by higher output and consumption, a situation 
called “rebound effect” and theorized as the “Jevons’ Paradox” (Alcott 2005; Langhelle 2009, 412).
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into a market (Hajer 2000, 262–63), hence the designation of “free market environmentalism” 
(Castree 2008a, 147; Pepper 1998, 5). Its foundation is the “neoliberal ethic:” that the free mar-
ket should be the core principle ruling or governing our life, our economic, political, social, and 
environmental relations (Birch, Levidow, and Papaioannou 2010, 2900).158 Indeed, ecological 
modernization is an innately neoliberal project, and corresponds to a “neoliberalization of na -
ture” (Castree 2008a; 2008b). Nature is neoliberalized through a variety of—sometimes contra-
dictory—processes: Nature is privatized (meaning that formerly communally owned, un-owned, 
or state-owned environmental phenomena like land are privatized), and marketized (meaning 
that phenomena which had no price before and/or have not entered the global market now enter  
market exchange), which will be examined more thoroughly in the following subsection. Nature 
is liberalized, for example in resource trade. Nature is deregulated and re-regulated: environ-
mental protection is deregulated, “rolling back” the state and its interference in environmental  
matters; while new environmental regulations are enacted (Birch, Levidow, and Papaioannou 
2010, 2900; Castree 2008a, 142, 147).
As a managerial response to the environmental crisis, ecological modernization was a decisive  
break with the ecological discourse of the 1970s. In point of fact, it is the neoliberal, repressive  
answer  to  the  radical  environmental  movement  of  the  1970s  that  demanded  revolutionary 
change and not mere reforms. Ecological modernization silenced contentious disputes and an-
tagonistic issues of the decade (Hajer 2000, 248–49; 2015, 61–62), along with co-opting the ter-
minology of transformation of the environmentalists (Wichterich 2015, 71). The success of the 
eco-modernist discourse was confirmed by its adoption in the Brundtland Report in 1987—the 
hallmark document of ecological modernization—and in the Agenda 21 at the United Nations 
Conference of Environment and Development in Rio 1992 (Hajer 2000, 249, 254). The green 
economy was one focal point at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in  
Rio  2012  (Jessop 2012).  Today,  ecological  modernization  manifests  in  policies  around  the 
world and in organizations like the OECD, the World Bank, and the International Monetary 
Fund (Hajer 2015, 62). The thesis will examine its expression in international food and agricul -
tural institutions like the FAO and in the animal-industrial complex more broadly.
3.3.3 Nature as a market
In the view of ecological modernization, former attempts to discursively grasp environmental 
protection, like “nature conservation,” failed: these attempts gave nature an intrinsic value that 
could not be operationalized (Fish, Winter, and Lobley 2014, 55). Ecological modernization, 
158 Kim defines neoliberalism, taking off in the 1970s, as “the implementation of certain types of policies—fiscal  
austerity, privatization, market liberalization, and governmental stabilization—designed to promote the operation of  
free markets and stymie any public efforts to impede or control them. […] What is distinctive under neoliberalism  
is the aggressive pervasion of market values into many previously nonmarketized aspects of social and political  
life” (2015, 142). 
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then, successfully conceptualized nature as a market, albeit  “the protection of nature is ulti-
mately for the purpose of its enlightened exploitation” (Rolston III 2001, 403). This discursive 
transformation of nature into natural resources and hence the conflation of business with the 
nonhuman environment resulting in a “green economy” constitute a quite singular evolution in 
human history (Luke 1995, 58).159 
To  not  only  discursively  transform nature  into  a  market,  resources  have  to  be  propertied.  
According  to  ecological  modernization  theory,  establishing  such  property  rights  and  then 
determining  their  price,  ensures  the  sustainable  exploitation  of  resources  and  avoids  the 
“tragedy of the commons” (Pepper 1998, 5). Nature should not be regarded as a sink or a free 
good (Hajer 2015, 28). In this form of neoliberal primitive accumulation, traditionally common 
goods are  privatized for  corporate  profit  and local  communities  are  stripped of  their  usage 
rights.
However, it is not only the use of natural resources that is commoditized; pollution is as well. 
Environmental degradation is, according to ecological modernization, a mere “matter of ineffi -
ciency” that  can be resolved through the right  technology and regulative framework (Hajer  
2000, 249; Szerszynski 2000, 116). Damage can be integrated into economic calculations as an 
externality (Hajer 2000, 251).160 Carbon dioxide emission certificates are a prominent example 
of allocating a price to environmental damage (Langhelle 2009, 395). Creating such tradable 
certificates was one of the principal strategies of the United Nations Framework Convention on  
Climate Change (signed at the Rio Conference in 1992 and put into force in 1994), and the Ky-
oto Protocol  (signed in  1997)  to  combat  climate  change.  The Convention and the Protocol 
aimed to make institutions pay for their emissions, thereby boosting the efficiency of production 
(Brand and Wissen 2013, 696). Under the Kyoto Protocol’s offset scheme “Clean Development 
Mechanisms” for instance, affluent countries invest in mitigation projects in the Majority World 
and can thereby meet their own national mitigation obligations (Gerber et al. 2013, 93). The Rio 
Conference further gave birth to the Convention on Biological Diversity which became binding 
international law in 1993. To protect biodiversity, its chief approach was to commercialize ge-
netic resources (Brand and Wissen 2013, 696–97).161 Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran  from the 
Stockholm Resilience Centre highlight the importance of biodiversity conservation in unam-
biguously economic terms: 
159 Luke observes a discursive shift from the terms “nature” to “environment” in the second half of the twentieth 
century, and progressively, the environment is broken down to its (alleged) parts—like ecosystems—in order to  
measure it (1995, 60–63).
160 Externalities are economically defined as “situations where a market exchange imposes costs or benefits on oth-
ers who aren’t party to the exchange” (Stiglitz 2010, 15).
161 The access and gains of such commercialization are still up to negotiation (Brand and Wissen 2013, 696–97).
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“Maintaining this natural capital, with a portfolio of species, provides insurance that the sys-
tem will be able to cope with disturbances and shocks, such as fires or pest outbreaks, and 
still continue to provide desired ecosystem services, e.g. feed crops, and if damaged, rebuild 
and regain productivity” (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran 2011, 7).
“Paying to conserve,” “selling it to save it,” aligning preservation with economic processes, or,  
more generally,  the  capitalization of  nature,  is  thus  not  mere  discourse  but  has  resulted  in 
concrete  policies.  Other  cases  besides  carbon  trading  or  biodiversity  are  “natural  capital 
accounting”  or  “green  accounting,”162 the  United  Nations  Reducing  Emissions  from 
Deforestation  and  Forest  Degradation  (REDD  and  REDD+)  initiative,  and  payments  for 
Ecosystem Services (Wichterich 2015, 73). Despite the allegations of mythology discussed in 
the paragraph 3.2.2, and the difficulties of setting spatial and temporal boundaries, ecosystem 
theory is  still  alive and kicking.163 Payments for Ecosystem Services is  a utilitarian,  policy-
oriented framework and defines nature as a “system producing flows of benefit” (Fish, Winter, 
and  Lobley  2014,  55  [original  emphasis]).  Still,  although  it  is  widely  recognized  that  
ecosystems  are  of  immense  value,  their  exact  financial  valuation  lacks  consensus.  This  is  
especially  the  case  for  services  delivered  to  a  global  public.  Existing  estimates  of  global 
ecosystem  services  are  criticized  either  for  “underestimating  infinity”  or  for  calculating  a 
numerical value that exceeds global income which in turn would make it impossible to account 
for  any  damage  (David  Simpson  2011,  6–7).164 This  dilemma  challenges  the  purpose  of 
measuring nature with money in the first  place, which ignores incommensurable values like 
aesthetics or sacredness,  and the ethical  and political  aspects of  resource use and territorial  
rights (Fish, Winter, and Lobley 2014, 53; Rodríguez Labajos and Martinez-Alier 2013).165 
162 Green accounting is “a popular term for environmental and natural resource accounting, which incorporates envi-
ronmental assets and their source and sink functions into national and corporate accounts” (Rodríguez Labajos and  
Martinez-Alier 2013, 493).
163 Two prototypical institutions evaluating ecosystems are the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, a multi-million 
USD enterprise by over 1,300 scientists analyzing change of ecosystems and their services (with the insight that 15  
of the 24 scrutinized ecosystems were being degraded); and the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services (David Simpson 2011, 4–5).
As ecosystem theory is still the dominant paradigm in ecology, parts of this thesis, especially in chapter 2.3 on  
planetary boundaries,  equally—albeit  sceptically—rely on studies  clearly taking ecosystems as  their  analytical 
point of departure.
164 In 1997,  Costanza et  al.  have assigned an average yearly value of  33 trillion USD to the entire  biosphere 
(Costanza et al. 1997). An updated version of the paper augments the figure to 125 trillion USD (Costanza et al.  
2014).
165 Still, in this world dominated by numbers, it can be an interesting thought experiment to contrast the revenues  
from ecosystems with the damages done to them. The Think Tank Trucost examined the profits of the biggest in -
dustries worldwide, and then contrasted those figures with the externalized costs of environmental degradation (as -
sessing the costs of emissions, water consumption, land use, waste, and air, land and water pollution). Whereas al -
most no business would be profitable would it internalize the costs, the livestock industry shows the biggest dis -
crepancies regarding revenue and caused damage. The natural capital cost of global cattle ranching and farming 
constitutes 710 percent of its revenue, meaning that it causes more than 7 times more resource-damage in monetary  
terms than it actually makes. For South America, the ratio is particularly high: 353.8 billion USD in natural capital 
costs opposed to a revenue of 16.6 billion USD, which equals a ratio of 18.8 (Trucost 2013, 9).
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3.3.4 Sustainable intensification
In contemporary agriculture and in the Livestock Revolution a policy field in line with ecologi -
cal modernization is sustainable intensification.  In true fact, the Livestock Revolution and the 
highly inefficient production of animal protein are the primary reasons why there is a perceived  
need for sustainable intensification—and, as will be shown in chapter five, sustainable exploita-
tion of farmed animals—in the first place. The industry-model of sustainable intensification lit-
erally unites the two principles of innovative environmental protection (“sustainable”) and old-
fashioned economic growth, or productivity increase (“intensification”). 
In their article “Sustainable Intensification in Agriculture: Premises and Policies,” Garnett et al. 
define sustainable intensification as 
“a call to increase food production from existing farmland in ways that place far less pres -
sure on the environment and that do not undermine our capacity to continue producing food 
in the future.” (Garnett et al. 2013, 33). 
While sustainable intensification has been integrated in national and international policies (the 
FAO has been working with sustainable intensification since the 2000s, and it is a policy prior -
ity through the “Save and Grow” program,166 there is also a growing contestation of the concept 
(Garnett et al. 2013, 33).167 The term is simultaneously viewed as an oxymoron, a description, or 
an aspiration.168 Essentially, there are two competing paradigms. The first paradigm is a continu-
ation and expansion of high-tech, industrial agriculture, known for mechanization, simplifica-
tion of crop management, heavy machinery, increased input of external resources, bigger depen-
dency on fossil fuels and technology, and exploitation of economies of scale. In 2009, the Royal 
Society’s publication “Reaping the Benefits”—the most quoted reference on sustainable intensi-
fication—summarized that “no techniques or technologies should be ruled out” (The Royal So-
ciety 2009, ix).  This statement served as a legitimization to label all sorts of biotechnology as 
166 “Save and Grow” is a strategy for “sustainable crop production intensification through an ecosystem approach”  
and is being promoted in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe (COAG FAO 2014). See also FAO 2011c;  
2016i.
167 The FAO Homepage on “Sustainable Crop Production Intensification” reads: 
“The need to feed a growing population is a constant pressure on crop production, as is coping with an increasingly  
degraded environment and uncertainties resulting from climate change—and the need to adapt farming systems to 
these. Sustainable crop production intensification provides opportunities for optimizing crop production per unit  
area, taking into consideration the range of sustainability aspects including potential and/or real social, political,  
economic and environmental impacts. 
Recent trends would indicate that the incorporation of scientific principles of ecosystem management into  farming 
practices can enhance crop production (yield). With a particular focus on environmental sustainability through an 
ecosystem approach, sustainable crop production intensification aims to maximize options for crop production in -
tensification through the management of biodiversity and ecosystem services” (FAO 2016j).
168 The origins of sustainable intensification de facto lay in African small-holder agriculture (Garnett and Godfray 
2012, 8). Today, it is instead considered the successor of the Green Revolution (Collins and Chandrasekaran 2012,  
5).
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“sustainable,” including genetic and ecological engineering.169 Agribusiness and multinational 
biotech companies have subsequently been advertising their methods and products under the 
guise of sustainable intensification (Collins and Chandrasekaran 2012, 5). In this approach, sus-
tainability is solely defined as “eco-efficient productivity” that supports the future accumulation 
of capital (Birch, Levidow, and Papaioannou 2010, 2913). Boyd, Prudham, and Schurman re-
flect: 
“The desired result, of course, is higher yields, shorter turnover times, improved disease re-
sistance, etc. Nature, in short, is (re)made to work harder, faster, and better.” (Boyd, Prud-
ham, and Schurman 2001, 564). 
The second paradigm is agroecology.170 Agroecology, in turn, asks for a fundamental change in 
agriculture. Building on local farmers’ and indigenous knowledge and resources, and paying at-
tention to the social and economic context, it aims to maintain biodiversity and ecosystem ser-
vices, such as pollination, soil fertility, water use, pest and disease control (Meyer 2014, 15). 
The “harder, faster, better” framing of sustainable intensification assumes that food production  
must augment significantly (additional 60-120 percent) to feed the growing world population by 
2050.171 The academic discourse and policy documents are fixated on the supply-side of higher 
yields, without ever touching upon the demand-side of reforming consumption, in particular the 
consumption of highly inefficient animal foods (Garnett and Godfray 2012, 12). Garnett and 
Godfray maintain that it is “inaccurate to link sustainable intensification with a defined require-
ment for a specific increase in food production. The link between the two must be broken” (Gar-
169 The world’s largest fertilizer corporation, Yara International, for instance, is a sponsor of climate smart agricul -
ture, a sustainable intensification strategy promoted by the World Bank (Collins and Chandrasekaran 2012, 6–7).  
Another instrument of sustainable intensification is precision agriculture,  “digital  agriculture,” or “information-
based crop management,” defined as the “spatially variable management of crop production.” Precision agriculture 
is applied in all the stages of production, applying nutrients or manure, controlling weed, managing water and dis -
eases. Advanced and new technologies are applied, such as “satellite-supported positioning systems, yield mapping,  
remote sensing, sensor technologies, geo-information systems, various rate application techniques, and decision 
support systems” (Meyer 2014, 15).
170 One definition of agroecology is “the integrative study of the ecology of the entire food systems, encompassing  
ecological, economic and social dimensions, or more simply the ecology of food systems.” (Francis et al. 2003,  
quoted in Wezel et al. 2009, 3). Agroecological research can take place on three different scales: on the plot and  
field scale, on a farm and agroecosystem scale, and at a global scale, investigating the whole food system. Never-
theless, in addition to being a scientific discipline, agroecology constitutes a farming practice and a social and polit-
ical movement. Its interpretations differ from country to country. Primarily in Germany, it is an academic disci-
pline, in France, a farming practice, in Brazil, a movement, in the United States, a science and social movement. In  
Brazil, the agroecology movement promotes small-scale agriculture, rural communities, food sovereignty and au-
tonomy (Wezel et al.  2009). In Latin America, while building on indigenous farming traditions, agroecological  
practices include “conservation of natural resources, adapted soil fertility management and conservation of agrobio-
diversity” (Wezel et al. 2009, 4).
171 In fact, at a 2008 United Nations world food security conference, the FAO argued that food production must be 
doubled in order to feed the growing human population. Though the claim has been relativized since, the message  
has taken hold (Collins and Chandrasekaran 2012, 5).
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nett and Godfray 2012, 15). Yet, the productivist model still pushes for boosting yields.  Con-
cerns about famine and “overpopulation” (Collins and Chandrasekaran 2012, 23) are instrumen-
talized to justify intensification and agricultural expansion, structural changes, and extension of 
private  property regimes (Birch,  Levidow,  and Papaioannou 2010,  2910).172 Yet,  instead of 
feeding the people, such processes are ultimately feeding corporate profits. They have a top-
down approach involving scientists rather than the farmers themselves, they promote hybrid 
seeds, genetic modification, or biofortification, and prioritize global supply chains over local 
food sovereignty (Collins and Chandrasekaran 2012, 15):173
 
“Sustainable intensification claims to include agro-ecological farming practices but in prac-
tice seems to focus primarily on technology-based approaches. It aims to help small farmers 
but is driven by the agendas of corporations, the science establishment and international 
donors” (Collins and Chandrasekaran 2012, 22). 
3.4 Ecological contradictions and evasion
As one might guess, the promise of ecological modernization and, ultimately, of sustainable de-
velopment, that is, the promise to combat the ecological crisis with environmental regulations 
and “poverty” with green growth, has shown itself to be unfulfilled and unfulfillable. Global in-
equality and environmental destruction continue to escalate (Foster 2003; Görg 2011, 43–44). 
Humanity is facing an ecological collapse—156 percent of the Earth’s biocapacity was used in  
2012 (Global Footprint Network 2016), and this notwithstanding nearly fifty years of interna-
tional efforts to attain sustainable development. 
The basic contradiction of capitalism is that it is based on endless growth in a world with finite  
resources. Further, it exploits nature in such a way that it undermines its own basis of existence 
(Görg 2011, 50). A similar paradox is that human beings have become the biggest power on 
Earth and have altered the environment according to their needs (or, mostly for the needs of  
capital;  compare  critical  accounts  of  the  Anthropocene:  Malm and  Hornborg  2014;  Moore 
2014a; 2014b), yet, they seem to have no remedy to counter the increasing number of environ-
mental catastrophes and crossings of planetary boundaries.
172 In reality, small-scale farmers provide the bulk of domestically consumed food in Africa, Latin America and  
Asia, and not industrial agriculture (Collins and Chandrasekaran 2012, 22).
173 Genetically modified organisms are traded as one sustainable intensification strategy. The four major genetically 
modified crops are soy, maize, cotton and oilseed grape—none of them are primarily produced for food purposes.  
The majority of soy and maize are used as animal feed, cotton is a cash crop, and oilseed grape is primordially pro-
cessed for edible oil, but increasingly used in biofuels (Collins and Chandrasekaran 2012, 16).
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In addition, at no point in history has the scientific understanding of the human impact on the  
biosphere been greater, and more widely shared by people everywhere. Still, this information  
does not lead established forms of politics to take action on a global level  (Biro 2011, 4–5; 
Brand and Wissen 2013, 688). What are the reasons for this paradoxical situation? There is a 
sort  of  “willful  [sic]  production  of  ignorance  and  scientific  ambiguity”  when  it  comes  to 
knowledge about environmental crisis.174 A strategy of evasion and distraction is to side-track 
the catastrophe to  occur  “sometime” in  the  future.  Climate  change is  a prominent  example 
where legitimacy and the authority of knowledge—as in the case of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on  Climate  Change—are  questioned  by  powerful  actors  like  governments  or  corporations.  
Governments,  for  example,  fear  that  slowing  down  the  fossilist  economy  would  be 
economically and socially troublesome, and then they shift  the problem to the international 
sphere,  to UN “Earth Summits” and “non-enforceable Protocols” (Peet,  Robbins,  and Watts  
2011). Sanbonmatsu notes, referring to the Parisian Climate Change Summit COP21:
“A top stage illusionist like David Copperfield can make a Lamborghini vanish right under 
the noses of his audience. But that is nothing compared to what played in Paris, where the  
world's political elites made the global warming crisis itself disappear—by creating the illu-
sion of decisive action, where in fact there was nothing. 
[…] [T]he illusion of action in Paris may in fact prove worse than no action at all. For it has 
left the public with the mistaken impression that the climate crisis is now going to be dealt 
with, perhaps even solved, on the cheap, in half-measures, and without disturbing the pow-
erful  economic and social forces that profit from ecological  destruction. And that is the 
greatest deception of all” (Sanbonmatsu, January 07, 2016).
Ecological modernization thus magically manages the crisis through first, giving the impression 
of solving the crisis via externalizing the damages to the Majority World, and second, by its val-
orization in capitalist terms, by making money with it (Brand and Wissen 2013, 692–93). Still, 
glossing over the issues with a thick green polish does not really make them disappear. Global  
capitalism still depends on the overuse of natural sinks and resource exploitation (Brand and 
Wissen 2012, 548). In essence, ecological modernization disregards the biophysical contradic -
tions of capitalism—the limits to growth in the finite system of Earth (Hajer 2000, 255; 2015, 
61): the very same limits defended in the 1970s, before sustainable development was co-opted  
by green capitalism. Boggs concludes: 
174 Notwithstanding the serious evasion and deceptions, the reliance on expert knowledge poses problems as well.  
Whereas science is a fundament of political ecology, science is historically also a part of the problem. Science is  
not value-free, it is developed and conducted with a specific interest, and today often stems from powerful actors, 
such as the military. Science from the Minority World overrides local, traditional knowledge, so Peet, Robbins, and  
Watts (2011, 31, 38, 40). The question remains: If the paramount degradation has been caused by the Minority  
World, why should the solutions stem from the very same actor? (Bullard and Müller 2012, 59; Hajer 2000, 258).
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“Spurred by unfettered corporate expansion, neoliberal globalization thus subverts ecologi-
cal balance by its very logic, and an often neglected component of this downward cycle is 
animal-based agriculture. Neoliberalism legitimates its unsustainable practices on a founda-
tion of technocratic arrogance, mythological belief in free-market economics, an instrumen-
tal view of nature, and contempt for other species.” (Boggs 2011, 79–80).
To wrap up this critical overview of ecology, sustainable development, and green capitalism,  
the relationship between the used concepts should be clarified, albeit in a simplified, but not -
withstanding instructive manner.
       
Figure 7: Terminological clarification.
Figure 7 illustrates the rapport between the terms sustainable development, ecological modern-
ization theory, and green capitalism on the one hand, and sustainable intensification and the pro-
posed term of “sustainable exploitation” on the other.
The first box represents society and nature, standing in a dialectic relationship. Green capitalism 
is perceived as an economic and social order, and therefore also a system ordering nature. The 
origins of sustainable development in the 1970s, on the other hand, encompass ecological theory 
that criticized resource exploitation in capitalism (Georgescu-Roegen 2013) and that claimed 
that endless economic growth—the basis of capitalism—was not feasible in a finite world.
However, the neoliberal decades of the 1980s and 1990s, the neoliberalization of nature and the 
reduction of sustainable development to green growth transformed sustainable development the-
oretically and practically into green capitalism. The theoretical fundament for this transforma-
tion is ecological modernization theory.
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Within this form of socio-ecological relations, there are agricultural practices. One such practice 
is sustainable intensification, outlined in subsection 3.3.4. One crucial share of contemporary 
agriculture is the livestock industry. For the livestock industry, this thesis proposes that the term 
“sustainable exploitation” is parallel to sustainable intensification in agriculture. The term aims 
to underscore the commodification of sentient beings and the bloody and violent character of  
the complex.
Finally, the sketch bears the form of a credit card in order to accentuate the common core of  
those theories and practices: the profit imperative.
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4 METHODS
With the linguistic turn in social sciences, and the growing importance of communication and 
media, sociological discourse analysis has become increasingly popular.175 In its most radical 
sense, the linguistic turn designates that there is “no knowledge of reality which is independent  
of language, or discourse, […]  all  knowledge is discourse” (Hughes and Sharrock 2007, 328 
[original emphasis]).  Discourse analysis relies on the view that knowledge is socially condi-
tioned. There is no such thing as “neutral” knowledge: knowledge is a tool of power. As a con-
sequence, public policy scholar Hajer boldly states that “power structures of society can and 
should be studied directly through discourse” (Hajer 1995, 55). 
To study power structures in the animal-industrial complex and to investigate practices of natu-
ralization and capitalization on the basis of stakeholder documents is equally the aim of the fol -
lowing discourse analysis. This chapter lays down the methods of the thesis. After an introduc-
tion to sociological discourse analysis, the concrete methodological steps are presented, from 
the choice of the sample, presentation of core actors to a discussion of the instruments of analy-
sis and interpretation.
4.1 Sociological discourse analysis 
First elaborated as a linguistic method, discourse analysis has been transformed and established 
as a qualitative research method for the social sciences.176 The work of Foucault has been highly 
influential in inquiries on hegemonic subjects and social mechanisms of exclusion by the fields 
of postcolonial, cultural and gender studies. In the last decade, discourse analysis has been insti-
tutionalized  within  the  social  sciences  and  has  differentiated  into  a  heterogeneous  field 
grounded in social constructivism (Keller 2013, 1, 58–59). German sociologist and discourse 
analyst Keller (2013) categorizes the most prominent contemporary European streams in dis-
course  analysis  as  discourse  theory (Foucault,  Mouffe,  Laclau),  Critical  Discourse  Analysis 
175 This popularity can be witnessed in the quantitative rise in monographs, book series, journals, conferences, and 
seminars on the issue.
176 Discourse analysis is indeed primarily a qualitative research method; a purely quantitative approach is very sel -
dom chosen in the field (Lazaraton 2002, 32). Whereas quantitative analysis is interested in numbers, in how often  
something appears, and is performed rather “mechanically,” qualitative analysis inquires into the “why and how” of  
something, which is the goal of discourse analysis. Nevertheless, this does not obviate the need for small-scale 
quantitative counts, for instance, in order to estimate the importance of a specific category. To clarify, the insight 
that a category appears seldom or not at all is also insightful (Lazaraton 2002, 33). Such a quantitative assessment  
of the use of terms like “nature,” “efficiency,” or “poverty” in the Livestock Revolution discourse is presented in  
appendix 3. 
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(Fairclough, Wodak, van Dijk), the sociology of knowledge approach (Keller) and the German 
Critical Discourse Analysis (Jäger).177
Hajer has examined the environmental discourse of acid rain policies in the UK and the Nether-
lands. In this early, yet still topical examination, he defines discourse as:
“A specific ensemble of ideas, concepts,  and categorizations that are produced, repro-
duced,  and transformed in a particular  set  of practices and through which meaning is 
given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1995, 44).
Discourse analysis studies the (re)production and transformation of this ensemble and, thereby,  
the (re)production and transformation of social order. Discourse analysis is thus not solely about  
ideas, but rather about material reality (Jäger and Maier 2013, 168). Policies, for example, only 
make sense according to a certain definition of a problem (Foucault 1990). To illustrate: today, 
as migration is defined as something negative, it must be prevented. Here, we can engage with 
Foucault (1994) about the “conditions of existence” of certain ideas and the impossibility of 
other ideas. Some arguments simply cannot be brought forward. In addition to the argument in 
question, the source of the claim is also vital. Both what can be said, and who can say it, is re -
stricted. Thus, Hajer calls discourses exclusionary, asserting that “[t]he political conflict is hid-
den in the question of what definition is given to the problem, which aspects of social reality are 
included and which are left undiscussed.” The aim of discourse analysis is thus to reveal the po-
litical conflict and to understand why a certain definition dominates over others (Hajer 1995, 
43–44). The normal or mainstream character of some discourses hides its arbitrariness, and that  
it is a result of negotiation and power play (Hajer 1995, 56–57). Discourse analysis includes ob-
serving “how seemingly technical positions conceal normative commitments” (Hajer 1995, 55). 
To return to the initial statement that discourses are a means to study power structures, in a very 
fundamental way, discourses are about power. They exercise power “because they institutional-
ize and regulate ways of talking, thinking and acting” (Jäger and Maier 2013, 166). Keller ex-
emplifies their intervening and dynamic nature by defining discourses as 
“more or less successful attempts to stabilize, at least temporarily, attributions of meaning 
and orders of interpretation, and thereby to institutionalize a collectively binding order of 
knowledge in a social ensemble” (Keller 2013, 2).
On a practical level, the basis, or primary data of discourse analysis are texts. Yet, in contrast to  
linguistic discourse analysis, sociological discourse analysis is not interested in particular lin-
177 Keller has published extensively in German (see, for instance, Keller et al. 2005; 2011; Keller 2008; 2011), but  
this thesis will only reference his useful discourse analysis textbook in English (Keller 2013).
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guistic peculiarities (Keller 2013, 2). Another specificity is that discourse analysis is primor-
dially invested with “naturally” obtained documents; this means that the data should be already 
available and not generated in the course of research (Hughes and Sharrock 2007, 328; Taylor 
2013, 59–60). The choice of print media diminishes the risk of transforming the research object  
through interaction, as it exists for example in interviews (Mautner 2008, 32). 178 Moreover, the 
fact that the texts in question have already been published signifies that they have gone through 
a process of scientific and political evaluation and, eventually, approval. Mautner writes that 
this selection process is always “conditioned by economic, political, cultural and social struc-
tures.” Nonetheless, these structures are obscured in everyday life which makes the results look  
completely “unbiased.” Discourse analysis reveals the conditions that brought the texts into be-
ing and thereby discloses their situated character (Mautner 2008, 33–34). 
4.2 Applied methods
In the following section, the concrete methods of this thesis are demonstrated. The ulterior mo-
tives for explicating the whole process in detail are, on the one hand, to be as methodologically 
transparent as possible, and, on the other hand, to assist students in performing their own stud-
ies.179 
4.2.1 Self-reflection
One decisive insight of discourse theory is that there is no place outside of a discourse, no exter-
nal,  objective viewpoint for a scholarly investigation. Science is a discourse, as well (Hajer  
1995, 49). The researcher is influenced by dominant discourse and will contribute either to its 
hegemony by reproducing it, or they will add to a competing discourse.180 In any case, they are 
inescapably embedded in a relationship with discourse. In order to be intelligible, it is hence es-
sential to be transparent and accountable in the methodological procedure. This means docu-
menting, explicating, and legitimizing the choices of data, the applied codes and concepts, the 
instruments of analysis, the problems encountered in the process, and so on. In a nutshell: it 
means to be self-reflective (Mautner 2008, 37). Self-reflection equally includes laying out the 
reasons for choosing a specific discourse and research topic in the first place. The position and 
interests of the researcher necessarily influence any discourse analysis they undertake. In this  
thesis, the motivation and positioning of the author are demonstrated in the introductory chapter. 
4.2.2 Sample
178 Yet, for sociology, a discourse encompasses not only discursive practices like texts, but also non-discursive prac-
tices (for example, slaughter) and materializations (say, slaughterhouses). Altogether, these elements form a dispos-
itive (Jäger and Maier 2013, 170). In this thesis, however, the focus is on discursive practices.
179 Another useful instruction can be found in Methmann and Oels 2015.
180 In allyship with trans and gender-nonconforming identities, the thesis applies the gender-neutral pronoun “they.” 
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4.2.2.1 Choice of data and access
The specificity of discourse analysis is that not just one single document, but a multitude of 
texts and their historic and sociopolitical context are scrutinized (Jäger and Maier 2013, 169). 
However, a complete discourse analysis does not require an endless amount of data. The re-
searcher collects fragments until they perceive repetitions in the arguments of these texts. The  
discourse is then completely “saturated,” to apply the jargon of discourse analysis (Keller 2013, 
100). 
One challenge in the sampling procedure of this project was to clearly frame the discourse of  
the Livestock Revolution and to close it off from neighboring discourses, such as the environ-
mental consequences of the livestock industry, which is a burgeoning field of study. The selec-
tion criteria are explicated in the following paragraphs.  The data can roughly be split in two 
groups. The first  group consists of documents discussing the Livestock Revolution; thus, its 
content was decisive. The second group of data has been selected solely on the basis of author-
ship: the multi-stakeholder partnership “Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock.” A list of the 
entire sample, comprehending virtually one hundred texts, is provided in appendix 1.
4.2.2.1.1 Documents on the Livestock Revolution 
Throughout the years 2014, 2015, and 2016, key publications on the “Livestock Revolution” 
have been searched in a cyclical sampling process. The conditions for including a document in  
the sample were that it was: published in English; publicly available online; contained the key-
words “Livestock Revolution” in the title or body of the text; authored by international institu-
tions such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Interna-
tional Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) or the International Livestock Research Institute 
(ILRI), the reasons for which will be explicated below, and/or of international scope and signifi-
cance. The goal was to systematically assess and cover the whole discourse until saturation, as 
described above. This included Google searches with the keywords “livestock revolution.”181 
The discourse fragments examined here lead to more results, following the trail of their refer-
ences. In order to situate the fragments, their authors are indicated throughout the analysis. The 
timeframe of this sample stretches from the first recorded mention of the Livestock Revolution 
181 FAO publications retrievable online were explored in a more targeted manner: Both the FAO publication section 
(http://www.fao.org/publications/en/  accessed  June  7,  2016)  and  the  FAO  online  Document  Repository 
(http://www.fao.org/documents/en/ accessed June 7, 2016) have been examined. An additional search has been car-
ried out in the publications of the FAO Division “Agriculture and Consumer Protection Department” (http://www.-
fao.org/ag/againfo/resources/en/publications.html accessed June 7, 2016) comprising the sections “Animal Produc-
tion,” “Animal Health,” “Animal Welfare,” “Environment,” “Feed and Food Safety,” and “Sector Analysis and Pol-
icy.” The “Sector Analysis and Policy” section included the FAO “Livestock Policy Briefs” 2005-2008; and the  
Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative Policy Briefs. The Document Repository has been searched with the keyword 
“livestock revolution.” Further, English publications within the concept “livestock” have been searched. 
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in 1999 until today, a period of seventeen years.  To gain an understanding of the material as-
sessed here, the thesis will now turn to an explication of the most important documents.
The very central document of the Livestock Revolution discourse is the original Livestock Rev-
olution report from 1999, henceforth called the “Revolution report” (Delgado et al. 1999).182 It 
was authored by agricultural economists of the International Food Policy Research Institute, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and the International Livestock Re-
search Institute. The authors from the International Food Policy Research Institute were the se-
nior research fellows Christopher Delgado and Mark Rosegrant and the research analyst Claude 
Courbois. The FAO was represented by Henning Steinfeld, then senior officer for livestock de-
velopment planning, and later promoted to Chief of Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and 
Policy Branch at the FAO headquarters in Rome. Simeon Ehui was the coordinator of the Live-
stock Policy Analysis Project at the  International Livestock Research Institute (Delgado et al. 
1999, 72). Before its publication, the report was reviewed and commented on by experts at the 
World Bank, the International Rice Research Institute, the World Food Prize Office, and Natu-
ral Resources International (UK) (Delgado et al. 1999, viii).
Though the Revolution report is unique for its breadth and impact, it only marked the beginning 
of the Livestock Revolution discourse. Numerous  publications from FAO, ILRI or IFPRI re-
searchers, as well as independent authors and two conferences (Brown 2003; Owen et al. 2004) 
debated the Livestock Revolution. These publications either support or criticize the Revolution 
on different grounds. Moreover, some of them have complemented the projections of the initial 
1999 report through 2020 by forecasts through 2050 but do still call this evolution “Livestock 
Revolution.” In these cases, the discourse analysis in chapter five indicates that the prognoses 
are through 2050.
Significant fragments are  the “Livestock Policy Briefs” on the Livestock Revolution by the 
Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and Policy Branch of the Animal Production and Health 
Division (AGAL) of the FAO. 
The International Livestock Research Institute continued its discussion of the Revolution, most 
importantly in the strategy reports “Making the Livestock Revolution Work for the Poor” (ILRI 
182 Delgado, Christopher, Mark Rosegrant, Henning Steinfeld, Simeon Ehui, and Claude Courbois. (2011) 1999. 
“Livestock to 2020: The Next Food Revolution: Food, Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper 28.” Un-
published manuscript,  last  modified March 24,  2011.  A summary of  this  report  has  been  issued  as  Delgado, 
Christopher, Mark Rosegrant, Henning Steinfeld, Simeon Ehui, and Claude Courbois. 2000. The coming livestock 
revolution. Background Paper 6. New York: FAO. Background Paper No. 6. UN Department of Economic and So-
cial Affairs; Commission on Sustainable Development, Eight Session, 24 April - 5 May 2000, New York. A short -
ened and slightly updated version of  the Report  is  “Livestock to 2020: The Revolution Continues” (Delgado, 
Rosegrant, and Meijer 2001).
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2000a; 2000b) and “Livestock—a pathway out of poverty” (ILRI 2002).183 The focus of the In-
ternational Livestock Research Institute clearly is the importance of livestock for smallholders 
(Hall, Ehui, and Delgado 2004; Jabbar 2004; Wright et al. 2012). Subsequently, the Interna-
tional Food Policy Research Institute coins the term “livestock industrialization” (Delgado and 
Narrod 2002; Delgado, Narrod, and Tiongco 2008) and continues its research on the future of 
the livestock sector (Narrod, Tiongco, and Scott 2011).
Noteworthy in the discourse of the Livestock Revolution are the recurring authors. Though the 
previously mentioned international institutions are of considerable size, a handful of male live-
stock economists dominate the debate, as will become apparent in chapter five.  The contact per-
son for the FAO “Livestock Policy Briefs” series was Henning Steinfeld. Senior Livestock Pol-
icy Officer Pierre Gerber was responsible for the first brief of 2005 (FAO 2005, 8). In 2008,  
Joachim Otte was the Coordinator of the FAO’s Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative and re-
sponsible for the 2008 brief on “Livestock Policy and Poverty Reduction” (FAO 2008, 8). In ad-
dition, there is livestock economist Achilles Costales of the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative 
of the FAO, Philipp K. Thornton as well as Mario Herrero from the International Livestock Re-
search Institute; and Christopher Delgado and Mark Rosegrant from the International Food Pol-
icy Research Institute.184 Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld deliver an exceptional assessment of 
the structures “underneath the Livestock Revolution” (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006). 
Steinfeld writes about the Revolution as a “global veterinary mission” (Steinfeld 2004). Stein-
feld  and  Chilonda  debate  the  Revolution’s  “old  and new players”  (Steinfeld  and  Chilonda 
2006). Ugo Pica-Ciamarra and above-mentioned Joachim Otte from the FAO’s Pro-Poor Live-
stock Policy Initiative scrutinize the “Rhetoric and Reality” of the Livestock Revolution. Pica-
Ciamarra and FAO colleagues examine livestock in the household-economy (Pica-Ciamarra et 
al. 2015) and the significance of breeding programs (Hammond 2000). Jeroen Dijkman equally 
belongs to the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative when he expounds on the “elusive livestock 
revolution” (Dijkman 2009).
The highly influential FAO publication on the environmental impact of the livestock industry, 
Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options, by Henning Steinfeld, Pierre Ger-
ber, Tom Wassenaar, Vincent Castel, Mauricio Rosales, and Cees de Haan (henceforth Steinfeld 
et al. 2006 or Livestock’s Long Shadow), also discusses the Livestock Revolution (Steinfeld et 
al. 2006, 16). Livestock’s Long Shadow is a milestone in the discourse on the ecological hoof-
print and was cited in numerous studies on the matter. Its follow-up study from 2013, Tackling 
183 Further reports include  AGTR 2011; Blümmel et al. 2013; Pinstrup-Andersen, Pandya-Lorch, and Rosegrant 
1999; Vercoe, Fitzhugh, and Kaufmann 2000.
184 The authors’ positions listed here refer to period of the corresponding texts’ original publications; they do not  
necessarily reflect these authors’ current positions or employment.
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Climate Change Through Livestock: A Global Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Oppor-
tunities by Pierre Gerber, Henning Steinfeld, Benjamin Henderson, Anne Mottet, Carolyn Opio, 
Jeroen Dijkman, Alessandra Falcucci, and Giuseppe Tempio (hereafter  Gerber et al. 2013 or 
Tackling Climate Change), has been added to the sample, as well, although it does not apply the 
term “Livestock Revolution.” Both studies not only represent  the problem of the ecological 
hoofprint, they propose solutions to it while also increasing productivity. A number of non-FAO 
papers deal with the environmental repercussions of the sector, too, for instance Barrett 2001.
The World Bank suggests policies  and technologies  to “Manage the Livestock Revolution” 
(World Bank 2005). The text, co-authored by livestock specialist Cees de Haan, is based on  
studies by Christopher Delgado and his colleagues at the International Food Policy Research In-
stitute and the International  Livestock Research Institute.  Farrell  (2002) declares a  “Poultry 
Revolution” spearheading the Livestock Revolution. (Poor) smallholders are another concentra-
tion of publications dealing with the Livestock Revolution (among others, Heffernan 2004) and 
their intensification (Udo et al. 2011). Several publications are dedicated to biotechnology’s role 
in the Livestock Revolution, in particular in “developing countries” (Hoffmann 2005; McCrabb 
et al. 2005; Onteru, Ampaire, and Rothschild 2010; Rothschild and Plastow 2014).
A number of publications focus on the impact  of  the Livestock Revolution in the Majority  
World, concentrating on Africa, Asia, and to a lesser degree on Latin America (Nicholson and 
Parsons 2012), with case studies on the Philippines, India, or Egypt. Li 2004, Li et al. 2008, Rae 
2008, Rae and Zhang 2009, and Waldron et al. 2007 analyze the Livestock Revolution in China. 
Critical in-depth accounts of the Revolution include Fritz 2014, Smil 2002 or York and Gossard 
2004.  Rivera-Ferre  (2009)  questions  the  argument  that  the  Revolution  is  “demand-driven.” 
MacLachlan studies the “Evolution of a Revolution” (2015). The working paper “Revolution 
Reconsidered: Evolving Perspectives on Livestock Production and Consumption” by Sumberg 
and Thompson (2013), published by the STEPS Centre in Brighton (UK), a global research and 
policy center, offers a precious analysis of the evolution of the notion. Deutsch, Lannerstad, and 
Ran from the Stockholm Resilience Center write on “Responsible Environmental Choices for a 
Sustainable ‘Livestock Revolution’” (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran 2011). 
Finally, two notable publications were issued by animal rights or animal welfare organizations: 
A Well-Fed World calls to “Reverse the ‘Livestock Revolution’” (AWFW 2016). Garcés from 
the Compassion in World Farming Trust studies the impact of factory farming on farmers and 
animals in the Majority World (Garcés 2002).185
185 The organization presents itself as a research-based farm animal welfare organization.
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4.2.2.1.2 Documents by the Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock
The term “Livestock Revolution” entered the discursive stage in 1999, and its message was here 
to stay. More than fifteen years after its first appearance, the stated need to almost double meat  
production  appears  unchallenged.  In  this  period  of  time,  partnerships  and  strategies  were 
launched to sustainably intensify the sector and meet production goals. One core partnership is 
the “Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock” (hereafter abbreviated as the “Global Agenda”).  
This multi-stakeholder partnership unites the public and private sector, academia, donors, non-
governmental and inter-governmental organizations, and social movements (Global Agenda for 
Sustainable Livestock 2015a, 7–8). The Global Agenda does not only stand for policy research, 
but also for policy action. It makes use of the discourse of the Livestock Revolution—although 
without using the term itself186—and shows pathways to achieve it. In addition, the Agenda was 
initiated by the FAO as a direct result of a recommendation of the FAO’s Committee on Agri-
culture, and to date, the FAO is the convener, programmatic collaborator, and secretariat of the 
Global Agenda (which will be elaborated in detail below). This is why documents issued by the 
Global Agenda have been added to the sample as a second group. The selection of the Global 
Agenda for Sustainable Livestock as one contemporary and active policy example was con-
stantly reassessed throughout this study. The Agenda’s growth and development, its engage-
ment in the UN sustainable development discourse, and its relative prominence within the FAO 
justified an ongoing analysis of the multi-stakeholder forum.
The cyclical sampling process dated from 2014 through December 2016. The data gathered on 
the Agenda includes their homepage content, Action Plans, Welcome Letter, The Agenda Con-
sensus, Good Practices Guidelines, key messages, and the presentation of their partners. All the 
Global Agenda material was publicly retrievable online. The Agenda’s publications date back to 
2013 with its first strategy document187 and end with news announcements from December 2016 
(Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016d). 
4.2.2.2 Actors in the discourse 
The presentation of the most important actors in the discursive field is a constituent of the de-
tailed discourse analysis introduced in the next section. It provides background on the signifi-
cance of the discourse, its scope and reach, and the interests at stake. The following provides a  
186 In fact, no contemporary international multi-stakeholder initiative applies the term.
187 Back then, the Global Agenda was called “Global Agenda of Action in support of sustainable livestock sector de -
velopment.”
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short background of the FAO and the Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock. The focus here 
is on the FAO and not the International Food Policy Research Institute or the International Live-
stock Research Institute for three reasons. First, the International Food Policy Research Insti-
tute,  based in  Washington DC,  and the International  Livestock Research Institute,  based in 
Nairobi, are two single research centers, associates of the CGIAR Consortium, a “worldwide  
partnership engaged in agricultural research for development” (IFPRI 2016). The FAO, on the 
other  hand,  is  the  main international  institution and authority  for  food and agriculture  as  a 
whole. It has a much wider scope and enjoys wide international recognition and significance 
and thus so do its publications. Second, the focus of this thesis is on the environmental sustain-
ability of the livestock sector and on how the Revolution should be achieved given its massive 
need for limited resources. The FAO has issued two primordial reports on the issue. Finally, the  
International Livestock Research Institute is also a member of the Global Agenda of Sustainable 
Livestock and thus indirectly part of the second sample. 
4.2.2.2.1 FAO
Like all large intergovernmental organizations, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the  
United Nations can seem to be a rather opaque institution. It is helpful to take a look behind the  
scenes to understand the impact of its policy recommendations.188 The agency had its first ses-
sion in 1945 (FAO 2016a).189 Today, it consists of 194 Member Nations, two Associate Mem-
bers and the European Union as one member organization (FAO 2016d). These members have 
very diverse interests which can lead to contradictory perspectives on specific problems, includ-
ing ambiguous livestock policy recommendations—those ambivalences will occupy center stage 
in the fifth chapter.190 Each Member Nation and Associate Member is represented by one dele-
gate. Its Conference meets biennially and elects Council Members and the Director-General.191 
The FAO offices identify and implement actions and assist governments in food and agriculture 
policies and projects (FAO 2016d).192 The FAO’s three main goals are 
“the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition; the elimination of poverty and 
the driving forward of economic and social progress for all; and, the sustainable manage-
188 No claim is being made here to completely cover or to do justice to the complexity of this UN agency.
189 For a detailed history of the FAO compare Small and O’Broin 2015.
190 There are not only inconsistencies within the FAO. Other institutions of the United Nations, such as the United 
Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD)  or  the  United  Nations  Environment  Programme 
(UNEP), advocate for a decrease in production and consumption, in contrast to the FAO’s appeal to double meat  
production (Emel and Neo 2015, 2; Westhoek et al. 2016). Nevertheless, the scope of this thesis does not allow for  
a deeper analysis of this subject.
191 Since 2012, the FAO’s Director-General is José Graziano da Silva of Brazil (FAO 2016d).
192 Employing more than 3,000 permanent staff members, the FAO’s network comprises five regional offices, nine  
sub-regional offices, 80 country offices, and other decentralized offices, and is headquartered in Rome, Italy. The 
total budget 2016/17 amounts to 2.6 billion USD. 61 percent of the budget stems from voluntary contributions of  
Members and other partners, 39 percent stem from assessed contributions by the member countries (FAO 2016b).  
The value of programs and projects implemented in 2014/2015 was 1.6 billion USD, mainly funded through volun-
tary contributions (FAO 2016d).
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ment and utilization of natural resources, including land, water, air, climate and genetic re-
sources for the benefit of present and future generations.” (FAO 2016a).193
Special attention is dedicated to the FAO’s Committee on Agriculture (COAG). As one of the  
eight Committees assisting the FAO Council, the Committee on Agriculture is the FAO’s “main 
technical advisory committee on agriculture” (FAO 2016e).194 It advises the FAO Council, Con-
ference, and Director General in all matters relating to agriculture, livestock, agricultural policy, 
food, nutrition, and resource management, and suggests pathways for concerted action (FAO 
2016e). The COAG was founded in 1971 and remains an “important forum for informed and  
strategic discussion” to this day. The Committee’s advice to the Council to foster the develop-
ment of the seed industry only incrementally offset the effects of the Green Revolution of the  
1970s, a fact that leads the Committee itself to speak of its own “quiet power and influence” 
(COAG FAO 2014).195 The promotion of “cleaner, greener agriculture” is a top item on the 
Committee’s agenda. Highlighting the positive importance of agribusiness and agro-industries 
for food security and rural employment was the goal of a COAG 2007 recommendation (COAG 
FAO 2014). Recognizing the vitality of sustainable agriculture, the Committee further contrib-
uted to the preparatory process of the Rio+20 Conference, and assisted in developing the “Cli-
mate Smart Agriculture Alliance,” the initiative “Greening the Economy with Agriculture,” or 
the “Save and Grow Initiative” (see section 3.4.4).196
The COAG had already taken up the issue of future livestock production and sustainability in 
2005. In 2010, it recommended the FAO tackle the issue. The multi-stakeholder partnership 
Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock was thereafter created and endorsed by the Committee 
in 2012 (COAG FAO 2014). At its twenty-fifth Session in September 2016, the Committee dis-
cussed the governance structure of the Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock and called for  
an even greater engagement of the FAO (FAO 2016h).  Next  to being an intergovernmental  
stakeholder, the FAO is the convener, programmatic collaborator, and secretariat of the Global  
Agenda, providing administrative and operational support (COAG FAO 2016, 6). The important 
role of the Global Agenda in fostering the sustainable development of the livestock sector is ad-
ditionally emphasized in the FAO report Tackling Climate Change (Gerber et al. 2013, 101). 
193 The FAO’s strategic objectives are: 1) to “Help eliminate hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition; 2) to make 
agriculture, forestry, and fisheries more productive and sustainable; 3) to reduce rural poverty; 4) to enable inclu -
sive and efficient agricultural and food systems; 5) to increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises”  
(FAO 2016a).
194 The Committee, part of the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Department currently has 126 members and 
meets biennially (FAO 2016g).
195 The Committee still supports the development of seed systems all over the globe, defining good quality seeds as 
“certified” seeds. In 1999, it advised concentrating on biotechnology which led to the FAO’s creation of the “Inter-
Departmental Working Group on Biotechnology” (COAG FAO 2014).
196 Further areas of strategic relevance are gender equality in agriculture, soil governance, and water resources.
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4.2.2.2.2 Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock
“Sustainable livestock. For people, for the planet” 
(Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014b, 14).
As described, the Global Agenda  for Sustainable Livestock has been initiated by the FAO in 
2010 and officially launched in 2013. It unites seven different clusters of sector stakeholders:  
the public and private sector, academia/research, donors, NGOs, social movements and commu-
nity-based organizations, and inter-governmental and multi-lateral organizations,  such as the 
World Bank or the FAO (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2015a, 7–8).197 The Agenda 
analyzes,  informs, networks, and provides guidance through voluntary guidelines and sector 
recommendations (Global Agenda of Action 2013, 4). It has developed several frameworks and 
tools to assess natural  resource use efficiency, or to manage manure,  among others (Global  
Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2015a, 6). Nevertheless, the Agenda additionally “agrees on 
action” and is “geared towards practice and policy change” (Global Agenda for Sustainable  
Livestock 2015a, 1). In essence, the Agenda “acts as a platform to promote livestock sector in-
vestments”  collaborating  with  governments,  donors,  investors,  and  development  agencies 
(Global  Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2015a,  12).  Its  goals are to become the “leading  
multi-stakeholder platform” for sustainable livestock development (Global Agenda for Sustain-
able Livestock 2015a, 11), and “to become a key implementation process of the UN Agenda 
2030 for Sustainable Development” (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2015a, 5).
Which actors are united in the Agenda? There is no straightforward way to find a list of the 
Agenda’s current members. There are inconsistencies between the Agenda’s homepage section 
197 In more detail, the seven clusters are described as follows: “1. Public Sector—representatives from governments; 
2.  Private Sector—representatives from private sector organizations; 3.  Academia/research—representatives from 
research organization and universities;  4.  Donors—representatives from monetary contributors to the Agenda’s 
Trust Fund; 5.  NGOs—representatives from interest groups such as animals welfare and environmental or liveli -
hood non-governmental organizations; 6. Social movements and community based organizations—representatives 
of pastoralists,  indigenous people,  agricultural  workers,  small  farmers and peasants;  7.  Inter-governmental and 
multi-lateral  institutions—institutions  that  have  a  mandate  in  livestock  sector  development,  e.g.  World  Bank, 
CGIAR, OIE, FAO, WHO, represented by the Livestock Global Alliance as appropriate” (Global Agenda for Sus-
tainable  Livestock 2015a,  28).  The organizations join the Global  Agenda by signing the consensus document  
(Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2015a). Stakeholder commitment is voluntary; decisions are made by 
consensus (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016b). The Global Agenda itself is a partner of the FAO’s 
“Sustainable Food and Agriculture” Initiative. Other partners are the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food  
and Agriculture. Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA Alliance), the multi-partner program Energy-
Smart Food for People and Climate (ESF), the Global Soil Partnership (GSP), and the REDD+ program (Reducing  
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) (FAO 2016l). The Agenda’s structure comprehends a Guiding  
Group with five representatives of every stakeholder group (cluster), three Focus Area groups, and a Technical  
Support Team. It has incubated several multi-stakeholder platform meetings, the regional technical networks “Dairy 
Asia-Network” and the “Global  Network on Silvopastoral  Systems (GNPSPS).”  Likewise,  the partnership has 
launched thematic initiatives on “Livestock Waste Management” and “Enteric Methane” (Global Agenda for Sus -
tainable Livestock 2015a, 5). In the period from 2016-2018, the Agenda has a budget of 3.5 million USD, exclud -
ing Focus Areas and Knowledge Networks (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2015a, 3). 
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“Partners” and the Agenda’s news announcements (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 
2016a; 2016d), declaring that the Agenda consisted of 82 members, and the web section “Part-
ners” that listed 77 partner logos when last checked on December 30, 2016 (Global Agenda for  
Sustainable Livestock 2016f). The present count combines both information sources which re-
sults in a working total of 80 members. It is nowhere specified to which cluster a specific mem -
ber pertains. Table 4 is a proposal to structure the members in clusters, and in their origins—
stemming from either the Majority or Minority World as appropriate. In appendix 2, all the  
members are listed in detail. Despite its potential flaws,198 the structure offers an overview of the 
diverse clusters and their respective weight in the Agenda. The goal of such a categorization is 
to test the Agenda’s following claim:
“The Agenda partnership addresses the multiple facets of sustainability simultaneously. Its 
inclusion of all key stakeholders contributes to a clear voice for each facet.” (Global 
Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014a).
Moreover, in its Action Plan 2016-2018, the Agenda deplores a “lack of engagement and insuf -
ficient participation of developing countries and emerging economies” (Global Agenda for Sus-
tainable Livestock 2015a, 15). This assertion should be examined, too. 
Table 4: Members of the Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock. 
Cluster To-tal
Minority 
World
Majority 
World
All clusters 80 51 29
1 Public sector 16 6 10
2 Private sector 16 15 1
3 Academia/research organizations 28 17 11
4 Donors ? ? ?
5 Non-governmental organizations 9 8 1
6 Social movements and community-based 
organizations 4 1 3
7 Inter-governmental and multi-lateral organizations 7 4 3
Following this categorization, the majority of Agenda members are academic/research organiza-
tions (35 percent). The next two largest groups are governmental representatives and representa-
tives from private sector organizations (both 20 percent). Fourth is non-governmental organiza-
tions (eleven percent), and the fifth group consists of inter-governmental and multi-lateral orga-
nizations (nine percent). Social movements are the weakest group (five percent). No donor can 
198 The structuring is a putative one, and the lines between the cluster academia/research, NGOs, and social move-
ments are blurred. Consequently, the structure must be taken with a grain of salt.
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be identified online, however, as several members appear to not be represented on the home-
page, the unidentified members might be donors. 
29 of 80 members are based in the Majority World. This equals 36 percent.199 The partners from 
the Majority World are mainly research institutions (11 of 29) and governmental organizations 
(10 of 29). The governments involved are Germany, France, Ireland, New Zealand, The Nether-
lands, Switzerland, the Dominican Republic, Rwanda, Panama, El Salvador, Uganda, Kenya, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Ethiopia, and Paraguay. Hence, primarily Europe and Latin America are rep-
resented; Asian, and, to a lesser degree, African countries are underrepresented. 
The private sector group includes powerful lobby organizations such as the International Meat 
Secretariat, France, the International Dairy Federation, Belgium, the International Poultry Coun-
cil, United States, the International Egg Commission, United Kingdom, and the International 
Feed Industry Federation, Germany/Luxemburg. The Agenda explicitly “builds on the expertise 
and entrepreneurial skills of the private sector in an alliance with the public sector and other 
stakeholders” (Global Agenda of Action 2013, 4). Likewise, it promises the private sector “new 
business and livelihood opportunities” obtained from the Agenda (Global Agenda of Action 
2013, 4).  It is notable that with one exception, all the sixteen lobby organizations are based in 
the Minority World. 
In general, it appears that the industry’s stakeholders—especially those from the private sector
—engage in various networks. To elucidate, the executive committee of the Agenda member 
Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, a private sector group based in The Netherlands and 
the United States, has a representative of the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association for president.  
Its Vice President is a representative of the World Wildlife Fund, the Secretary-Treasurer is  
from Elanco, and the two “members at large” are representatives of McDonald’s Corporation  
and JBS, USA. The Canadian Cattlemen’s Association and the World Wildlife Fund are mem-
bers of the Agenda as well. Another example is the Agenda member LIFLOD, the Livestock 
Farming and Local Development Network, uniting stakeholders like researchers, farmers, and 
development agencies, which are, again, almost exclusively Global Agenda partners. 
The  NGO  partners,  nine  in  total,  include  four  animal  welfare  groups,  four  environmental 
groups,  and  one  human  rights  group  (see  appendix  2).  Social movements  are  even  more 
underrepresented  with  five  representatives.  Going  back  to  the  Agenda’s  assertion  that  it 
included “all key stakeholders,” and that “each facet” of sustainability had a “clear voice,” the  
199 In September 2016, this was still at 31 percent, not even a third. At that time, there were almost as many Minor -
ity World lobbies (22 percent) as members from the Majority World (31 percent).
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detailed membership directory suggests that governments, research institutions, and the private 
sector are the principal voices and that the economy constitutes the main facet of the Agenda. 
4.2.2.2.3 Self-positioning of the actors
In the publications, the FAO reports and the Global Agenda present themselves as the ones who 
bring about change through knowledge creation, policy recommendations, and networking. The 
FAO portrays itself as creating and distributing knowledge and sharing policy expertise. It is a 
“neutral forum” that forges dialogue between “rich and poor nations” and fosters public-private 
collaboration (FAO 2016d). In addition, the FAO Rome headquarters is a place where “world 
leaders have discussed food issues and made groundbreaking decisions for global food security” 
(FAO 2016c). The slideshow on the Global Agenda’s homepage, on the other hand, claims that 
“[t]he Agenda builds consensus on the path towards sustainability” (Global Agenda for Sustain-
able Livestock 2016c). Both FAO and Global Agenda posit themselves as crucial players in the 
“sustainable development” of the sector, and are noticeably committed to remaining optimistic 
in a rather desperate situation.200 To illustrate further, the FAO report Tackling Climate Change 
introduces its findings by stressing that this 
“new report shows that the potential to significantly reduce emissions exists and is  
within reach. Options are available for all species, systems and regions. But we need 
political will and better policies” (Gerber et al. 2013, ix).
Fraser, Chair of the Guiding Group of the Global Agenda in 2014, boldly states: 
“I believe this initiative represents a collective ‘force for good’ that responds to a 
global need by simultaneously addressing the social, economic and environmental 
performance  of  livestock  systems”  (Global  Agenda  for  Sustainable  Livestock 
2015b). 
4.2.3 Instruments of analysis and of interpretation 
The present study relies on Keller’s accessible instructions while complementing them with Ha-
jer’s  “argumentative approach.” Among others, the term “argumentative” serves to show how 
actors in a discourse try to convince the public of their definition of the problem (Hajer 1995,  
53–54). According to Keller, any investigation should include, first, a detailed analysis of each 
200 For instance, the Global Agenda defines itself as “a partnership of livestock sector stakeholders committed to the  
sustainable development of the sector.” (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016b). 
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discourse fragment (which means, each text), comprising, next to a scrutiny of its content, one  
of its form, rhetorical means, and other peculiarities. Second, a structural, overarching analysis  
of the discourse is needed encompassing all fragments (Keller 2013). This holistic picture is  
painted in chapter five. In addition, a quantitative assessment of the three discourse fragments 
Revolution report (Delgado et al. 1999), Tackling Climate Change (Gerber et al. 2013), and the 
Global Agenda Action Plan  (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2015a)  is brought for-
ward in appendix 3. Though not representative for the whole discourse, it illustrates the chang-
ing use of terms like “nature,” “efficiency,” and “poverty.”
4.2.3.1 Detailed analysis
The first, detailed analysis of each fragment examines, first, the context of the fragment. This  
context comprises its authors, which, in most cases of the present analysis, were representatives 
of the FAO and the Global Agenda (see above); the addressed public, which mainly is an in-
formed group of sector stakeholders; and the bigger socio-historic and economic context. This  
context has been laid out in depth in chapter two. Second, a detailed analysis targets the formal 
or rhetorical structure of the document in question. It asks whether the paper is, for instance, of  
scientific, educational, entertaining, or political nature. The language and layout of the docu-
ment are equally studied. The documents examined here are primarily research papers and stud-
ies, and policy documents with sector recommendations. Their layout may differ, but they are  
similar in rhetorical structure and style. Generally, the tone is sober, technical, and apparently 
impartial. Nonetheless, optimistic and pessimistic undertones repeatedly appear in the studies. 
This will be exemplified in more detail in chapter five. Third, and most importantly, the detailed 
analysis contains an analytical reconstruction of the document’s content, exposing its so-called 
“problem structure” or “phenomenal structure.” In this central part, the structure and dimension 
of the problem is re- or deconstructed. Seemingly “neutral” statements are put in context and  
contrasted with the actors’ positions and reference values. 
Following Keller’s guidelines and categories (Keller 2013, 115–21), all the discourse fragments 
have been coded and investigated. The codes that emerged in the analysis and the reasons be-
hind them are then explained. The categories and codes consisted of: the  causes of a certain 
problem (in the case of the ecological hoofprint, codes in this category were inefficiency or the  
animals’ digestion); the assignment of responsibility to somebody or something (codes included, 
for example, blaming small livestock farmers or legislation); presenting  solutions to the issue 
(intensification); self-positioning in the field (for instance, comparing the FAO and the Global 
Agenda’s self-representation mentioned above); positioning of others and their suggestions; and 
finally, the reference values of the actors. Such reference values included, among others, the as-
signed value of nature or the definition of “progress.” On many occasions, the statements in the  
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texts, taken together, generated a portrait of ecological modernization. This last category has 
been the most difficult to assess. Its interpretation was facilitated through comparing and con-
trasting various representations of the problem structure and the proposed solutions, and a con-
stant process of evaluating and re-evaluating the documents. This movement further required 
taking into account the development and history of the animal-industrial complex as elaborated 
in chapter two, a consideration of the socio-historic and economic context, and the continuous 
remembrance of the contingency of things. 
Out of this detailed analysis, storylines emerge in the discourse (Keller 2013, 124–27). Essen-
tially, storylines reduce the complexity of a certain problem (similar to a metaphor) and order  
understandings (Hajer 1995, 56). While reducing fragmentation, they close the discourse, as 
well. Their power is constituted by the feeling that “it sounds right,” which encompasses not 
only plausibility but also trust and acceptability (Hajer 1995, 62–63). Chapter five features the 
most important storylines such as “The Livestock Revolution is a natural and inevitable event in 
the  course  of  progress,”  “The  Revolution  can  be  furthered  with  intensification  and  green 
growth,” and “Animal production contributes to food security, to the livelihoods of the poor, 
and to environmental sustainability.”
It was not possible to apply these ready-made categories to every discourse fragment. At times, 
a category was not to be found, and another category was very prominent in turn. Nevertheless, 
as a first step every fragment has been scrutinized according to the categories. Another  chal-
lenge in the detailed analysis was the interdisciplinary nature of the discourse. Reports from 
such diverse fields as Earth sciences, agronomics, veterinary science, or political economy were 
consulted and assessed.201 The scrutiny of these reports demanded acquiring basic knowledge in 
each field. 
4.2.3.2 Structural analysis
Keller suggests complementing the first,  detailed analysis by a second, diachronic structural 
analysis  (Keller  2013).  Such structural  analysis provides  a holistic picture of  the discourse.  
Here, every discourse fragment is contextualized within the whole discourse. The full picture of 
the structure of the discourse is only retrievable at the end of the detailed analysis of all dis-
course fragments. The structural analysis investigates whether a specific fragment constitutes a 
novelty or a repetition in the discourse. By analyzing the discourse’s structure along with the  
emerging storylines, discourse coalitions appear. Discourse coalitions are formed by different  
actors who adhere to certain storylines. This means that discourse coalitions are not necessarily 
based on shared interests but rather on shared storylines (Hajer 1995, 65). In the present case,  
201 This is a general problem of analyzing environmental discourse, because it comprehends discourses from the nat -
ural as well as from the social sciences (Hajer 1995, 45).
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the FAO, the International Food Policy Research Institute, the International Livestock Research 
Institute  and the Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock enter into one discourse coalition. 
These actors do not necessarily further the exact same agenda, nonetheless, they all refer to the 
same storylines. The fact that the discourse overall features only one discourse coalitions shows 
how uniform and universal the storylines function, and how minimal the objections against the 
Revolution are.
The goal of the second chapter was to provide an in-depth analysis of the past, present and fu-
ture of the animal-industrial complex, and its effects on the farmed animals, the environment,  
and society at large. As previously stated, discourse analysis differs from mere textual analysis  
in its comprehension of those socio-historic, economic, and political conditions that have been 
produced and reproduced by the discourse. These conditions pertain to the structural analysis as 
well.  For  example,  the  storyline that  the  Livestock Revolution contributed to  food security 
“sounded right” in the decades where grain prices were low. This, however, drastically changed 
with the food crisis of 2008. Now, the same storyline sounds odd at best. In the production and 
reproduction of material reality through this discourse, special attention was dedicated to the in-
tersection of animal exploitation, social discrimination, and environmental degradation. The sto-
rylines have, in a final step, brought about the mirror move of capitalizing on/controlling nature 
and naturalizing capitalism/control, elaborated in the third, theoretical chapter. This mirroring 
lens of analysis divides chapter five into two parts and embeds it in a wider societal critique. 
The overall process of the detailed and structural analysis, starting from the analytical recon-
struction of the problem structure with codes and categories, is illustrated in figure 8.
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Figure 8: Illustration of detailed and structural analysis.
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PART III
5 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: THE LIVESTOCK REVOLUTION AS 
SUSTAINABLE EXPLOITATION
In essence, the Livestock Revolution is an increase of 70 percent in the demand for animal prod-
ucts by 2020, caused by increasing disposable income, population growth, and urbanization. As 
stated previously, this demand is mainly propelled  by the Majority World, which adds to its 
world-shattering aura (Delgado et al. 1999, 1), and it will presumably be met by industrial sys-
tems that are providing 80 percent of total sector growth (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 278).202 
This chapter is dedicated to an analysis of the discourse of the Livestock Revolution. Chapter  
four  elaborated  the  methodological  approach,  whereas  chapter  two on  the  animal-industrial 
complex provided the socio-economic basis for the investigation. Chapter three established the 
theoretical background and foil against which the analysis is performed. The analysis in the  
present chapter is structured in two parts: part A covers elements of the capitalization and con-
trol of nature, and part B features storylines of the naturalization of control and capitalism. 
As a whole,  the discourse analysis here follows the problem structure of the discourse and 
carves out its storylines and discourse coalitions. First, it examines the Livestock Revolution’s 
rhetoric (5.1). Second, it defines the problem, the Livestock Revolution, according to its key ac-
tors, its authors (5.2). The Revolution is presented in quantitative terms by asking the following 
questions: What will the concrete growth in the sector look like? What share exactly will the 
Majority World have in the sector? Third, the reasons for the Revolution are elucidated (5.3).
In part A (capitalization and control of nature), in section four (5.4), the responsibilities and the 
solution of the productivity increase and socio-economic and environmental challenges of the 
Revolution (sustainable intensification) are presented and contrasted with the move to capitalize  
on and control nature. The fifth section (5.5) is dedicated to the actual subjects of the debate,  
those who “embody” the Revolution: the farmed animals. It investigates their representation in 
the discourse and critically examines the intended effect of sustainable intensification: the sus-
tainable exploitation of these animals. The sixth section (5.6) comprises an examination of de-
mand  and  supply  in  the  Revolution  and  concomitantly,  a  reflection  on  its  contingency.  It  
202 As sketched in the methodological overview in chapter four, some studies have extended the projections of the 
initial 1999 report for 2020 by calculations for the year 2050 yet still refer to it as “Livestock Revolution.”
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thereby equally deconstructs the storylines of sections 5.3 and 5.4 (the reasons for and solutions 
of the Revolution). This section starts with a consideration of a possible reversal of the Revolu-
tion: if the animal-industrial sector is such a great challenge for the environment, why not en-
courage a reduction of the consumption of animal foods, at least in the Minority World, rather 
than its growth? The second subsection features an opposing account and shows how the Revo-
lution is appraised. Third, the mutually exclusive binary of supply and demand is deconstructed.  
Subsections four and five examine the material, technological, and institutional conditions sus-
taining the Revolution, as well as who profits from it. 
Part B of the analysis draws on the other side of the mirror move: the naturalization of control  
and capitalism (5.7). Here, eminent storylines and their underlying reference values are scruti -
nized. In addition, this analysis digs out the inconsistencies, contradictions and breaks in the 
Livestock Revolution discourse. First, the dietary shift towards more animal protein is said to be 
a sign of modernization. The second storyline is that it supposedly constitutes an opportunity, 
but also a risk, for smallholders. Third, the Revolution should guarantee food security, yet, due 
to its rising use of feed grain, it constitutes a threat. Finally, the Revolution is said to be of sub -
stantial importance for the environment—though a danger as well. Each of those justifications 
for the Revolution is juxtaposed with the detrimental effects the Revolution engenders. Essen-
tially, the arguments as such are deconstructed as forms of naturalizing control and capitalism. 
5.1 Revolutionary rhetoric
“A revolution is taking place in global agriculture that has profound implications for our 
health, livelihoods, and environment. Population growth, urbanization, and income growth 
in developing countries are fueling a massive global increase in demand for food of animal 
origin.” (Delgado et al. 1999, 1).203
The epic tone of this first sentence of the report introducing the Livestock Revolution bears re -
semblances to the beginning of the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels.204 Yet, here, the 
specter haunting the world is not communism, but meat consumption. Applying such a revolu-
tionary rhetoric is by no means a matter of chance. The discourse of modern agricultural devel-
opment of the last five decades is dominated by the idea of “revolution.” Among them are the 
influential Green Revolution of the 1960s,205 the White and Pink Revolution, designating milk 
203 The classification in developing and developed countries in the original Livestock Revolution report is as fol -
lows: the developed countries are “Australia, Canada, Eastern Europe, European Union, other Western European  
countries, Israel, former Soviet Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, United States.” The developing countries  
are “all other countries in FAO Statistics Database.” (Delgado et al. 1999, 66).
204 “A specter is haunting Europe—the specter of communism.”
205 For a critical account, see Jarosz 2012.
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and beef production in India, the Blue Revolution in aquaculture,206 or the Supermarket Revolu-
tion (which symbolized the spread of supermarkets in the Majority World which will be dis -
cussed in part 5.6) (Sumberg and Thompson 2013, 5). The term “revolution” conveys an image 
of  an unprecedented,  unforeseeable,  and even dangerous,  sudden change,  both in scale and  
quality.207 “Revolution” raises hopes, but also fears, and correspondingly, the threats and prom-
ises of the Revolution are a recurring theme in the discourse. The sundry elements of the Revo-
lution offer “both dangers and positive opportunities for human welfare and environmental sus-
tainability” (Delgado et al. 1999, 59). 
The revolution is a powerful imaginary that enforces a rapid response. Talking about a “revolu-
tion” in fact furthers, even “makes” the revolution (Sumberg and Thompson 2013, 5–6). For 
Ehui, coordinator of the International Livestock Research Institute’s Livestock Policy Analysis  
Program and co-author of the Livestock Revolution study, it is a “wake-up call” for action, and 
he adds: “It’s happening, whether we like it or not. We can’t just sit back and watch” (ILRI  
2000a, 3–4). There is no possibility to alter course:  The Livestock Revolution “is a given that 
must be dealt with,” according to the report (Delgado et al. 1999, 3):
“In sum, it is unwise to think that the Livestock Revolution will somehow go away in re -
sponse to moral suasion by well-meaning development partners. It is a structural phenome-
non that is here to stay. How bad or how good it will be for the populations of developing 
countries is intricately bound up with how countries choose to approach the Livestock Rev-
olution.” (Delgado et al. 1999, 65).
A revision of the Revolution report in 2001 confirms the “conservative” initial findings, stating 
“whether it  is a good thing is not the issue; it  is  a phenomenon that  will  occur”  (Delgado, 
Rosegrant,  and Meijer  2001,  17).  With a  similar  level  of  pathos,  the  authors  introduce the 
Revolution as  “one of the largest structural shifts to ever affect food markets in developing 
countries” (Delgado et al. 1999, 4). On the very first page of the Revolution document, it is de-
fined as a challenge that “will stretch the capacity of existing production and distribution sys-
tems and exacerbate environmental and public health problems” (Delgado et al. 1999, 1). This 
expansion will  be especially hazardous for the Majority World (Delgado et al.  1999, 9).  In 
greater detail, the Revolution authors define seven characteristics:
“(1) rapid worldwide increases in consumption and production of livestock products; (2) a 
major increase in the share of developing countries in total livestock production and con-
206 For more information on the Blue Revolution, see Rivera-Ferre 2009.
207 Twine observes how the term “revolution” has been stripped of any emancipatory content (Twine 2010, 161), 
which mirrors the eco-modernist discourse’s appropriation of the transformative language of the environmental  
movement.
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sumption; (3) ongoing change in the status of livestock production from a multipurpose ac-
tivity with mostly nontradable output to food and feed production in the context of globally 
integrated markets; (4) increased substitution of meat and milk for grain in the human diet;  
(5) rapid rise in the use of cereal-based feeds; (6) greater stress put on grazing resources 
along with more land-intensive production closer to cities; and (7) the emergence of rapid 
technological change in livestock production and processing in industrial systems.” (Del-
gado et al. 1999, 59).
5.2 The Revolution in numbers
The Livestock Revolution is said to have started in the 1980s and supposed to continue until the  
2020s (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 16), accompanying the projected short- and long-term rise in  in-
come,208 urbanization and population (Dijkman 2009, 3).  As the Livestock Revolution focuses 
on demand, it makes projections of consumption trends.209 
Table 5: “Past and projected trends in consumption of meat and milk in the Majority and Minority 
World.”
208 Income has been growing since 1950 and is expected to grow in the future (Thornton 2010, 2854).
209 To determine the relationships between supply and demand for animal products and feed grain over time, the  
economists used the IMPACT model (“International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and 
Trade”) developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (Delgado et al. 1999, 3, 21-23).
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Year Annual per capita consumption
Meat (kg) Milk (kg)
Majority Minority Majority Minority
1980 14 73 34 195
1990 18 80 38 200
2002 28 78 44 202
2015210 32 83 55 203
2030 38 89 67 209
2050 44 94 78 216
2050/198
0 +214% +29% +129% +11%
Year
Total consumption
Meat (Mt, million metric 
tons) Milk (Mt)
Meat 
(Mt)
Milk 
(Mt)
Majority Minority Majority Minority Total Total
1980 47 86 114 228 133 342
1990 73 100 152 251
2002 137 102 222 265
2015 184 112 323 273 296 487
2030 252 121 452 284
2050 326 126 585 295 452 880
2050/198
0 +594% +47% +413% +29%
+240% +157
%
Note. Adapted from “Livestock production: recent trends, future prospects,” by Philip K. Thornton, 2010, 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 365 (1554), p. 2854. Copyright 
2010 by The Royal Society. Adapted and reprinted with permission. The data for 1990-2015 stems from 
Steinfeld et al. (2006) and for 2030-2050 from Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2006). Projections are shown 
in italics. The table differs slightly from the table 2 in section 2.1.2.3 adapted from Steinfeld and Chilonda 
(2006, 3). 
Two tables adapted from Thornton (2010, 2854) show past and projected trends in meat and 
milk consumption, both for the Majority and Minority World from 1980 to 2050. The per capita 
as well as the total consumption of both meat and milk is projected to rise everywhere; however,  
the growth is much higher in the Majority World. There, annual per capita meat consumption 
210 The per capita meat consumption in the Minority World in 2013 was 113 kilograms on Turtle Island,  114  
kilograms in Australia and New Zealand, and 77 kilograms in Europe. The per capita milk consumption in the  
Minority World in 2013 was 248 kilograms on Turtle Island, 219 kilograms in Australia and New Zealand, and 215  
kilograms in Europe (FAOSTAT 2017). The projected values of 83 kilograms of meat and 203 kilograms of milk  
on average might be rather conservative.
The per capita meat consumption in the Majority World in 2013 was 19 kilograms in Africa, 55 kilograms in  
Central  America,  45  kilograms  in  the  Caribbean,  81  kilograms in  South  America,  33  kilograms in  Asia,  38  
kilograms in Melanesia, 32 kilograms in Micronesia, and 102 kilograms in Polynesia (FAOSTAT 2017). The per 
capita milk consumption in the Majority World in 2013 was 44 kilograms in Africa, 105 kilograms in Central  
America, 70 ki-lograms in the Caribbean, 135 kilograms in South America, 60 kilograms in Asia, 39 kilograms in  
Melanesia, 11 kilograms in Micronesia, and 77 kilograms in Polynesia (FAOSTAT 2017).
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triples from 1980 to 2050, and milk consumption doubles. Total consumption of meat surges 
seven-fold and total consumption of milk multiplies more than five-fold. The growth in the Mi-
nority World, on the other hand, does not surpass 50 percent in any category. Nevertheless, as 
massive the upsurge in the Majority World is, the per capita consumption of animal products is 
still three times as large in the Minority World as in the Majority World. 211 To keep up with this 
demand, global meat production is expected to proliferate from 229 million tons in 1999/2001 
to 465 million tons in 2050; global milk production is anticipated to almost double from 580 to 
1,043 million tons (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 275).
As shown, demand is stagnating in the Minority World (see the next section) (Steinfeld 2004,  
20). Still, even in the Majority World demand is not distributed equally, and not consistent for  
all livestock species. Half of the growth rate Delgado et al. projected in 1999 is due to growth in 
China (FAO 2011b, 5). Consumption in urban areas is growing significantly more than in rural 
areas (FAO 2011b, vi). As for species-specific growth, monogastric livestock like poultry and 
pigs clearly account for the bulk of expansion (Delgado et al. 2000, 6). More specifically, the  
Livestock Revolution is said to be “spearheaded by the Poultry Revolution” (Farrell 2002, 1). 
For instance,  demand in poultry meat in South Asia is expected to grow by 850 percent until 
2030 (FAO 2011b, viii). Per capita production growth for ruminants, on the other hand, is de-
scribed as stagnating (FAO 2013, 142).212 
5.3 Reasons for the Revolution
Unlike previous revolutions, such as the Green Revolution, the Livestock Revolution is said to 
be demand-driven, not supply-driven (Delgado et al. 1999, 1). Furthermore, the Livestock Rev-
olution is portrayed as unfolding on a whole new quantitative level. The consumption of milk 
and meat in the Majority World between the 1970s to the mid-1990s is reported to be “over half 
as large” as the Green Revolution’s upsurge in cereal consumption (Delgado et al. 2000, 2). In 
addition, the Livestock Revolution is not only much larger but also much more lucrative. Its  
market value rose by approximately 155 billion USD, “more than twice the market value of in-
creased cereals  consumption” under  the  Green Revolution  (Delgado,  Rosegrant,  and Meijer 
2001, 1). Hence, big money is at play. 
211 In a more recent estimate, the Global Agenda expects the global demand for meat to rise by 85 percent from 
2005/2007 to 2050 (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016h). For milk, Tackling Climate Change expects 
an increase of 58 percent from the level in 2010 (Gerber et al. 2013, 1).
212 MacLachlan has calculated the fastest growth in the slaughter of different animal species (in absolute numbers) 
per region: for chickens, it is China and the USA, for pigs: China, goats: South Asia, China and Africa, cattle: In-
dia, Brazil and China (MacLachlan 2015, 29). For a full list of growth in demand for livestock products from 2000  
to 2030 in different world regions, compare FAO 2011b, 20.
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As specified above, the reasons advanced for the Revolution are income increase, population 
growth, and urbanization. Income growth is portrayed as the principal reason for the Livestock 
Revolution (Delgado et al. 1999, 5; FAO 2011b, viii; ILRI 2000a; Steinfeld et al. 2006, 9).213 
     
Figure 9: “The relationship between meat consumption and income.”
Reprinted  from  “Livestock  to  2020:  The  Next  Food  Revolution:  Food,  Agriculture,  and  the 
Environment,” by Delgado et al., 1999, p. 6.
 www.fao.org/Ag/againfo/resources/documents/lvst2020/20201.pdf.  Copyright  1999  by  International 
Food Policy Research Institute. Reprinted with permission.214
The hypothesis and storyline of increased income is equal to increased expenditure on livestock  
products is supported by figure 9 showing the positive, curved relationship between per capita  
income and per capita meat consumption. The outliers in the figure are attributed to cultural or 
religious characteristics. China is pictured as having a high preference for pork, whereas in In -
dia meat consumption is less widespread due to religious dietary rules. Price changes are men-
tioned as another economic factor for bigger consumption. Real prices of cereals, milk and meat  
have significantly fallen since the 1980s (Delgado et al. 1999, 6) (compare section 5.6.3).
In the Majority World, the proliferations in consumption have been “patchy” with massive up-
surges in consumption in China and Brazil, yet almost no growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of South Africa for poultry and Kenya for milk, there 
has even been a reduction in the per capita consumption of animal foods (Dijkman 2009, 2, 
compare also Sumberg 2003).  The FAO concludes: “It  would appear that economic growth 
must accompany population growth if the ‘revolution’ is to occur” (FAO 2011b, 3). 
213 For a study on the correlation between gross domestic product and meat consumption, see Speedy 2003.
214 “Note: Each dot is an observation for 1 of 78 developing and developed countries examined. The solid line is a 
statistically significant trend.” (Delgado et al. 1999, 6).
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Population growth is another factor for the Livestock Revolution: more people consume more 
meat and milk in absolute numbers. Population growth has been rapid in countries of the Major-
ity World: 2.1 percent per annum between 1970 and 1995 on average, according to the authors  
(Delgado et al. 1999, 8). Due to this rise, demand for animal protein would grow “enormously”  
even without an increase in per capita consumption, and this trend will continue (Delgado et al.  
1999, 12). Nonetheless, population growth equally requests a boost in cereal production by 50 
percent by 2050 (Herrero and Thornton 2013, 20878), yet nobody speaks of a “Cereal Revolu-
tion.” By 2050, the world population is expected to reach 9.3 billion (FAO 2016k). Most of this 
growth will take place in in the Majority World (FAO 2011b, 3), particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Thornton 2010, 2854). By 2050, the Majority World will be the home of 90 percent of 
the population (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran 2011, 3). 
The authors of the Livestock Revolution nominate urbanization as another major factor con-
tributing to higher meat consumption.215 Affluent urban citizens are described to be more likely 
to diversify their diets because they have more access to a variety of foods and they are said to  
prefer convenience over caloric content (Delgado et al. 1999, 6). Urban populations share dif-
ferent features: the average number of people in a household is smaller than in rural areas, and 
they include many single-person households. Moreover, urban populations have higher dispos-
able  incomes than rural  populations,  and,  finally,  they are confronted with intercultural  ex-
change and international trade (Smil 2002, 305–6; Steinfeld et al. 2006, 8).
Still, the Revolution is “not a ubiquitous phenomenon” (FAO 2011b, 6). In stark contrast to the 
Majority World, the demand for animal protein in the Minority World is described as stagnat -
ing. In 1999, the authors of the Livestock Revolution explain this low growth by pointing to 
“slow population growth, slowing urbanization, satiation of diets, and growing health concerns 
about high intakes of cholesterol and saturated fatty acids from some animal products” (Delgado 
et al. 1999, 59–60). In 2011, the FAO wrote that in the Minority World, “people already eat as 
much animal-source foods as they need and would like to,” and observed a trend of reduced 
consumption (FAO 2011b, 20). The feared health effects of a diet heavy in animal fats, whether  
cardio-vascular diseases, cancer, zoonosis, or pathogens related to those products, have resulted 
in “sporadically and sometimes permanently suppress[ing] demand for animal products” (Stein-
feld and Chilonda 2006, 5). Between 1961/1963 and 1997/1991, per capita consumption of ani-
mal protein increased by 25 percent, but stagnated from 1985-2004 (Steinfeld 2004, 21). For 
some authors, the “meat phase” is over: 
215 Urbanization will increase from 50 percent in 2008 to 70 percent in 2050, however very unevenly distributed  
(FAO 2011b, 4). Whereas in Latin America and the Caribbean, more than 80 percent of the population will be ur-
ban dwellers, in Africa, it will only be a fifth of the population (Dijkman 2009, 3). 
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“With low or no population growth, most OECD countries are past the ‘meat phase’ and 
markets as well as people are saturated.” (Steinfeld and Chilonda 2006, 5).
However, these projections are not without controversy among the institutions that put them for-
ward.  Pica-Ciamarra and Otte,  researchers at  the FAO Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative, 
problematize the essential arguments of the Livestock Revolution. According to their article 
“The ‘Livestock Revolution’: Rhetoric and Reality” (Pica-Ciamarra and Otte 2009), the growth 
in the livestock sector does not merit the term “revolution.” Their critique concerns, first, the  
geographic scale of the Revolution, second, the supposed reasons for Revolution, and thirdly, 
the pace of the sector’s growth. First, Pica-Ciamarra and Otte deem the Revolution a regional 
phenomenon rather than a global one, affecting only a few countries (in particular China, India 
and Brazil), and not all products from animal exploitation. Even on a smaller scale, the previ -
ously mentioned differences between classes and between rural and urban areas are remark-
able.216 Hence, general assertions about the Majority World (in the original: the “developing 
world”) are problematic (Pica-Ciamarra and Otte 2009, 8–9). Second, Pica-Ciamarra and Otte 
argue that the Revolution can predominantly be assigned to population growth and not to urban-
ization or income growth as purported by the Revolution authors. The exception is China, where 
the urban population consumes double or triple the amount of animal foods consumed by the ru-
ral population (Steinfeld and Chilonda 2006, 6). Third, the authors contend that, although the 
Revolution report from 1999 asserts a “rapid growth” of the sector, it does not substantiate what 
216 Pica-Ciamarra and Otte challenge the assertions of the Revolution report that global diets are undergoing a fun -
damental shift by comparing national food baskets of regions in the Majority World in the years 1980 and 2003.  
The comparison shows, according to the authors, that there are no distinguishing changes in food habits in Latin 
America, the Middle East, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Preference shifts for meat and milk are recorded 
in South Asia (meat constituted two percent of the basket by weight in 1980, and remained two percent in 2003; the  
percentage of milk in the basket rose from 16 to 21 percent) and East and Southeast Asia (the percentage of meat  
increased from five to nine percent of the food basket, and milk from two to three percent).  Yet, the biggest change 
has taken place in the consumption of fruit and vegetables in East and Southeast Asia: their share of the food basket  
more than doubled from 23 to 52 percent. Yet, nobody is talking about a “fruit and vegetable revolution” (Pica-Cia-
marra and Otte 2009, 7–8). Furthermore, the Revolution document claims that the rise in consumption is a phenom-
enon of the Majority World. Pica-Ciamarra and Otte analyze changes in annual per capita consumption of meat and 
milk from 1980/82 to 2001/03 and argue that a) there was a steady surge in the consumption of meat and milk in  
the Minority World, b) milk consumption has remarkably risen in South Asia, but not meat consumption, c) in  
North Africa and the Middle East, meat and milk consumption have been stagnating, and d) East and Southeast  
Asia, and Latin America showed an extraordinary increase in meat consumption, yet, not milk consumption (Pica-
Ciamarra and Otte 2009, 12–13).
Steinfeld provides a detailed regional assessment of the Revolution (however, without denying its existence): Sub-
Saharan Africa has low levels of animal protein consumption which constitutes five percent of daily caloric intake. 
Consumption will not outstandingly increase. In North Africa and Near East, the total consumption of animal pro-
tein is also relatively low, around 8.7 percent of caloric intake in 1997/1999. In Latin America and Caribbean, the 
intake of animal foods has a longer tradition and is relatively high: in 2004, animal protein represented 16.6 percent 
of caloric intake. Brazil has a special position, with 18.8 percent; consumption is expected to approach industrial 
levels by 2030. South Asia shows large increases in milk and poultry consumption. In East Asia, consumption of  
pig meat is especially increasing. In China, caloric intake levels were 15 percent in 2004, and are supposed to aug-
ment to 20  percent by 2030. Milk consumption is very low (seven kilograms in 1997/1999), however, egg con-
sumption is extremely high (15 kilograms in 1997/1999) (Steinfeld 2004, 22–23).
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“rapid” exactly conveys. Pica-Ciamarra and Otte analyze the annual growth rate in per capita 
meat and milk consumption by region for 1980 to 2003. According to their data, average annual 
growth rates, being lower than two percent, cannot be considered “rapid,” with the exception of 
East and Southeast Asia, and Brazil (Pica-Ciamarra and Otte 2009, 9–10).217 Notwithstanding 
their interesting assertions, their fundamental critique and the denial of the advent of a food rev-
olution has not been echoed at the FAO, International Livestock Research Institute, or Interna-
tional Food Policy Research Institute. 
PART A CAPITALIZING ON AND CONTROLLING NATURE
5.4 Sustainable intensification 
How should the massive and rapid increase in both consumption and production of animal pro-
tein be achieved? And how can its environmental and social challenges be mastered at the same 
time? The solution for “sustainably” furthering the Livestock Revolution has already been iden-
tified in the 1999 report (Delgado et al. 1999, vii): sustainable intensification. In the years after 
the Revolution document, the discourse of sustainable intensification in the animal-industrial 
complex has taken hold and gained standing. The multi-stakeholder partnership Global Agenda 
for Sustainable Livestock already bears the greening of the sector in its name.218 The Agenda 
partners believe that the livestock sector can address poverty and hunger eradication and the 
projected upsurge in demand by “promoting a sustained economic growth, inclusive social de-
velopment and an efficient use of natural resources” (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 
2015a, 4).  Indeed, “green livestock growth” and “greening livestock sector growth” are key 
messages of the Global Agenda (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016h). As elabo-
rated in section 3.3.4, both the expansion of industrial agriculture and small-scale organic farm-
ing have in the past been defined as measures of sustainable intensification. Yet, the approach 
chosen in the Livestock Revolution is its “harder, faster, better” version, the forceful furtherance 
of intensive production. The instruments suggested could have come straight from an ecological 
modernization textbook: “technological progress in the production, processing, and distribution 
of livestock products,” “[r]apid advances in feed improvement and genetic and reproductive 
217 MacLachlan maintains that the statistical picture of annual growth rates in consumption turns out to be complex.  
In Brazil, China, USA, Central America, and South America, average annual growth rates in meat consumption in  
kilotons and per capita have been higher in the period 1991-2001 than in the period 2001-2011. In India, Southeast  
Asia, and Africa, they have been higher in the period 2001-2011 than in the period 1991-2001. China, Brazil, Cen-
tral America, and Southeast Asia have witnessed the biggest growth rates. On average, global growth rates have  
equalized (meat consumption in kilotons: 1991-2001: 2.7 and 2001-2011: 2.8 and meat consumption per capita:  
1991-2001: 1.1 and 2001-2011: 1.3) (MacLachlan 2015, 26).
218 At its sixth multi-stakeholder partnership meeting in Panama in June 2016, the Agenda developed the Panama 
Declaration committing themselves to the “sustainable development of the livestock sector, to generate widespread 
benefits for people and the planet.” (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016e). The Agenda’s “main orienta -
tion” is the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its seventeen Sustainable Development 
Goals (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2015a, 1).
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technologies,” and “[i]nstitutional and regulatory development” (Delgado et al. 1999, 4). What 
follows is a presentation of the predominant measures and storylines of, first, efficiency increase 
and intensification, second, technological innovation, and third, regulation, management, and 
policy reform. As will be elaborated in the fourth section, they are, in sum, all measures for cap-
italizing on and governing nature as proposed by ecological modernization theory.
5.4.1 Efficiency
The number one instrument for business-as-usual sustainable intensification is increasing pro-
ductivity via increasing efficiency. Efficiency can have many aspects. For the Livestock Revo-
lution authors, it equals industrialization. Industrial systems are presented as innately efficient 
operations:  they are “knowledge- and management-intensive,” they “maximize[s]  the use of  
scarce resources,” they mobilize genotypes and biotechnology, and improve animal husbandry 
and veterinary care (Delgado et al. 1999, 17). Feeding practices in industrial agriculture are “so-
phisticated,” applying phased feeding, feed additives, and synthetic amino-acids (Delgado et al. 
1999, 18). In contrast, grazing systems are presented as “traditional operations,” which is to say, 
inefficient,  not  “knowledge-intensive” or  “sophisticated.”  The Revolution report  claims that 
grazing systems cover about 26 percent of the world’s land surface (Delgado et al. 1999, 45) yet 
provide only ten percent of meat production. In addition, with increasing land scarcity, “grazing 
systems lead to either land degradation and economic decline,” or they develop into mixed or  
industrial systems (Delgado et al. 1999, 17). Twenty percent of the world’s grazing areas are ac-
tually already degraded (Delgado et al. 1999, 45). 
The  International  Livestock  Research  Institute  highlights  the  need  to  sustainably  intensify 
smallholder mixed systems, on which the majority of poor people in the livestock sector rely 
(ILRI 2000a; 2002, 7; Wright et al. 2012); moreover, it calls to combine biotechnology and in-
dustrialization with agroecological approaches (Pinstrup-Andersen, Pandya-Lorch, and Roseg-
rant 1999). This suggestion remains isolated, however. Ten years after the Revolution docu-
ment, the discourse of intensification and structural change is alive and kicking. The FAO indi-
cates that there are three options for coping with bigger demand: production must “rapidly” in-
tensify, the number of producers must go up, or imports must increase (FAO 2011b, vi, 21). In  
regions where imports are not projected to increase, such as in India, domestic production must  
massively and rapidly intensify (FAO 2011b, 22).
There are substantial differences in productivity and resource use efficiency between different  
regions, types of livestock systems, and animal products, suggesting potential for improvement 
(Herrero and Thornton 2013, 20879). In the Majority World, the reduction of emissions per unit 
of output should be achieved through intensification, according to the 1999 report (Delgado et  
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al. 1999, 56).  The 2013 FAO study Tackling Climate Change observes “a direct link between 
GHG emission intensities and the efficiency with which producers use natural resources” (Ger-
ber et al. 2013, xiii).  Emission intensities are the emissions per unit  of animal product.  The 
range between the lowest and the highest emission intensities in milk production, for example,  
is from below 1.7 kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalents per kilogram milk to nine kilograms 
of carbon dioxide equivalents per kilogram milk.219 In this logic, the culprits are, again, grazing 
systems. They have, on average, the highest emission intensities (Gerber et al. 2013, 25–26).220 
By the same token, industrial systems have the lowest emission intensities for both ruminant 
and monogastric production.221
To close this efficiency gap, strategies exist at the animal, production unit, and supply chain lev-
els.  At  the  animal  level,  better  animal  health,  feed digestibility  and balance,  and improved 
breeding and genetics are methods that apply to both ruminants and monogastric animals (Ham-
mond 2000; Rege et al. 2011). At the production unit level, manure management and feed pro-
duction can be improved, and equipment should be energy efficient. At the supply chain level,  
waste should be minimized, and energy efficiency fostered (Gerber et al. 2013, 84).222 In total, 
emissions could be diminished “by between 18 and 30 percent […], if producers in a given sys-
tem, region and climate adopted the practices currently applied by the 10 to 25 percent of pro-
ducers with the lowest emission intensity.” (Gerber et al. 2013, 44). The authors of the Tackling 
Climate  Change report  underline that  the achievement of this  mitigation potential  does—in 
principle—not necessitate a change in production systems,223 but that the shift is de facto al-
219 “Emission intensities for beef are highest in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean,  
and East and Southeast Asia […]. Higher emissions are largely caused by low feed digestibility (leading to higher  
enteric and manure emissions), poorer animal husbandry and lower slaughter weights (slow growth rates leading to  
more emissions per kg of meat produced) and higher age at slaughter (longer life leading to more emissions)” (Ger-
ber et al. 2013, 26).
220 “The major mitigation potential lies in ruminant systems operating at low productivity, for example, in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Part of the mitigation potential can be achieved  
through better animal and herd efficiency. Mitigation potential is also important in intermediate pig production sys-
tems of East and Southeast Asia.” (Gerber et al. 2013, 44).
221 For ruminant production, as productivity increases, emission intensity decreases (Gerber et al. 2013, 42–43). The 
OECD countries are home to 20 percent of the global number of dairy cows, however, they produce 73 percent of  
global milk (Gerber et al. 2013, 76). The relationship is different for monogastric production, for example pig pro-
duction. It takes the shape of an inverted U curve: emission intensity in intermediate systems is higher than in both  
backyard and industrial production. As backyard spaces are limited, it is suggested to scale intermediate systems up  
to industrial systems (Gerber et al. 2013, 42–43). Interestingly, this assertion mirrors the Environmental Kuznets 
curve discussed in chapter three.
222 “Possible interventions to reduce emissions are thus, to a large extent, based on technologies and practices that  
improve production efficiency at animal and herd levels. They include the use of better quality feed and feed bal -
ancing to lower enteric and manure emissions. Improved breeding and animal health help to shrink the herd over-
head (i.e. unproductive part of the herd) and related emissions. Manure management practices that ensure the recov-
ery and recycling of nutrients and energy contained in manure and improvements in energy use efficiency along  
supply chains can further contribute to mitigation. Sourcing low emission intensity inputs (feed and energy in par -
ticular) is a further option.” (Gerber et al. 2013, xiii).
223 “This mitigation potential does not imply any farming system change and is based on existing and already ap -
plied technologies” (Gerber et al. 2013, 46); “the mitigation potential can be achieved within existing systems; this 
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ready taking place (Gerber et al. 2013, 47).224 The International Food Policy Research Institute 
has labeled this development “livestock industrialization” (Delgado and Narrod 2002; Delgado, 
Narrod, and Tiongco 2008).
Closing the efficiency gap is a priority of the Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock as well.  
For the Agenda partners, it is indispensable to elevate both natural resource efficiency and prof -
itability (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016h). Notably, efficiency increase is even 
defined as the first principle of sustainability (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014b, 
9).225 To enlarge productivity yet decrease land use, the sector should aim at “faster live weight  
gains,” “higher land-use intensity,” “higher pasture productivity,” and “larger use of cultivated 
feeds of good nutritive quality” (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016h). 
Private-public partnerships are a central instrument for reaching efficiency (Global Agenda for 
Sustainable Livestock 2016i, 2016b), and the private sector is lauded for its green initiatives and 
its “leadership role.”226 The Revolution report already claims in 1999 that the “private sector has 
played an important and often dominant role in boosting livestock productivity and solving en-
vironmental problems in industrial systems.” (Delgado et al. 1999, 63). 
Paradigmatic cases of ecological modernization are the promises of the environmental and eco-
nomic benefits of mitigation interventions, a typical win-win situation (Gerber et al. 2013, xiii).  
These technologies and practices  foster  “sustainable  food production,  economic growth and 
poverty alleviation” (Gerber et al. 2013, ix), serving “both mitigation and development objec-
tives”  (Gerber et al.  2013, xv). A “double,” or perhaps “triple dividend” is expected by the 
Global Agenda, too, which acts “towards improved sector performance by targeting natural re-
source  protection,  while  including  poverty  reduction  and  public  health  protection”  (Global 
Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016b). 
5.4.2 Technology 
means that the potential can be achieved as a result of improving practices rather than changing production systems 
(i.e. shifting from grazing to mixed or from backyard to industrial)” (Gerber et al. 2013, xiii).
224 “If the mitigation potential identified in this assessment does not require any system change, nor any change in  
the mix of products generated by the sector (i.e. milk, eggs, beef, etc.), these changes are de facto taking place and  
affect the overall emission intensity of livestock. The two commodities currently showing highest growth rates are  
among those with lowest global average emission intensity, namely milk and poultry […], which will tend to re -
duce average emission intensity per unit of protein. This is further accentuated by the fact that most of the growth is 
taking place among high productivity (dairy) and intensified (industrial broilers and layers) systems, which gener -
ally have the lowest emission intensity.” (Gerber et al. 2013, 47).
225 The Agenda’s five principles of sustainability are to: “(i) increase efficiency; (ii) enhance livelihoods and human 
well-being; (iii) protect resources; (iv) increase resilience; and (v) improve governance.” (Global Agenda for Sus-
tainable Livestock 2014b, 9).
226 In fact, the Tackling Climate Change publication explicitly mentions the International Dairy Federation, the U.S. 
Cattleman Association, and the “Walmart’s Global Sustainable Agriculture Goals” (Gerber et al. 2013, 98).
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“Technology remains the key component because future development, including that of the 
livestock sector, will depend upon land- and water-saving technology to substitute for use of 
natural resources. This trend toward knowledge-intensive systems can be widely observed. 
Smart  technologies,  supported by astute policies,  can help to meet future demand while 
maintaining the integrity of the natural resource base” (Delgado et al. 1999, 57).
“Technology is  necessary  for  the  radical  redirection  of  global  food systems” (Thornton 
2010, 2864).
Technological change is presented as “the key to solving environmental problems” (Delgado et 
al. 1999, 48), and to foster productivity. For the publication Livestock’s Long Shadow, the “most 
promising approach” to decreasing emissions from farmed animals is “better nutrition and ge-
netics,” including the genetic manipulation of the animal’s digestion (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 119). 
In the words of the Tackling Climate Change document, breeding and genetics should “increase 
feed conversion ratios and reduce nitrogen and organic matter excreted per unit  of product” 
(Gerber et al. 2013, 84). 50 to 90 percent of the nutrients in animal feed are excreted in manure,  
and 20 to 30 percent of the dietary energy are not digested by farmed animals (Global Agenda  
for Sustainable Livestock 2016i). Concrete measures in feed technology include probiotic and 
antibiotic feed additives, microbiological techniques, microbial genomics, precision in animal 
feeding,  changing the rumen to better digest high-fiber feed, and administering growth hor-
mones (Delgado et al. 1999, 52–54; McCrabb et al. 2005).
Reproductive technologies are equally to be applied and improved. They range from artificial  
insemination, embryo transfer, selection of local breeds and crossbreeding, to advances in ge-
netics (Delgado et al. 1999, 52–58; Rothschild and Plastow 2014). Genetic engineering is gener-
ally used as a method for sustainable intensification (Holloway 2015). Genomic selection, intro-
duced in subdivision 2.1.4.2,  might “revolutionize animal breeding” as a whole, according to 
Thornton (2010,  2858). Onteru, Ampaire, and Rothschild (2010) explore the possibilities of 
transgenic technology and animal cloning in the Majority World. Other directions are nanotech-
nology227 and transgenic livestock. Thornton maintains that nanotechnology “could redefine the 
entire notion of agriculture and many other human activities” (2010, 2864).228 Even though most 
227 Nanotechnology involves matter at the nanometer, this means of 1-100nm size (Kuzma 2010).
228 Uses of nanotechnologies in animal production include the detection and removal of pathogens and microbial  
contaminants in CAFOs (on dead or live animals, in their waste, and feed), the delivery of vaccines or hormones, 
genetic engineering of livestock increasing reproduction and fertility, the quality/design of animal-derived food,  
and supply-chain tracking (Chen and Yada 2011; Kuzma 2010). Nanotechnology can be used to improve water  
quality and availability in terms of microbial disinfection, desalination, and removal of heavy metals. Moreover, it  
can enhance animal feed by adding nutrients or digestive aids, hereby increasing feeding efficiency and ultimately 
profitability. Precision farming, minimizing inputs and maximizing outputs, is an area of application in feed pro-
duction. Nanotechnology can help deliver agricultural chemicals and therefore decrease run-off, it can be deployed 
in field sensing systems, or genetic engineering (Chen and Yada 2011, 586–90). 
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nanotechnological applications in the agricultural sector are still at the research and develop-
ment stage, researchers are confident that they will be applied on a large scale in the near future 
(Chen and Yada 2011, 586). Transgenic animal milk with human proteins, on the other hand,  
could be “essential for lowering the production costs of numerous pharmaceuticals that remain 
out of reach for all but the relatively rich,” according to the 1999 Revolution report (Delgado et  
al. 1999, 43).229 Transgenic technology can change existing genetic information or introduce 
new,  exogenous information into  genomes.  The difference  from traditional  breeding is  that 
transgenic technology does not halt at the “species barrier” but can select desired traits of other 
species (Laible 2009, 123–24).230
One crucial element is the transfer of technology and knowledge from the Minority World to the 
Majority World (Delgado et al. 1999, 52), or, in the words of the Global Agenda,  “from the 
world’s most to least efficient production systems.”231 Such transfer would cover genetics, feed-
ing systems, and animal health control (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016h). The 
adoption of  biotechnology in the Majority World  should be promoted through microfinance 
schemes or subsidies if long-term financial aid is needed (Gerber et al. 2013, xiv, refer also to  
ILRI 2002, 17). 
Shifting from low-productive breeds to fewer animals of high-productivity is one strategy for 
the Livestock Revolution (Herrero et al. 2009, 117).232 Another tactic is to switch from exploit-
ing ruminants to exploiting monogastric species (Herrero and Thornton 2013, 20879). By 2020, 
229 Human milk has a high concentration of the antimicrobial protein lysozyme (Laible 2009, 128).
230 Given the prevalent lactose intolerance of the majority of people around the globe, one (lucrative) aim of trans-
genic technology is to lower the content of lactose in (cow) milk. Such transgenic milk, “an elegant alternative to 
expensive post-harvest milk processing,” is being researched in mouse models (Laible 2009, 128). The reduction of 
unhealthy saturated fatty acids is another clear objective in developing transgenic milk and meat. Animal fats pro -
voke coronary heart and cardiovascular diseases. To solve this problem, alien enzymatic activities are being intro-
duced in mammals, inducing a higher concentration of unsaturated fatty acids and even of omega-3 fatty acids that  
are normally found in fish. According to Laible, this “sustainable strategy to fortify meat” could compete with the  
current practice of feeding fishmeal to livestock (Laible 2009, 130–31). The environmental benefits of transgenic  
technology are, apart from boosted productivity and the reduction of livestock in numbers, mitigation methods: for  
instance, the introduction of genes to better digest and utilize feed can diminish phosphate supplements and, thus, 
phosphate excretion. The future risks of climate change, and the “immense pressures” that will be put on livestock  
including a possible “struggle for survival” are an important justification for transgenic technologies, according to  
Laible (2009, 132–33).
231 Technologies “have to be adapted and disseminated to the developing world to eliminate low productivity” (Del -
gado et al. 1999, 52).
232 However, Tackling Climate Change warns that the emission intensity from beef produced from specialized breed 
herds is twice as high as from dairy herds. “This difference is primarily due to the fact that dairy herds produce both  
milk and meat while, on the other hand, specialized beef herds mostly produce beef. As a consequence, emissions  
from dairy herds are attributed to milk and meat while emissions from beef herds are allocated to meat (in both  
cases, a limited fraction is allocated to other goods and services, such as draught power, and manure used as fuel).”  
(Gerber et al. 2013, 24–25). In Europe, only 20 percent of beef stems from specialized breed herds; the majority  
stems from dairy cows and “surplus calves,” which explains low emission intensities (Gerber et al. 2013, 26).
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44 percent of total meat production will stem from chickens, which will be the number one ex-
ploited species (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran 2011, 1).
5.4.3 Policy reform, regulation, management
“The worst thing that well-motivated agencies can do is to cease public investments that fa-
cilitate economic, sustainable, and small-operator forms of market-oriented livestock pro-
duction. Lack of action will not stop the Livestock Revolution, but it will help ensure that 
the form it takes is less favorable for growth, poverty alleviation, and sustainability in the 
developing countries.” (Delgado et al. 2000, 10; Delgado, Rosegrant, and Meijer 2001, 21).
“Experience in both developed and developing countries confirms that a laissez-faire ap-
proach, simply standing back and allowing market forces to play out, is not a viable option.” 
(FAO 2005, 3). 
Next to technological change, ecological modernization theory and similarly the discourse of  
the Livestock Revolution advise environmental regulation and management of waste (Gerber et 
al. 2005), feed, and water (Amede et al. 2009; Sraïri 2011) to “sustain growth.” Mechanisms 
mirroring the value of natural resources are proposed as a general mitigation option (Delgado et 
al. 1999, 48). Livestock’s Long Shadow advocates pricing natural resources in order to internal-
ize the “externalities” of environmental degradation:
“Most frequently natural resources are free or underpriced, which leads to overexploitation 
and pollution” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, xxiii). 
“A top priority is to achieve prices and fees that reflect the full economic and environmental 
costs, including all externalities” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, xxiv). 
“There should be secure and if possible tradable rights to water, land, use of common land 
and waste sinks” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, xxiii).
“Many environmental  goods and services  are not  traded  and,  while  they  are  obviously 
valued by society, they do not have a market price. In the absence of a market, valuing the 
environment in an appropriate way presents formidable challenges” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 
223).
The Tackling Climate Change report recommends “to introduce supporting policies to constrain 
emissions in the sector (e.g. through tradable or non-tradable emission permits)” and regulations  
against deforestation (Gerber et al. 2013, 88). Nature is correspondingly transformed into a mar-
ket by comprehending the animal-industrial complex as a “livestock-based bio-economy.” For 
the Global Agenda, a bio-economy “generates smart, resource efficient, and carbon-neutral con-
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sumption and production methods and technologies.” (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 
2015a, 33).233
As outlined earlier, the Livestock Revolution discourse depicts pastures as inefficient and de-
graded.  The  Revolution  authors  charge  “inadequate  property  rights  or  enforcement  mecha-
nisms” and “lack of market access,” but also “politically motivated subsidies to large produc-
ers” (Delgado et al. 1999, 10, 58). For the Global Agenda, overgrazing is a consequence of low 
productivity, and poverty (Global Agenda of Action 2013, 5). Steinfeld even terms it “poverty-
led degradation” (Steinfeld 2004, 35).234 As a solution, the Revolution authors suggest “[i]nstitu-
tional change in property rights in commercializing smallholder areas” (Delgado et al. 2000, 10) 
and grazing fees to lessen grazing pressure (Delgado et al. 1999, 58). A more radical proposal is  
to reorient pastoralists to provide environmental services. In contrast to taxing the use of natural 
resources (FAO 2005, 6–7), the instrument “payments for ecosystem/environmental services” 
(outlined in part 3.3.3) compensates those people who do not use resources, but safeguard them. 
Livestock’s Long Shadow advances payment for ecosystem services as a solution on the local,  
national and international level (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 281). The discourse targets extensive, tra-
ditional systems that  are “often difficult  to intensify.”235 In addition, extensive systems face 
“market barriers in accessing modern value chains,” and can thus not compete (Gerber et al.  
2013, 2). Consequently, the suggestion is to stop extensive farming:
“Little productive extensive systems,” “doubtful” to survive in a world demanding for 
“environmental services”, “[…] need to be re-oriented towards adding environmental 
service provision, rather than mere production or subsistence” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 280).
In sum, biodiversity stewardship, carbon sequestration,236 and eco-tourism can be future markets 
for the services of poor smallholders (ILRI 2002, 7).237 Herders and livestock keepers should be 
compensated for these services and concomitant grasslands restoration.  Yet,  in order for these 
233 In more detail, a “bio-economy strives to integrate the biomass flows of different industries in such a way that 
one industry’s waste or emissions become another industry’s raw material.” As livestock uses a large part of hu-
man-appropriated biomass, the sector must be linked to the bio-economy. “The bio-economy, particularly the live-
stock-based bio-economy, is an essential part” of the solutions to future food and water need, and climate change 
mitigation and adaption, according to the Agenda, and they suggest transforming organic waste into “a range of  
value-added products.” Such biomass can be used as “renewable raw materials for industry” (Global Agenda for  
Sustainable Livestock 2015a, 43).
234 “[P]overty-led degradation is occurring in semi-arid and humid environments due to increased population pres -
sure, ill-defined resources access, and poor access to markets and financial services. Degradation reinforces poverty  
by reducing the productivity of shared resources and by increasing vulnerability.” (Steinfeld 2004, 35).
235 See in addition Steinfeld et al. 2006, 118–19. The Revolution authors maintain that “[i]n places where land is  
‘free’ (such as most of the African Sahel), more intensive use of the land without additional inputs could further de-
grade its productivity.” (Delgado et al. 2000, 9; Delgado, Rosegrant, and Meijer 2001, 20). Note the problematic 
description of the “free land.”
236 The potential for carbon sequestration in grassland areas is considerable and could offset around 0.6 gigatons car -
bon dioxide equivalents per year (Gerber et al. 2013, xiii, 89).
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mechanisms to work, institutional change is necessary.  Communally managed land “without 
clear ownership or access entitlements” is not only blamed for land degradation, but can simi -
larly pose “significant challenges” for carbon sequestration. The hurdles include management, 
“ownership of soil carbon assets,” and monitoring to decrease non-permanence risks (Gerber et  
al. 2013, 89). Fundamentally, common-property pastures do not fit the industrial model of live-
stock production: the return on investment to individuals is complicated (Costales, Gerber, and 
Steinfeld 2006, 23).
Nevertheless, the authors of the Livestock Revolution do not only criticize pastoralists and com-
mon property regimes. In a rather conflicting account, they place responsibility on the dominant 
development: subsidized, polluting, large-scale industrial production promoted by market dis-
tortions (Delgado et al. 2000, 10, 48).238 Next to subsidies, governments should tackle  trade 
policies and exchange rates, develop environmental regulation and financial incentives, and en-
sure market access and agricultural support services for smallholders (FAO 2005, 5–7; Gerber  
et al. 2013, 83–85). The Global Agenda even recommends “reconnecting specialized livestock 
production to crop agriculture” (Global Agenda of Action 2013, 3) in order to recycle nutrients 
and energy in manure, principally reverting the metabolic rift introduced in the part on CAFOs 
(2.1.3.1). Such recycling provides mineral fertilizer and simultaneously curtails waste, nutrient 
overload, and greenhouse gas emissions (Global Agenda of Action 2013, 5).239 Herrero et al. 
topple the astonishing disruption in the discourse with a uniquely controversial assessment: 
“Research on mechanisms for de-intensifying these [industrial] systems is an exciting new 
opportunity that requires further research to fully elucidate the impacts of these changes on 
food supply and environmental impacts.” (Herrero et al. 2009, 113).
Nonetheless,  the  literature  on  environmental  mitigation  technologies  and  practices  is  much 
vaster than the one on policies (Gerber et al. 2013, 91). The Tackling Climate Change text dis-
approves that mitigation policies remain, in the end, non-binding,240 and that they have to be 
economically attractive in order to gain acceptance (Gerber et al. 2013, 99–100). Yet, they argue 
that “collective action is now urgently needed” (Gerber et al. 2013, 101), given “the nature of 
237 Another option are silvo-pastoral techniques. In silvo-pastoral systems, farmers raise more animals per hectare,  
still, they compensate those emissions by planting and conserving trees (FAO 2005, 6–7).
238 “Distortions in domestic capital markets often promote inefficient, large-scale pig, milk, and poultry production 
in the peri-urban areas of developing countries. These policies distort the pattern of livestock development and ulti-
mately cannot be sustained. Further, poor environmental regulations, distortions in the marketing chain that prevent  
competition from rural areas, and lack of legal accountability for pollution promote urban piggeries and dairies that  
cannot adequately dispose of waste materials.” (Delgado et al. 2000, 10).
239 The Agenda calls this tactic “Waste to worth.” Methods include using animal manure as fertilizer on crops or in  
fishponds, or using it as compost or for biogas production (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016i).
240 The authors draw a parallel to the Kyoto Protocol. An additional shortcoming is that most carbon markets do not 
include the emissions of the livestock sector (Gerber et al. 2013, 92).
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climate change as a global public good,” and “the effect of climate [change] has started to be 
felt in everyone’s life” (Gerber et al. 2013, x). 
5.4.4 Critique
The suggested measures to further the Revolution and control the environmental repercussions 
fit  the  classic  eco-modernist  agenda:  the  storylines  range  from  the  belief  in  technological  
progress, managing the environmental crisis with regulation and institutional change, to public-
private partnerships and the “triple dividend” expected in the combination of economic growth, 
natural resources protection, and poverty alleviation. The free market environmentalism of the 
Revolution discourse literally transforms nature into a market, allotting a price to and trading 
environmental goods and services. It calculates environmental damage, internalizes the “exter-
nalities,” and remunerates environmental stewardship, as in the proposed reorientation of farm-
ers towards the provision of ecosystem services.
In a quantitative diachronic study of the Revolution discourse, the growing prominence of valu-
ing nature in economic terms is represented by the increasing appearance of words like “natural 
resource use,” “environmental assessment,” “environmental accounting,” or “environmental ser-
vices.”  Resonating the discursive shift  from nature  to  environment  historically  observed by 
Luke (1995, 60) (compare chapter three), the Revolution report (Delgado et al. 1999), the Tack-
ling Climate  Change publication (Gerber  et  al.  2013),  and the Global  Agenda Action Plan 
(Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2015a) never reference “nature” as such (compare 
the discourse statistics in appendix 3).241 
Extensive and subsistence agriculture of “the poor” is blamed for environmental—“poverty-
led”—degradation and inefficiency (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 114, 280).  Land degradation is de-
picted as “tragedy of the commons,” hence the call for a change in property rights and institu-
tions. In the words of Luke, this form of sustainable development is sustainable degradation. 
The degradation inherent in the sector’s growth is not perceived as a problem as long as there  
are mechanisms to monitor and manipulate it (Luke 2006, 99). The necessity of such “green 
livestock growth” disregards the inherent biophysical contradictions of capitalism—the impossi-
bility of infinite growth in a finite world, and the degradation of the very resources humanity de-
pends on. Those contradictions and the problems originating in intensive agriculture are simply 
241 Additionally, while it is obvious that the term “sustainable” would feature prominently in the Global Agenda Ac-
tion Plan, its count of 155 mentions in 55 pages is still overwhelming. The word principally appears as “sustainable  
development,” but also, and this is novel, as “sustainable sector development,” “sustainable livestock,” and “sus -
tained growth” (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2015a).
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overpowered in the industrial meat regime, and “solved” with more intensification—albeit “sus-
tainable” one.242 
In the animal-industrial complex, sustainable intensification signifies sustainable  exploitation. 
As maintained in section 3.3.4 on sustainable intensification, the Livestock Revolution is the  
principal motive for the perceived need for sustainable intensification in the first place. Animal 
products are very resource-intensive, highly inefficient food items. But the obligation to con-
sume them is seldom questioned. On the contrary, the dietary substitution of meat and milk for  
grain is presented as an obvious, biological fact (which will be discussed in-depth in section 
5.7). This form of sustainable intensification hence follows a narrow productivism. One risk of 
such an approach is the rebound effect (compare footnote 157). As a matter of fact,  Tackling 
Climate Change fears that the ecological benefits of efficiency improvements could be equal-
ized by the subsequent expansion of production, both in increasing herd size, intensification,  
and additional clearing of land (Gerber et al. 2013, 87–88). Herrero and Thornton similarly ob-
serve the “perverse incentive” that increasing productivity and revenue incites farmers to in-
crease their farm size, although the goal of “environmentally friendly animal farming” would be  
to  “produce  more  with  fewer  but  more  productive  animals.”  (Herrero  and Thornton  2013,  
20879).243 
Environmental regulations, “sophisticated” feeding practices, “knowledge- and management-in-
tensive” systems,  genetics,  optimizing emission intensities,  carbon sequestration,  knowledge 
transfer from the Majority to the Minority World, and institutional change are not neutral, apo-
litical mechanisms. Graeber defines policy the following:
 
“The notion of ‘policy’ presumes a state or governing apparatus which imposes its will on 
others. ‘Policy’ is the negation of politics; policy is by definition something concocted by 
some form of elite, which presumes it knows better than others how their affairs are to be  
conducted. By participating in policy debates the very best one can achieve is to limit the 
damage, since the very premise is inimical to the idea of people managing their own af-
fairs.” (Graeber 2004, 9).
242 Ripple et al.’s observation on climate change mitigation also applies to the animal-industrial complex: “So far,  
global climate policy instruments have mainly focused on engineering improved industrial processes, energy effi -
ciency and investments in alternative energy generation technologies,  because sustainability has been predomi-
nantly interpreted as technological progress rather than changed patterns of human behaviour.” (Ripple et al. 2013,  
4).
243 The Tackling Climate Change report projects global average emission intensity to decrease, thanks to productiv-
ity gains. Further, the total emission intensities of the sector as a whole are projected to decrease, as well, because 
livestock products from monogastric species have a higher growth rate than products from ruminant species. None-
theless, the efficiency gains will not be capable to offset the increasing emissions due to the sector’s overall growth  
(Gerber et al. 2013, 100). 
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Technological progress, “necessary for the radical redirection of global food systems,” accord-
ing  to  Thornton  (2010,  2864),  is  not  a  decontextualized  “magic  wand of  ingenuity”  either 
(Malm and Hornborg 2014,  64).  FAO author  Hoffmann lauds poultry breeding companies’ 
“highly successful way of protecting their intellectual property investment in superior breeds” 
(Hoffmann 2005, 57). Such solutions are about making money. These measures reflect and en-
tail a world of private property and state or corporate access and control, on both the intellectual  
and physical level. One is inclined to speak of “imperial meat” or “imperial milk.”244
The discourse is saturated with storylines distracting from underlying power structures.  The 
Tackling Climate Change document, in defining climate change as a matter of collective action, 
conceals globally differentiated responsibilities.  Yet,  such large-scale emissions are not “hu-
manity’s” fault: As presented in the third chapter, in 2008, the Minority World, home to 18.8 
percent of the human population, has emitted 72.7 percent of carbon dioxide emissions since 
1850. “A significant chunk of humanity is not party to the fossil economy at all”—the account-
ability for climate change of around a sixth of the populace tends to zero (Malm and Hornborg 
2014, 65). This unequal liability is matched with the unequal distribution of ecological destruc-
tion, and the power to counter it—also as producers. All the texts fail to mention that people in  
the Minority World have the capital to outsource their environmental destruction, they have the 
capital to simply move their home or production to a region less affected by climate change, and 
they have the capital to apply mitigation strategies. 
In summary, whereas the Minority World is responsible for the bulk of the ecological dilemma 
and meat consumption—consuming three times as much as the Majority World, the proposed 
changes, in the forms of intensification and new regulations, should chiefly take place in the  
Majority World (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 6, 81). As Banerjee states, “[t]he Third World, still in 
need of development, now needs to be told how to develop sustainably” (2003, 174).
5.5 Animals in the Livestock Revolution 
How are animals portrayed in the Revolution discourse? What about animal welfare? As elabo-
rated in the introduction, animal welfare is a growing concern worldwide; social movements 
and academia continue to draw attention to the emotional, intellectual and physical capacities of  
nonhuman animals. What about the papers examined in this study? And finally, what are the im-
plications of sustainable intensification for farmed animals? What is particularly “sustainable” 
about sustainable intensification, and how do animals experience their exploitation turned sus-
tainable? 
244 This image reminds of Imperial Leather (MacClintock 1995). 
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5.5.1 Representation in the discourse
In the Livestock Revolution discourse, the machine-like language of the documents studied here 
corresponds to the instrumental and industrialized treatment of farmed animals. These animals  
are called “a key commodity for human well-being” (Herrero et al. 2009, 111) or mere “food 
producing animals”  (Steinfeld 2004, 37); chickens and pigs are characterized as “short-cycle 
species” (Steinfeld 2004, 31). In the account of the poultry revolution, Farrell writes that “[b]ird  
performance is predicted to improve in all categories” (2002). After the outbreak of BSE, the  
“destruction of large numbers of animals” was necessary (World Bank 2005, x). Thornton et al.  
call animal genetic resources “the ultimate non-renewable resource” (Thornton et al. 2009, 120).  
Another illustration is the glossary of  Tackling Climate Change which explicates some of the 
technical terms in livestock production. The applied terminology does not indicate the involve-
ment of any sentient beings whatsoever; on the contrary, it defines the animals as pure machines 
of productivity, as in this brief list of examples:
“Age at first calving (farrowing) The time spent between birth and first calving (farrow-
ing); i.e. the age at which a heifer (gilt) becomes a cow (sow).
Breeding overhead Animals dedicated to reproduction, rather than to production; i.e. ani-
mals necessary to maintain herd/flock size.
Broiler Chicken reared for meat.
Cohort Class of animals within a herd/flock defined by their age, sex and function (e.g. 
adult females, replacement females, males for fattening).
Co-product Output from a production activity that generates more than one output (e.g. 
milk, meat, manure and skins are among the co-products of dairy production). The term 
does not include services that may also be provided (e.g. draught power).
Layer Chicken reared to produce eggs for human consumption.
Productivity Amount of output obtained per unit of production factor. In this report, it is 
used to express amount of product generated per unit of livestock and time (e.g. kg milk per 
cow per year).” 
(Gerber et al. 2013, xviii–xxi [original emphasis]).
If animals are principally portrayed as “production factors,” what kind of consideration does 
their welfare get? In general, animal welfare merits only occasional mention,245 yet its promi-
nence grows over time.246 The Revolution report classifies animal welfare as an issue of “inten-
sified systems in developed countries,” but also in India because of religious reasons. It  ad-
dresses the “ethical issues” industrialization raises, as well as the “concerns about animal wel -
245 The two publications from animal welfare organizations, Garcés 2002 and AWFW 2016, are truly the sole docu-
ments on the Livestock Revolution that dedicate so much as an entire paragraph on the impact of the Revolution 
on farmed animals. Suffice it to say, animal welfare generally is almost never considered in climate change mitiga -
tion strategies in the livestock sector (Shields and Orme-Evans 2015).
246 Compare the discourse statistics provided in appendix 3. 
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fare and the unpleasantness suffered by those who live downwind from major industrial hog 
farms.” (Delgado et al. 1999, 37).247 In an Indian case-study of the Livestock Revolution, Khan 
and Bidabadi (2004, 102) remark on potential future “immense animal suffering.” Livestock’s  
Long Shadow maintains that animal welfare concerns motivate certain consumers to lower their 
consumption (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 11). Steinfeld lists animal welfare issues in “unregulated” 
intensified  production.  In  such  systems,  animals  are  not  able  to  express  their  “natural  be-
havioural features,” a condition “associated with real and suggested animal suffering.” Long-
distance trade is another detrimental element, as is genomic selection for increasing productivity 
that impinges the animals’ skeletal and circulatory systems (Steinfeld 2004, 39). Steinfeld is 
convinced that consumers in “more affluent societies” are concerned by this situation and will  
assert a larger influence in regulating animal production (Steinfeld 2004, 39–40; compare also 
Vercoe, Fitzhugh, and Kaufmann 2000, 412). The  Tackling Climate Change publication asks 
for safeguards “to avoid the potential negative side-effects of efficiency gains” in the form of  
poor welfare (Gerber et al. 2013, xiv). Throughout the hundred pages of the document, “animal 
welfare” is mentioned four times, mainly in relation to trade-offs with more efficient production 
(Gerber et al. 2013, xiv, 60, 88). The Global Agenda admonishes intensive agriculture to have 
met demand-led growth and concurrently neglected “other aspects of sustainable development, 
including animal welfare” (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014b, 9), and pleas  to 
“respect socially desirable outcomes that are not the immediate focus of Agenda-related activi-
ties” such as animal welfare, public health, or animal genetic diversity (Global Agenda for Sus-
tainable Livestock 2016b, 6). The Agenda even advances a labeling scheme for improved ani-
mal welfare as a strategy for smallholders to diversify their products. Like that, markets can be  
created  and  expanded,  according  to  the  Agenda  (Global  Agenda  for  Sustainable  Livestock 
2014b, 5). 
This instrumentalization of animal welfare for profit is consistent in all the scrutinized docu-
ments: Livestock’s Long Shadow recommends that “improving animal genetics and minimizing 
animal stress (adapted brooding, ventilation and animal health measures) improves weight gain 
and, therefore, feed efficiency” (Steinfeld et al.  2006, 172).  Tackling Climate Change treats 
“poor animal health” not as a welfare issue, but as an issue of lower herd productivity (Gerber et 
al. 2013, 73).  Thornton argues that while there is “conflicting evidence as to the potential for  
adding value to animal products through higher welfare standards,” “[i]mproving animal wel-
fare  need  not  penalize  business  returns  and indeed may increase  profits.”  (Thornton  2010,  
2863). 
247 In addition, the report mentions “the esteem that traditional stockraisers everywhere hold for their cattle” and the 
ambiguities of genetic engineering (Delgado et al. 1999, 43).
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The higher returns on products from animal exploitation thanks to animal welfare labels are a 
prototypical win-win situation of ecological modernization. The problems are regulated, and in 
the end, there is even financial gratification from it. The system as such is not questioned or  
overturned. In a paper on animal captivity, Acampora ponders that the zoo reformer “wants the 
inmates to feel as comfortable, as snug, and as much at home as possible” (Acampora 2005,  
109, quoted in Morin 2016, 2). The same can be said about animal welfare and “happy meat.” 
The only reason to make the confined animals feel better is to make them more governable, con-
trollable, compliant,  and healthier,  all  of which guarantees their sustainable exploitation and 
generates  higher returns.  Garnett  and Godfray observe the widely shared priority of  animal 
health because of its economic benefits in the wider sustainable intensification policy field (Gar-
nett and Godfray 2012, 35). Not surprisingly, in stakeholder partnerships, where big animal wel-
fare organizations join large corporations and producers’ organizations—the Global Agenda for 
Sustainable Livestock is a paradigmatic illustration –, greener production is advertised as a good 
bargain for producers.248 They can focus on quality instead of quantity, and profit from a label 
which will  “boost profitability by increasing margins” (MacMillan and Durrant 2009, 13).249 
Nevertheless, the only winner of such campaigns is, eventually, the animal industry which gets 
more returns,  credibility, and the “license” to exploit  even more farmed animals (Francione  
2012, 257).250 As a matter of fact, the market for “sustainable” animal foods with a welfare label 
is booming.  Organic animal products promise attractive revenues: organic meat is on average 
twice as expensive as non-organic meat. The organic market has a lucrative outlook in India,  
Brazil and China.251 In the Minority World, animal foods with a green or welfare label are an  
equally promising business. Still, the percentage of organic meat on the market is on average 
below two percent (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 47, 49).252 
This extremely low figure illustrates, first, that there is major growth potential, and second, that  
sustainable meat has an impressive discursive power.  Whereas the Livestock Revolution has 
far-reaching repercussions, affecting the lives of millions of nonhuman and human animals, and, 
yet, gets relatively little attention, products like “happy meat” or “organic milk” with an animal  
welfare label are extraordinarily prominent and dominate the imagery of ads and supermarkets,  
248 Typical cases are  the “Livestock consumption and climate change—A framework for dialogue” report by the 
Food Ethics Council and the World Wildlife Foundation UK (MacMillan and Durrant 2009) or the “Reviewing the 
Costs: The Economics of Moving to Higher Welfare Farming” report by Compassion in World Farming (CIWF 
2011). 
249 However, van der Zijpp, Wilke, and Carsan (2010, 142) fear that strict animal welfare regulations in the Minority 
World may shift intensive production to the Majority World.
250 Moreover, meat producers are creating their own animal welfare standards, and the multiplicity of labels is both  
pacifying and distracting self-declared “ethical” consumers (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Eu-
rope 2014, 47).
251 The organic market in India was worth 190 million USD in 2012. From 2012 to 2015, it had already boosted its 
sales to one billion USD (Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe 2014, 49).
252 Jamieson and Stanescu estimate that in the United States, it is one percent (Jamieson 2008, 185–86; Stanescu  
2013, 104).
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notwithstanding their  limited empiric  occurrence.  In  addition,  not  only is  the percentage of 
farmed animals reared in a “happy, sustainable way” minimal, their “happy” life nonetheless 
ends with being killed. And how exactly a “happy death” should look like is a neglected issue in 
the green discourse (Jenkins and Stanescu 2014; Stanescu 2011).253 
Besides, “sustainable” meat involves all the usual, abhorring practices debated in chapter 2.2  
and continued in the next paragraph, such as gassing male chickens at birth, specialized breeds 
that are prone to diseases, artificial insemination, continuous pregnancies, separating the moth-
ers from their babies, and so on (Stanescu 2013, 103). In sum, not only do animal welfare labels 
and products like “sustainable meat” not fulfill their pledge, and thus instrumentalize their green 
label for generating profits, they additionally reform, naturalize, and legitimize animal exploita-
tion in general.254 
Steinfeld’s comments on animal welfare violations and “real and suggested animal suffering” in 
“unregulated” intensified production, and the concerns those circumstances raise in “more afflu-
ent societies,” are, albeit subtly, vilifying production and consumers in the Majority World as  
indifferent about animal welfare. The augmented yet “enlightened” sustainable exploitation of 
animals in the Minority World with its animal welfare standards is then an indicator of societal 
“advancement.” Not only does Steinfeld represent the Minority World as more “progressive” or 
“civilized,” he also conceals that violence and exploitation are the daily consequences of animal  
exploitation in “regulated” as much as in “unregulated” systems. It is animal production itself  
that innately forbids the “expression of natural behavioural features” Steinfeld laments.  Tack-
ling Climate Change’s observation on animal welfare “side-effects” is a similar misrepresenta-
tion of “sustainable” animal exploitation. In the animal-industrial complex, capital is generated 
with animal exploitation, and the violence enacted on animals, those “side-effects,” is the indus-
try’s very foundation. 
5.5.2 Effects of sustainable intensification
“Increased production can be derived by a combination of expansion in animal numbers and 
increased productivity, the latter being a compound of higher off-take rates (shorter produc-
tion cycles by, for example, faster fattening), and higher carcass weight or milk and egg 
yields.” (Steinfeld 2004, 28).
253 In an article on the discourse of Australian environmentalism, McGregor ponders: “The right to a humane death  
does not question the right of humans to kill/cull, instead it is the method of killing/culling that becomes central.”  
(McGregor 2004, 600).
254 Stanescu offers an excellent critical analysis of the phenomenon—not only deconstructing the purported “sus-
tainability” of these commodities, but also dismantling their speciesist and anti-emancipatory nature (2011).
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With these sentences, Steinfeld mechanistically sketches what the Livestock Revolution signi-
fies for farmed animals. The repercussions exist on a quantitative and qualitative scale: more an-
imals will be exploited, though the exploitation additionally gets more extreme. The Revolution 
report specifies that the increase of livestock production in the Majority World in the 1970s to  
1999 has largely originated in a higher number of animals, not in a higher carcass weight (Del-
gado et al. 1999, 2). Poultry is the fastest growing sector in the Revolution, and the proportion 
of beef is diminishing in the total output; in addition, the amount of meat “gained” from one 
chicken is far less than the amount of meat ripped out from a cow. These factors signify that the  
total number of animals killed for meat production might escalate by 2050, despite the produc-
tivity gains.  Weis estimates that  by 2050, global  meat consumption will  probably equal the  
deaths of almost 120 billion animals (Weis 2013b, 71).255 He speaks of the “other population 
bomb,” perhaps a true one this time: that of farmed animals (Weis 2010, 139). 
The qualitative aspect of the Livestock Revolution is the industrialization of exploitation, or 
“livestock industrialization” (Delgado, Narrod, and Tiongco 2008). Life cycle assessment has 
shown that intensified settings emit less greenhouse gasses than extensive settings, which corre-
sponds to the emission intensities discussed in subdivision 5.4.1. Consequently, Garnett  and 
Godfray fear that “the goal of sustainable intensification will be used to justify systems of pro-
duction that cause animal suffering” (Garnett and Godfray 2012, 35). Indeed, at least 75 percent 
of livestock production is estimated to take place in confined systems by 2030 (Thornton 2010, 
2856). The shift from ruminants to monogastric species facilitates an industrialization of pro-
duction. Nevertheless, not only monogastric species, more than half of cattle and sheep in the 
Majority World (with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa) will be shut in by 2030, too (FAO 
2005, 4). In general, the extremely brutal circumstances of industrial production explicated in  
chapter 2.2 on animals and violence will aggravate with the Revolution.
Nonetheless, sustainable intensification and exploitation have their own specificities. How do 
farmed animals experience the greening of their somber and bloody exploitation? One declared 
goal of sustainable intensification in the livestock sector is “to produce more, using fewer re-
sources, with benefits to all,” as the Global Agenda formulates (Global Agenda for Sustainable 
Livestock 2016c). More output should be created, with less input, but also with less emissions 
and less waste. 
255 Thornton expects the standing global cattle population (not the slaughtered individuals) to grow from approxi-
mately 1.5 billion animals in 2000 to 2.6 billion animals in 2050, the global sheep and goat population from 1.7 bil -
lion to 2.7 billion in 2050, and the global pig population to grow from 1 billion in 2010 to 1.1 billion in 2030, but 
then to decrease to 0.95 billion in 2050. The global poultry population is forecasted to grow from 20 billion in 2010  
to 34 billion in 2050 (Thornton 2010, 2856–2957).
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Genetic selection is one strategy to render animals more productive (Shields and Orme-Evans 
2015, 365), and Twine observes the so-called “molecular turn” to change animals’ genomes to 
obtain more “ecological” animals (Twine 2010, 162). However, until  genetic engineering en-
genders the desired result, countless “useless,” “undesired” animals end up being dumped in the 
process—be it because of imperfections, commercial worthlessness or severely compromised 
health (Benz-Schwarzburg and Ferrari  2016,  30).256 In the Majority World, traditional,  local 
breeds that are adapted to local climate, predators, parasites, diseases, and feed, are replaced 
with highly productive European breeds such as the Holstein dairy cow that are not used to such 
conditions (Galal 2007; Shields and Orme-Evans 2015, 369). Yet, in the course of the Revolu-
tion, the effects of climate change will severely impair the health of grazing animals. They will 
suffer from heat stress and extreme weather events, they will be more susceptible to vector- or 
food-borne diseases, and less resistant to infections, and they will experience feed and water  
shortages, too (Nardone et al. 2010, 58; Thornton 2010, 2860). Laible claims  that “relatively 
fast changes to the genetic make-up might be required” in order to “alleviate the effects and al-
low animals to adjust to the changed environmental conditions” (Laible 2009, 133). This rea-
soning is worrisome on several levels: the exploitation of farmed animals contributes to climate  
change, and the stress that those animals have to endure must be decreased by genetically alter-
ing them (which occasions the suffering and death of numerous useless generations) before they 
are going to be killed, which again will heighten greenhouse gas emissions. 
Feeding practices are another tactic to sustainably intensify production. Adding more concen-
trates to feed for ruminants while decreasing the amount of forage is a common practice to de-
crease greenhouse gas emissions. In some cases, the percentage of concentrates rises up to 90 
percent. This practice is called “finishing” in feedlots.257 The consequences of adding more con-
centrates like grains are numerous. The cow’s rumen is not used to this kind of food. Digestive  
problems provoke liver abscesses or foot disorder laminitis and ultimately account for a fourth 
of the mortality rate of cows in feedlots. Pigs’ digestive systems are designed for high fiber  
food. Yet feed concentrates, in order to boost productivity and cut emissions, are low in fiber.  
Pigs develop gastric ulcers, which contributes to the mortality rate in pig feedlots. Feed addi-
tives can inhibit fiber digestion and even be toxic for the animals. Sulfate, for example, can  
cause sulphur induced polioencephalomalacia,  a neurologic disease. In the United States, this 
disease is observed in cattle that are fed distiller grains, a by-product of the ethanol industry and 
256 What is more, the primary studies in genetic engineering to “enhance livestock” and “increase animal welfare”  
are predominantly performed on mice. As common in vivisection, the supposed “welfare” of the recipients of the  
new technology is valued more than the welfare of the mere “lab instruments,” the rodents.
257 In Brazil, the number of cows “finished” in such feedlots increased by 50 percent—from two to three million in -
dividuals—from 2003 to 2010 (Shields and Orme-Evans 2015, 364).
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low-cost feed additive which has a high content of sulfate (Shields and Orme-Evans 2015, 364–
65). 
Not only human food, all sorts of waste and animal by-products, be it animal hair, bone or blood 
meal, fish meal, horn and hoof meal, leather or liver meal, milk permeate, rat meal, rumen con-
tents,  and even paper have reportedly been or are being fed to farmed animals (Feedipedia  
2016). In the race for maximizing profit and minimizing expenditure, the industry invests in 
ways to convert waste into feed. One illustration is valkerase. Valkerase is a keratinase enzyme 
processing additive which has been developed to break down keratin in feathers, abundant in 
slaughterhouse waste. Valkerase makes feather meal more digestible. The feather meal is then 
fed to chickens (Torres 2007,  65). Housefly maggot meal  is  another example of converting  
waste into feed. Housefly maggots are grown on litter and are then fed as an additional protein  
source. “Housefly larvae are able to break up and dry out large amounts of poultry manure, and  
this ability makes them a potential solution to waste management in poultry farms,” write Heuzé 
and Tran of Feedipedia (Heuzé and Tran 2015). Hatchery by-product meal is another way to re-
cycle the nutrients in hatchery waste: 
“Hatchery by-product meal results from the processing of poultry hatchery wastes, such as 
shells of hatched eggs, infertile eggs, dead embryos and dead or culled chicks […]. World 
poultry production, including chickens, ducks, turkeys, geese and guinea fowl was 55.5 bil-
lion head in 2009 […]. It can be estimated from this figure that 0.8 to 3.3 billion tons of 
hatchery wastes are generated every year, using an hatchability value of 50-80% […], and 
an average egg weight of 60 g.” (Heuzé, Tran, and Chapoutot 2015).
In other words, the immense population of poultry generates a similarly colossal amount of 
“waste” or deaths. For the industry, it is clear that converting those “by-products” into feed is a 
profitable, and even “environmentally friendly” method to deal with non-economic side-effects:
“High nitrogen losses result in enrichment of ground water, lakes or rivers, pathogen distri-
bution, production of phytotoxic substances,  air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. 
Over-application of organic waste as fertiliser for cropping can result in nitrate (NO3) con-
tamination of groundwater […]. Processing hatchery wastes into animal feeds is a way to al-
leviate this environmental concern” (Heuzé, Tran, and Chapoutot 2015).258
258 The FAO feed encyclopedia actually deplores that feeding hatchery by-product was once banned in the European  
Union: “Like other animal by-products, the use of hatchery by-products for animal feeding is often regulated and  
even prohibited in certain countries due to concerns over the transfer of pathogens […]. In 2002, due to public  
health concerns following the BSE crisis, hatchery by-product meal was banned in the European Union for farm an-
imals but remained authorised for pet food […]. This ban was lifted on March 4, 2011 and hatchery by-product  
meal is again allowed for livestock feeding in the European Union” (Heuzé, Tran, and Chapoutot 2015).
130
Reducing waste is not the only strategy of sustainable intensification if it comes to feed manage-
ment. The industry is struggling to find a balance between maximal growth rates and feed con-
version by the animal on the one hand, and minimal nutrient input on the other hand. The nutri-
ent input must be minimized because corporations have a financial incentive to comply with en-
vironmental regulations and circumvent fines for pollution. An effect of this instrumental rea-
soning and minimal nutrient input is that the animal’s bones are too weak to bear her or his 
weight and fast growth; they easily break during transportation and slaughter, flawing the car -
cass and lowering profits (Clark 2012). Consequently, bone integrity is another factor that has to 
be considered in the development of so-called “environmental nutrition.” Environmental nutri-
tion was originally defined as
“the concept of formulating cost-effective diets and feeding animals to meet their minimum 
mineral needs for acceptable performance, reproduction, and carcass quality with minimal 
excretion of minerals” (Kornegay and Harper 1997, quoted in Clark 2012, 110).
In the FAO jargon, the trade-off is characterized as follows: 
“This can be achieved by […] synchronizing nutrients and mineral inputs to the animal’s 
requirement […], which reduce the quantity of manure excreted per unit of feed and per  
unit of product” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 171).
Clark accurately observes that this diet is not adjusted to the needs of the animal but solely to  
the “needs of capital” (2012, 109). Accordingly, he frames these new developments as “envi-
ronmental violence,” a term which traditionally has been used to denote the “culling” of un-
wanted species. Here, it is applied for the creation of new forms of oppressed animal life. This  
violence on animal subjects is justified with the ecological impact that results from their “unsus-
tainable” exploitation (Clark 2012, 111, 119).259 Environmental violence thus contributes to ren-
dering exploitation sustainable.
5.6 Demand and supply for the Livestock Revolution
The Revolution authors contend that the Livestock Revolution is demand-driven, in contrast to 
the Green Revolution, which was supply-driven. This dominant storyline has been reverberated 
in a plethora of publications. What is more, governments and development agencies follow the 
lead and take the Revolution for granted (Rivera-Ferre 2009, 92). The following paragraphs de-
259 The Global Agenda acknowledges this, depicting violence as “detrimental co-effects”:  “GHG mitigation tech-
nologies may come at a cost to animal welfare and other environmental variables; and practices and technologies  
that have beneficial rather than detrimental co-effects should be favored.” (Global Agenda for Sustainable Live -
stock 2014b, 6).
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construct this assertion. First, it is investigated why curbing this demand, given the environmen-
tal impact of the Revolution, is not an option. Second, it is shown how the countries with the  
most pronounced growth in consumption are congratulated and countries lacking such growth 
are pitied. Such appraisals for the Livestock Revolution provoke the question: who has an inter-
est in furthering it? Third, the dichotomy demand versus supply is examined. In the fourth and 
fifth section, the focus is on the material circumstances fueling the Revolution, including im-
ports and enabling technological and institutional conditions. This is by no means an exhaustive 
agroeconomic investigation. Rather, the chapter carves out discursive fragments on the neces-
sary supply and conditions for the livestock industrialization that are only mentioned in passing, 
and otherwise remained hidden. Such a deconstruction crashes the Revolution’s fated and inex-
orable façade: the Revolution becomes contingent,  a  question of interests,  of power. In this  
light, the refusal to discuss mitigation measures to curb demand becomes comprehensible, as 
well. 
5.6.1 Reducing demand is not an option
The Livestock Revolution discourse assumes an upsurge in the consumption of animal protein 
in the Majority World; in the Minority World, conversely, the growth is expected to be far less 
pronounced. A cheap and effective mitigation strategy for the environmental impact of the sec-
tor, and one that would simultaneously lessen animal suffering, would be to diminish the con-
sumption of livestock products in places where it has already reached excessive levels in the 
second half of the twentieth century, primarily in the Minority World. This strategy tackles the 
demand side, not the supply side. However, in the hundreds of pages written on the subject mat-
ter, curtailed consumption of animal protein or vegetarianism—let alone veganism—are bla-
tantly absent. The 1999 Revolution document does not name vegetarianism once. If vegetarian-
ism is mentioned in subsequent  publications,  its  theoretical  mitigation potential  is  acknowl-
edged yet deemed unrealistic. The World Bank’s report on the Livestock Revolution, for exam-
ple, estimates: “Obviously, except for very radical solutions, such as prohibiting livestock pro-
duction, there is no ‘silver bullet’ for solving these [environmental] problems” (World Bank  
2005, x). In other cases, the mitigation potential of lower meat consumption is presented as pop-
ulist, one-dimensional, or exaggerated:
“Human dietary preferences, along with many other factors, may change the current patterns 
of land use systems, but discussion of the implications of those changes needs to be more 
sophisticated than popular generalizations about reducing meat consumption” (Herrero and 
Thornton 2013, 20878).
“Recent high-profile calls to flock to the banner of global vegetarianism, backed by exag-
gerated claims of livestock’s role in anthropogenic global greenhouse gas emissions, serve 
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mostly to highlight the need for rigorous analysis and credible numbers that can help inform 
public debate about these issues” (Thornton 2010, 2863).
Livestock’s Long Shadow concludes, however, that a decreased consumption of animal products 
in the Minority World could “significantly reduce” the environmental damage by livestock (Ste-
infeld et al. 2006, 269) and lists the “tendency towards vegetarianism” as a reason for optimism 
(Steinfeld et al. 2006, 276). On the other hand, it maintains that “[a]ttempts to curb the booming 
demand for [animal] products have generally proved ineffective” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 4), al-
beit without further explicating those attempts.  In 2013,  Tackling Climate Change resonances 
this appraisal and adds the expected health benefits for regions with very high intake of animal  
proteins.  Further,  this  “important”  mitigation method is  “relatively low cost”  (Gerber  et  al. 
2013, 45). The authors equally acknowledge the low efficiency of animal protein (Gerber et al. 
2013, 1). Despite this evidence, the authors do not justify their sole focus on the supply-side by 
increasing productivity with a single word. Similarly, in all its publicly available documents, the 
Global Agenda makes one sole statement on reducing consumption:  “There is also increasing 
debate about the mitigation impacts that may be derived from changes in demand.” (Global 
Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014b, 6).  The  Agenda then quotes the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report of 2014 (Smith et al. 2014) (compare part  
2.3.1). 
Exemptions in the almost complete dismissal of reducing consumption in the discourse are the 
articles Herrero et al. 2009 and Thornton, Herrero, and Ericksen 2011. Here, lowering the de-
mand of animal foods in the Minority World, while meeting demand in the Majority World with 
“sustainably intensifying systems,” is mentioned as the  first mitigation option (Herrero et al. 
2009, 112, 117; Thornton, Herrero, and Ericksen 2011, 2).260 Overall in the Livestock Revolu-
tion discourse, only representatives of social justice or animal rights organizations consequently 
monitor the salient lack of tackling the consumption side. Shields and Orme-Evans from the  
non-governmental organization Humane Society International write in their article “The Im-
pacts of Climate Change Mitigation Strategies on Animal Welfare” that “production-side effi-
ciency approaches seem, in some ways, to avoid the heart of the problem” (Shields and Orme-
Evans 2015, 378). A Well-Fed World, a non-governmental organization campaigning against 
hunger and animal exploitation, asks to “reverse” the Revolution and lower meat consumption 
in the Minority World (AWFW 2016). 
260 To illustrate: “Reduce the demand for livestock products: Consumption of livestock products per capita has in-
creased in the developed world, and levels of consumption in some countries increase the risk of health problems. 
Here, demand is met by local production in very intensive systems or by import of livestock products. In both  
cases, this demand affects land use practices and use of resources in the developing world. Reducing the demand 
for livestock products in the developed world could lead to healthier people and reduce pressures on land and natu-
ral resources in developing countries.” (Thornton, Herrero, and Ericksen 2011, 2 [original emphasis]).
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5.6.2 Laudation of the Revolution
Those rare exceptions prove that the sector is supposed to grow, and its expansion is not to be 
decelerated. The sole measure necessary is to internalize the “social and environmental external-
ities,” the “collateral damage” of the Revolution. This blind acceptance of the Livestock Revo-
lution and even its encouragement are recurring elements in the discourse which praises the re-
gions  spearheading it.  The  International  Livestock  Research  Institute  calls  China and India 
“Asia’s star performers,” and Steinfeld and Chilonda laud the” booming” Indian poultry indus-
try and the “impressive growth” in the Chinese livestock sector (Steinfeld and Chilonda 2006,  
13). Livestock’s Long Shadow congratulates countries in Latin America for having “successfully 
expanded their domestic feed base, taking advantage of the low production costs and abundance 
of land. They have moved to adding value to feed, rather than exporting it” (Steinfeld et al.  
2006, 16).261 
In a similar vein, the publications criticize the low level of consumption in other regions of the 
Majority World which “leaves a significant potential and need for increases.” (Steinfeld 2004, 
21–22). The International Livestock Research Institute pities Sub-Saharan Africa’s “poor per-
formance” which reflects “its poor overall economic performance”  (ILRI 2000a, 5–6). In this 
region, consumption levels of animal protein “have not only been low, but have remained static  
and even declined over the last decade,” according to Steinfeld and  Chilonda  (2006, 11). In 
Latin America and the Caribbean, in 2004, “meat consumption per caput is still at about 60% of  
that of industrialised countries, implying that there is scope for further growth.” (Steinfeld 2004,  
22).  Likewise,  meat  consumption in South Asia is  “still  very low” (Steinfeld and Chilonda 
2006, 10). 
“Moreover, in many developing countries, where the need to increase protein consumption 
is  greatest,  the  productive  sector  has  not  participated  in  the  ‘livestock  revolution.’ For 
instance, there are still about 20 developing countries where per capita meat consumption is 
below 10 kg/year, compared with an average of 80 kg/year in developed countries. Cultural 
or  religious  reasons  may  explain  this  feature  in  some  countries,  but  low  productive 
capacities are, by and large, the main cause in many” (FAO 2013, 142).
These cultural explanations for a lower consumption are met with reluctance and almost frustra-
tion: The International Livestock Research Institute deplores that lactose intolerance in East 
Asia, vegetarianism in South Asia, and Muslim beliefs “everywhere” “curb demand” or “de-
press consumption” (ILRI 2000a, 6). 
261 The described “land abundance” refers to the Brazilian Cerrado and Mato Grosso region (Steinfeld and Chilonda  
2006, 11); the Cerrado region in particular is a highly biodiverse region (Fritz 2014, 6). No word is lost about the 
ongoing deforestation and biodiversity loss.
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5.6.3 Supply versus demand
The storyline of the demand-driven Livestock Revolution conveys the image of an anonymous, 
ever-increasing, powerful mass of consumers yearning for animal protein—an unstoppable oc-
currence in the natural course of human history. Nevertheless, supply and demand are not rigid 
economic variables, they are social events embedded in material conditions. To reduce the ad-
vent of such drastic structural changes in global agriculture to a mutually exclusive dichotomy 
of supply and demand is rather simplistic.262 The demand-side dogma indicates that there is 
something such as “consumer sovereignty;” a truly naïve view in the industrial meat regime and 
the broader, capitalist economy where corporations shape people’s wants and needs (MacLach-
lan 2015, 27; Rivera-Ferre 2009). The meagre “choices” consumers dispose of are always al-
ready constrained and constructed by decisions taken before the product even reaches the (su-
permarket) shelf (Parker 2013). Hence, the idea of changing the politics of production through 
consumer choices—the power to “vote with the fork”—is misleading.263 
Rivera-Ferre’s paper from 2009 is one of the few special cases investigating the driving forces  
behind the Revolution and breaking the link between the “rising demand” and the “need for in-
tensification.” She argues that an upsurge in demand is a result of cost externalization and sup-
ply increments. This combination on the supply-side then lowers product prices and changes  
consumer habits and is a principal reason for increasing consumption. In fact, prices for animal  
products have declined more than prices for other food (Rivera-Ferre 2009, 93–94). The cheap-
est livestock products, mainly poultry, witnessed also the biggest growth in consumption. Live-
stock production that could not profit from vertical integration, industrialization and economies 
of scale, such as beef production, remained relatively expensive (Rivera-Ferre 2009, 95). The 
focus on lower prices is also not to be confused with the Revolution’s alleged cause, higher in-
come. The first concentrates on the suppliers and therefore on structures, and the second focuses  
on the consumers. Accordingly, Rivera-Ferre maintains that economic and political factors fa-
voring transnational corporations, industrial systems, geographic concentration, and economies 
of scale triggered the Livestock Revolution (Rivera-Ferre 2009, 96). In addition, international 
institutions such as the World Bank have supported and funded the evolution of industrial pro-
duction systems (Rivera-Ferre 2009, 99). Rivera-Ferre:
262 The Green Revolution took place in the 1960s, with ongoing famines particularly in Asia. The hungry, from a  
strictly economic standpoint, do not represent a “demand” because they lack the capital to materialize that demand 
(compare the section on food security 5.7.3). Still, new strategies and technologies to heighten agricultural produc-
tivity were not developed in a vacuum. The race for profit and the combat against hunger by governments were mo -
tivations that incited the Green Revolution (Sumberg and Thompson 2013, 7).
263 Still, in “The Livestock Revolution—A Global Veterinary Mission,” Steinfeld attributes consumers with the au-
thority to influence the market and environmental regulations: 
“Concerns about the long-term productivity of natural resources, including land, water and air will not be reflected  
in market prices unless consumers demand it and unless the public and private sector respond by defining and es -
tablishing mechanisms that correctly reflect the present and future value of natural resources.” (Steinfeld 2004, 35).
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“It is obvious then that the increasing demand of meat and fish is not an inevitable process  
simply associated to urbanization or higher incomes, but a political and economical [sic] 
process conducted largely by agencies and institutions (and supported by some researchers) 
promoting a global development model within the neoliberal capitalist paradigm in their 
search of maximizing monetary benefit. In the case of meat and fish, this is reflected in the 
promotion of the intensive production systems.” (Rivera-Ferre 2009, 100).
The article “Underneath the Livestock Revolution” by the FAO authors Costales, Gerber, and 
Steinfeld, similarly discusses the Revolution’s structural underpinnings (Costales, Gerber, and 
Steinfeld 2006). The authors point out that change in the sector occurs in regions where there is 
“sufficiently high demand,” but also where economies of scale can be exploited, and where 
foreign direct investment facilitate the expansion (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 24–25, 
compare  equally  Delgado,  Narrod,  and  Tiongco  2008).  Very  fundamentally, the  “entry  of 
transnationals  into the  agri-food chain […] has transformed the manner  in  which agri-food 
products are purchased from suppliers, transformed into differentiated products, and distributed 
to consumers.” (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 17).
Apart from occasional remarks, the discourse remains relatively silent on supply-side changes 
that enabled the Revolution. The Revolution authors mention that price changes heighten con-
sumption (Delgado et al. 1999, 6); however, they do not elaborate on its implication and causa-
tion.264 Both Delgado and Narrod 2002 and Steinfeld 2003 suggest that the Revolution might be  
as supply-driven as it is demand-driven (compare Rivera-Ferre 2009, 93–94). In 2002, the Inter-
national Livestock Research Institute claimed that markets create demand (ILRI 2002, 7), and in 
2011, Narrod, Tiongco, and Scott from the International Food Policy Research Institute main-
tained that the Livestock Revolution “is both demand and supply driven.” (Narrod, Tiongco, 
and Scott 2011, 1).
In sum, the Livestock Revolution equals a whole mode of consumption and production that is 
occupying and intruding on the Majority World. MacLachlan frames it as the “agro-industrial  
model based on economies of scale and the integrated industrial-grain-oilseed-livestock com-
plex” (MacLachlan 2015, 36). Schneider proposes the industrial meat regime. This thesis sug-
gests the image of “imperial meat.” The Livestock Revolution discourse’s reference values like 
progress and modernization that can create and legitimize a demand, or, differently put, the val-
264 A typical case: 
“With notable exceptions for milk and poultry in the developed countries, where technological progress arguably  
preceded and precipitated changes in demand through lower prices, the supply side of the Livestock Revolution un-
til now has mostly responded—often under distorted incentives—to rapid increases in demand.” (Delgado et al.  
1999, 59).
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ues that symbolically drive the Revolution are discussed in subdivision 5.7.1. On the material  
side, the agro-industrial model necessitates, among other factors, fertilizer, feed, farmed ani-
mals, appropriate technology and infrastructure including the retailers that sell the products. The 
weight of such retailers cannot be underestimated. Costales, Gerber and Steinfeld explain that 
supermarkets not only respond to, but also shape demand (2006, 15). In addition, the vertical in-
tegration of production is indispensable, as are enabling political and economic conditions like 
foreign direct investments or the liberalization of the retail and trade sectors (for instance, by  
lowering tariffs and quantitative restrictions). Due to the hegemony of the Minority World in the 
animal-industrial complex, the Majority World is dependent on the Minority World for a certain 
segment of those factors and inputs (Garcés 2002, 7).
5.6.4 Necessary imports
One  crucial  input  for  the  Revolution  is  animal  feed.  The  International  Livestock  Research 
Institute writes that the Revolution literally “will suck in” imported cereal, and these imports 
will chiefly stem from the Minority World (ILRI 2000a, 7). As most of Asia and Africa “lack the 
capacity to produce substantial amounts of feed grain at competitive prices,” they will import  
more grains in the future or have to intensify their existing land resources (Delgado et al. 1999, 
20).  Nevertheless, not only the necessary feed, but livestock products as such will be and are  
already being imported (Guyomard, Manceron, and Peyraud 2012; Hoffmann 1999; Steinfeld et 
al. 2006, 17). Projections anticipate that domestic production in the Majority World will not 
keep up with demand for animal protein (FAO 2005, 3),  especially in East Asia and Africa 
(AGTR 2011). Countries in the Majority World will be import leaders, whereas countries in the 
Minority will be export leaders, with the exceptions of Southeast Asia for pork and chicken, and 
Latin America for beef (Hall, Ehui,  and Delgado 2004, 428–29; Narrod, Tiongco, and Scott  
2011).265 Net imports of meat products are predicted to increase by 131 percent by 2030; net  
imports of dairy products might expand by 96 percent (FAO 2005, 3). 
Who profits from those imports? When it comes to animal feed, the main exporters of wheat are 
the  United  States,  the  European  Union,  Canada,  Australia,  and  Russia.  The  United  States, 
Brazil, and Argentina are the biggest maize and soybean exporters. The global dairy market is 
dominated by the players European Union and New Zealand. The top meat exporting economies 
are the United States, the European Union, and Brazil. 
Several  countries  forward  their  export-sector  because  domestic  demand  is  stagnating.  The 
European  Union,  for  example,  has  difficulties  selling  poultry  to  its  citizens.  European 
consumers  prefer  fresh  chicken breast;  the  rest  of  the  chicken is  hard  to  vend.  Hence,  the  
265 Countries in the Majority World had already become net importers of meat products in the 1980s; the importa-
tion of milk and dairy products began even earlier (FAO 2005, 3).
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chickens are cut  into pieces,  frozen and exported.  The earnings from the European markets 
subsidize this trade. EU-27 chicken meat exports rose form 690,000 tons to 1.4 million tons  
from 2006 to 2012. France, Germany, and the Netherlands are the central poultry exporting 
countries. Africa is the destination of a third of EU broiler exports.266 These cheap exports—the 
frozen pieces  are  sometimes  sold  at  half  the  local  price—tend to destroy  local  production. 
African  countries,  on  the  other  hand,  have  difficulties  restricting  imports  because  of  trade 
liberalization agreements (Fritz 2014, 10–11). 
In general, an economy based on imports is much more vulnerable to global market shocks and 
price hikes (Garcés 2002,  8).  The dependency on imports is  particularly unfavorable to the 
Majority World due to the imports’ foreign exchange costs and the overall prominence of the 
agricultural sector (Upton 2000, 4).  Narrod, Tiongco, and Scott  from the International Food 
Policy Research Institute indicate that stringent safety requirements for animal foods in fact  
make  “it  almost  impossible”  for  countries  in  the  Majority  World  to  export  their  products 
(Narrod, Tiongco, and Scott 2011, 2). A look at this profit distribution sheds a different light on 
the purported “need” or inevitability of the Livestock Revolution. 
5.6.5 Necessary conditions
Technology, infrastructure, and political and economic conditions are further necessary ingredi-
ents for the Revolution. In close reading, paragraphs in the Revolution report demonstrate how 
the Minority World not only exports feed, but industrial technology and facilities, as well:
“In the developed countries,  technological  progress for  both ruminants and monogastric 
animals  involved  reproductive  and  genetic  technology,  including  advances  in 
biotechnology;  feed  improvement  through  blending,  processing,  genetic  means,  and 
chemical  treatment;  use  of  growth  hormones;  and  improvements  in  animal  health 
maintenance. Some of these industrial technologies, especially for pigs and poultry, have 
been fairly easily transferred to developing countries.” (Delgado et al. 1999, 63).
“In the next 20 years the transfer of meat and milk processing technology to developing 
countries by the private sector under public regulation is likely to be especially important 
for  food  production.  […]  The  establishment  of  dairy  plants  and  slaughterhouses  in 
producing  areas,  together  with  market  development,  will  play  an  important  role  in 
stimulating market-oriented production.” (Delgado et al. 1999, 55).
266 Delgado et al. explain how livestock products from the Minority World were already “dumped” in the 1970s and 
1980s in Sub-Saharan Africa (Delgado et al. 1999, 19). Currently, Smithfield’s frozen pork produced in Eastern Eu-
rope is exported to Liberia, the Ivory Coast, and Equatorial Guinea and sold at almost half of the local market price  
(Carvajal and Castle, May 05, 2009).
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In 2004, Steinfeld even speaks of the “wholesale transfer” of production systems:
“The wholesale transfer of these types of production systems has been facilitated by the  
relative  ease  and  speed  with  which  the  required  infrastructure  and  equipment  can  be 
transferred and operationalized in so-called ‘turn-key’ operations.” (Steinfeld 2004, 31).
So-called “turn-key operations” are supplied facilities that are ready for immediate use. In 2011, 
Narrod, Tiongco, and Scott maintain that “most of the technology” for the Revolution “has been 
developed by the private sector and transferred to developing countries.” (Narrod, Tiongco, and 
Scott 2011, 1). Steinfeld and Chilonda explain that the livestock industrialization—in particular 
poultry production—is essentially  not  an  “organic”,  but  a  discontinuous event:  “as  soon as 
urban markets  develop,  investors  step in,  often with no previous association with livestock 
production,  and  establish  industrial  type  units  and  associated  processing  and  marketing 
methods” (Steinfeld and Chilonda 2006, 9). The private sector is the driving force in spreading 
such operations in the Majority World: 
“The private sector,  therefore,  will  continue to play the leading role in further livestock 
technology development and diffusion in developed-country industrial systems. Industrial 
technologies  for  pigs  and  poultry  are  largely  transferable  to  developing  countries, 
suggesting that the need for public goods provision for these items is modest. The problem 
is that technology development and extension are also required for cattle and other types of 
livestock production. The role of the public sector becomes an issue here,  especially in 
developing countries, where large private companies rarely operate outside the industrial 
livestock sector.” (Delgado et al. 1999, 64).
Here, Delgado et al. do not mince words when describing the dominance of the private sector in  
the  Livestock  Revolution.  In  point  of  fact,  transnational  business  is  the  protagonist  in  the  
expansion of the animal-industrial  complex,  aided by the public sector.  Nonetheless,  in the 
discourse of the Livestock Revolution, the dominance of the private sector remains concealed, 
and a demand by anonymous masses in the Majority World occupies center stage. 
Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld sketch how transnational corporations, in order to expand their 
market share, are constantly trying to cut the costs of production. They tend towards vertical 
coordination, which means that retailers contract primary producers and processors. Henceforth, 
they control all stages of production, processing, and distribution. Differently put, such a “fully 
integrated system” implies that one sole food corporation owns all different units in the food 
chain, applying its uniform food quality and safety standards. Through vertical coordination, 
efficiency can be boosted and economies of scale exploited (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld  
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2006, 17–18; Delgado, Narrod, and Tiongco 2008; Steinfeld et al.  2006, 20). Foreign direct 
investment is crucial for the giant retailers:
“The entry of [foreign direct investment] allowed transnational food retailing companies to 
bring with them their state-of-the-art technology in product specification, quality control, 
labeling  and  packaging,  as  well  as  in  logistics  and  accompanying  infrastructure  in 
procurement and distribution. From these investments are built the economies of scale and 
the capacity  to meet competitively price and quality standards in both international  and 
domestic markets […].” (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 16).
Still,  foreign direct  investment needs advantageous policies  by the government  in question.  
Other  favorable  factors  for  the spread  of  transnational  food agribusiness  conglomerates  are 
multilateral trade and retail sector liberalization, “the breaking down of quantitative restrictions  
and lowering of tariffs, and the laying down of rules and standards for food quality and safety.” 
(Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 16). Steinfeld and Chilonda observe that governments 
support the creation of intensive, privately owned, “more efficient animal protein operations” in 
order to move away from “traditional” backyard production (2006, 7). This approach has been 
labeled “smallholder pessimism” (Jabbar 2004, 12). Waldron et al. (2007) and Rae (2008, 292) 
outline  how state  intervention in  favor  of  industrial  facilities  was crucial  for  the  Livestock 
Revolution in China. 
Taken together, the aggressive expansion of large retailers and agribusiness since the 1990s has 
a momentous—and perhaps even revolutionary—impact in the Majority World (Thornton 2010, 
2854):
“The emergence of supermarkets in developing countries reflects a structural change that al-
ters the way in which meat and dairy products are assembled, inspected, processed, pack-
aged, and supplied to consumers. It is a change that has deep impacts on livestock and milk 
producers,  particularly on who can and who cannot participate in the mainstream supply 
chains. A segmentation of markets can be seen, between the ‘formal’ and the ‘informal’ 
supply chains, and between the ‘wet’ markets for fresh and warm meat and the supermarket  
outlets of processed, frozen, packaged and branded meat. The relative significance of each 
market segment is tied to the level of economic development. […]
While the informal supply chains for livestock and raw milk, and the wet markets for meat,  
still constitute the dominant segments in developing countries, with the expansion of their 
economies, the large scale retail sector is growing. […]
The rapid expansion of large retailers in Latin America, East Asia and the Near East has 
been accompanied by a relative decline of traditional wholesale markets in regions where 
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the  restructuring  of  the  agri-food  markets  and  industries  have  been  most  dynamic.” 
(Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 16–17).
Conversely, in regions where this restructuring has not been as “dynamic,” informal markets 
dominate  the  sector,  and  production  is  oriented  towards  “home  consumption”  (see  also 
Parthasarathy Rao, Birthal, and Ndjeunga 2005). Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld write that for 
instance  “most  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa  has  not  yet  experienced  a  substantial  take-off  of 
supermarket diffusion.” (2006, 17). However, the future of informal markets is uncertain:
“The  resilience  of  informal  markets  is  apparently  providing  relief  to  small  livestock 
producers supplying informal markets in the rural as well as urban areas on the basis of 
strong consumer preferences for traditional products. There are, however, no guarantees that 
these markets will continue to be the locus of economic opportunities for smallholders in the 
longer run. While consumption patterns and habits appear to be embedded in tradition, the 
power of  structural  change in  modern market  chains to overcome seemingly immutable 
hurdles cannot be underestimated.” (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 17). 
There is even a parallel evolution of “supermarket penetration” and foreign direct investment:  
the  lowest  foreign direct  investment  took place in  Africa,  and South Africa,  whereas  Latin 
America  and  East  Asia,  except  China,  were  the  regions  with  the  highest  foreign  direct  
investment in the 1990s (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 16). 
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PART B NATURALIZING CONTROL AND CAPITALISM
5.7 Legitimization of the Revolution
There are only a few texts in the Livestock Revolution discourse that do not begin with a state-
ment on the considerable surge in the demand for food of animal origin in the next decades. Ac-
cepting the natural and unavoidable occurrence of the Revolution is the premise of almost every 
paper. The sector is harmoniously depicted as a constitutional part of human history and natural  
cycles. The FAO’s Committee on Agriculture portrays the livestock sector as
“serving human needs while affecting natural systems. Livestock systems have developed 
over millennia and are continuously adapting to very diverse conditions. Livestock use natu-
ral resources (land, water, biodiversity, forests, fish, nutrients and energy) and environmen-
tal services and transform them into agricultural products (food, feed, fibre, manure, trac-
tion) that serve not only immediate needs but also provide economic and social services 
(food security, economic growth and poverty reduction, health and cultural value).” (COAG 
FAO 2016, 6).267
Referring to the Sustainable Development Goals, the Agenda partners recognize “the role of the 
livestock sector in promoting peaceful and inclusive societies” (Global Agenda for Sustainable  
Livestock 2016e). The industrial,  (bio-)technologized, mechanized, and similarly destructive, 
violent, and colonial character of the complex is concealed here. With limited exceptions,268 the 
rights of indigenous peoples, so deeply disregarded by the sector, never merit a line, nor does 
the tribulation of workers in the animal-industrial complex (compare the section on the social 
consequences of the animal-industrial complex, 2.4)—not to speak of the unimaginable violence 
farmed animal have to endure (outlined in chapter 2.2). 
Next to the first premise of the Revolution’s unavoidable occurrence as part of human evolu-
tion, a second premise often evoked in the first sentences of papers on the Revolution is the so-
cio-economic, nutritional, and environmental importance of livestock. Even publications prob-
lematizing the sector’s environmental impact cling to the storyline that livestock is an indispens-
267 This paragraph is from the agenda item Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock at the COAG Session in Sep-
tember 2016. The machine-like and functionalist depiction of “livestock” in the quotation is worth noting.
268 The Global Agenda exceptionally observes that  uneven growth favoring industrial systems and poverty “may 
contribute to a further erosion of the rights of indigenous people” (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014b,  
5).  This  declaration is without precedent, as is:  “For stakeholder dialogue to be effective, meaningful and fair, it  
should be underpinned by science-based evidence, complemented as necessary by traditional knowledge.”  (Global 
Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014b, 12).  Similarly, in a 2016 document, the Agenda mentions the “occupa-
tional hazards” and the “high rate of child labour” in the sector for the first time ever (Global Agenda for Sustain -
able Livestock 2016g).
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able resource for humans (Herrero et al. 2009, 111).269 For instance, after illustrating the contri-
bution of industrial livestock systems to climate change,  Herrero from the  International Live-
stock Research Institute and his co-authors write that
“However, livestock are not bad everywhere. In smallholder crop-livestock and agro-pastoral and 
pastoral livestock systems, livestock are one of a limited number of broad-based options to in-
crease incomes and sustain the livelihoods of people who have a limited environmental footprint. 
GHG emissions from livestock and their impacts are relatively modest when compared with the 
contribution that livestock make to the livelihoods of hundreds of millions of poor people.” (Her-
rero et al. 2009, 117).
Herrero et al. not only evade and distract from the seriousness of the ecological crisis. They also 
make an argumentative move that is common in the Livestock Revolution discourse and essen-
tial for the naturalization and justification of the Revolution as such. They use the “livelihoods  
of the poor” as a justification for the emissions of industrial production that actually erode those 
very livelihoods. Similarly, the image of organic livestock products legitimizes CAFOs, as elu-
cidated in section 5.5.1.
In the following, these arguments and storylines that naturalize the Livestock Revolution are 
scrutinized: first, the notion of progress and modernity, second, the meaning of the Revolution 
for the poor, third, its meaning for food security, and, finally, its value for the environment. In  
terms of methodology, the storylines and underlying reference values of the Revolution dis-
course are first laid out and illustrated with paradigmatic quotes, and then, in a second run, ex -
amined and contrasted with efforts  to naturalize capitalism, and its  distractions from power 
structures.
5.7.1 Modernization
“The Livestock Revolution is propelled by demand. People in developing countries are in-
creasing their consumption from the very low levels of the past, and they have a long way to 
go before coming near developed country averages.” (Delgado et al. 2000, 2).
“Widespread evidence exists that as societies grow wealthier they substitute higher-priced 
livestock calories for lower-priced starch calories, at a decreasing rate as the substitution 
proceeds.” (Delgado et al. 1999, 61). 
“[C]onsumption  patterns  in  developed  countries  are  an  indication  of  where  developing 
countries are going” (Delgado et al. 1999, 2).
269 “Livestock systems have often been the subject of substantial public debate, because in the process of providing  
societal benefits, some systems cause large quantities of natural resources and also emit significant amounts of  
greenhouse gases.” (Herrero et al. 2009, 111).
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Throughout the Revolution report, the increase in the consumption of animal products is por-
trayed as an inevitable, natural evolution in the course of “modernization” and “progress.” This  
storyline insinuates that all societies develop in the same way, as if they were a plant, a natural  
organism, or as if they were the ideal-type of a child. In this generational view of the “human 
family,” “developed” countries are the adults and “developing” countries the children. The child 
(the “developing” country) goes through linear stages of development. Its youth is defined by 
deficiency—not enough meat, not enough sophisticated technology, not enough growth. As the 
FAO-experts Steinfeld and Chilonda note, “the absence of sustained economic growth also ex-
plains  why some countries,  notably  in  sub-Saharan  Africa,  have  not  yet  entered  the  ‘meat 
phase’” (2006, 5).  Nevertheless, with the right education, stimulation, and inputs, such as for-
eign investment, access to global markets, and environmental regulations, the “child” can reach 
adulthood. Africa is pictured as a particularly “bad pupil” in sector performance: the continent 
“has lagged behind in the development of the livestock revolution,” according to Steinfeld and 
Chilonda (2006, 11). Still, the Majority World is “currently engaged in a catching-up process”  
(Steinfeld et al. 2006, 10), according to  Livestock’s Long Shadow. The goal of the race is the 
“convergence of diets:”
“[L]ivestock  consumption  patterns  in  developing  countries  are  rapidly  converging  with 
those in developed countries” (Delgado et al. 1999, 36).
“[W]e  observe  that  diets  converge  globally.  Cultural  peculiarities  become  increasingly 
blurred as demonstrated by the surge of poultry consumption in South Asia. These changing 
patterns are further supported by the fact that the same eating habits, such as fast and conve-
nience food, are catching hold almost everywhere” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 17).
A metaphor similar to the “convergence of diets” is the “nutrition transition,” a rapid shift from 
undernourishment to diets richer in animal protein, pre-processed foods, sugar, fat, and alcohol.  
The caloric importance of “traditional staples” like cassava, potatoes, sweet potatoes, plantains, 
and various roots has been steadily declining since the 1960s (Steinfeld 2004, 21). This transi-
tion frequently ends up in overnutrition, reduced physical activity, and the upsurge of diet-re-
lated diseases like heart disease or hypertension (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 10). Despite those rather 
detrimental effects, moving up the “protein-ladder” is labeled not only as a sign of “progress,” it  
also promises further economic growth.270 In this same vein, Steinfeld writes that “developed 
nations” should provide “developing nations with an opportunity to export and grow their way 
270 Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld praise the Livestock Revolution for not only benefitting people, but also their  
livestock: “While large parts of the developing world are moving up the food chain, enjoying a richer and more di-
verse diet, so are livestock; traditional fibrous and energy-rich feed stuffs are in relative decline, and protein-rich to-
gether with sophisticated additives that enhance feed conversion are on the rise.” (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 
2006, 23).
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out of poverty” (Steinfeld 2004, 36). The Global Agenda equally believes in the “critical devel-
opment functions” of the sector (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014a).271
The “Livestock Revolution,” the “nutrition transition,” “convergence of diets,” the race up the  
“animal protein ladder”—these metaphors are all  development and modernization narratives 
(Sumberg and Thompson 2013, 18; Weis 2010, 142). The social is ecologized, and hegemony is 
naturalized: diverse continents and cultures are put on a uniform, unidirectional, meat-centered 
modernization ladder with the Minority World’s society on top. The “nutrition transition” is  
presented as a law of nature (Schneider 2014, 616). Animal-based nutrition is globally promoted 
as a “superior diet” and a marker of modernity, progress, economic growth, “class ascension,” 
and “Western” lifestyle (Weis 2013a, 70).272 Merriam Webster defines “convergence” as “mov-
ing toward union or uniformity,” and “independent development of similar characters (as of 
bodily structure of unrelated organisms or cultural  traits)  often associated with similarity of  
habits or environment” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2016). Yet, the Livestock Revolution is 
neither “moving toward union,” nor is it an “independent development.” The ongoing change in 
the Majority World is not a convergence, but a guided process in which powerful players have a  
vested interest to align global diets to the outlier consumption patterns of the Minority World of 
the late twentieth century. As shown in chapter 2, the Minority World’s diet is both historically 
and spatially unique; it belongs to a specific time and a specific place. Statistically speaking, the  
Minority World’s diet is the outlier, not the average; it is the anomaly, not the norm.  Still, the 
Revolution discourse naturalizes this situated experience of a small fraction of humanity and 
thereby universalizes an imperial mode of living. For instance, Livestock’s Long Shadow eluci-
dates how until the early 1980s, “diets with daily consumption of milk and meat were the privi-
lege of OECD country citizens and a small wealthy class elsewhere” and that animal foods were 
“an unaffordable luxury” “for most people in Africa and Asia” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 14). How-
ever, the text fails to mention that the high daily consumption of animal protein was unprece-
dented in those OECD countries, as well, and that next to class and other factors, this consump-
tion was the privilege of white cis-men of a specific religion, and age. What is more, in one sen-
tence, the authors generalize the dietary preferences of the African and Asian population as a 
whole. Such a declaration and the “convergence of diets” and “nutrition transition” narratives  
discursively eradicate and amalgamate the culinary and social culture and history of billions of  
people, which adds to the imperial and colonial character of the modern “dietary convergence.” 
A similar process occurred during colonization: in the Americas, the colonizers labelled all peo-
271 The quote goes: “The livestock sector performs critical development functions through its contribution to nutri -
tious diets,  economic growth,  and livelihoods.  Sector growth thus provides opportunities for  development  and 
poverty alleviation.” (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014a).
272 With the rising affordability of meat, class is nowadays marked by additional factors such as fresh, healthy,  
organic food (Weis 2013a, 83).
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ple “Indians,” in Africa, “Negroes” or “Blacks.” In both cases, the specific cultures, histories, 
and identities of Aztecs, Mayas, Aymaras, Chibchas, and Ashantis, Yorubas, Zulus, Baconogs,  
and many more, were amalgamated and erased (Quijano 2000, 551–52). As laid out in part 3.2.3  
on modernization theory, modernity has a second, “darker” side: coloniality (Ramnath 2011, 
29–30).
In the Livestock Revolution discourse, cultural or religious factors, the heterogeneity of the re-
gions and climates in question, and other elements influencing diet like gender, class, or race are  
relegated to the sidelines.273 By the same token, the cultural status of livestock for human soci-
ety, such as a reflection of social status or as dowry, is not very prominent. All this despite the  
significant cultural and religious dietary rules and traditions. The Revolution authors write that  
cultural differences make poultry meat and eggs the most popular livestock goods in the world, 
that pork is not deemed pure in many religions, and that lactose-intolerance is widespread in 
East Asia (Delgado et al. 1999, 8). Other documents claim that cultural factors have determined 
meat consumption and will do so in the future, for example beef consumption in India, or the  
consumption of pigs in Muslim countries (FAO 2011b, 6), and that differences of religion and 
taste decide on the animal species and quantity consumed (Steinfeld 2004, 22).274 But these as-
sertions remain anecdotal compared to the dominant quantitative narrative of the Revolution,  
explaining it in the economic and demographic terms of economic growth, population increase, 
and urbanization. 
As outlined in the introduction, this thesis should neither romanticize non-Eurosettler food cul-
tures, nor paternalistically decide for billions of people in the Majority World which diet or  
which way of life they should adopt. Vegetarianism, for instance, is much more common in the 
Majority World than in the Minority World. Moreover, it is not the aim to deny or morally  
judge cultural change. The point is to demonstrate how it is the Livestock Revolution that denies 
the cultural difference and complexity of diverse regions in the Majority World by, on the one 
hand, discursively placing all  social development on the meat-centered modernization latter,  
and, on the other hand, by the structural chokehold of livestock industrialization which is pro-
273 Such a perspective is human ecology, analyzing how environmental factors influence human activities. Cross-na-
tional evaluations show that in Asia, with growing gross domestic product, fish consumption is increasing on a 
much higher scale than meat consumption. In the Minority World, it is the opposite. York and Gossard conclude  
that in nations with more land per capita and hence more surplus grain, meat consumption is higher, and in coun -
tries with more access to water, fish consumption is higher. Furthermore, meat consumption is more widespread in 
temperate regions than in subarctic/arctic and tropical regions. Yet the authors themselves contend that in a global -
ized economy, and with the separation of production and consumption, the importance of these factors decreases  
(York and Gossard 2004).
274 Farrell maintains with regard to the poultry revolution: “Traditionally Indians have been largely vegetarians,  
partly because of religious belief but also because they did not have the funds to purchase livestock products.” (Far-
rell 2002, 1). Udo et al. (2011) debate the growing demand for sheep in Indonesia for Muslim feasts and sacrifices.
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moted by international institutions, corporations, governments and exporting countries in the 
Minority World in the need of new markets.
The “convergence” of diets, hence, is thus better defined as the “meatification” of diets.  Diets 
are being “meatified,” and this “meatification” is not only a reflection of global injustice—for  
the reasons laid out before—but also an exacerbation and reproduction of this injustice (Weis 
2013a, 9). Once more, the notion of “imperial meat” takes shape. Weis:
“While the meatification of diets has long been held as a goal and measure of development  
and a marker of class ascension, it should instead be understood as a vector of global in-
equality, environmental degradation, and climate injustice.” (Weis 2013b, 81–82).
Hornborg sustains that capitalism makes the exploited believe that they should be grateful for 
their exploitation—in the name of “development” (Hornborg 2009, 244). The same discourse of 
“offering  opportunities”  is  taking  place  with  the  Livestock  Revolution.  Diverse  agricultural  
models are equally viewed as stages of an “organic, endogenous development,” as if structural  
adjustment programs, foreign direct investment, or the world market did not exist. Industrializa-
tion in the Majority World is elucidated as part of the general “growth and modernization of  
global agri-food systems” (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 24). 
“As  countries  industrialise,  they  follow  a  pattern  in  relocating  livestock  production” 
(Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 22). 
“As soon as urbanization and economic growth translate rising incomes into ‘bulk’ demand 
for animal food products, large scale operators emerge.” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 19).
Agricultural “system change” is “an endogenous process in response to increased population 
pressure.” (Thornton et al. 2009, 120).
“In areas where economies are beginning to take off, managing the transition of the live-
stock sector requires a mix of policy institutional change, technology, and investment.” (Di-
jkman 2009, 4).
Likewise, the Revolution authors refer to a convergence of livestock systems and productivity  
levels—except for Sub-Saharan Africa:
“While livestock systems and productivity levels in some developing countries have begun 
to converge with those in developed countries, some whole regions, such as Sub-Saharan 
Africa, have fallen behind.” (Delgado et al. 1999, 63).
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Again, a unidirectional, linear (albeit subtler) model of development is supposed. Yet, economic 
policies, subsidies for CAFOs, or supermarket penetration are not issues of fate but rather of  
economic and political decisions. They enable a high consumption of livestock products in the  
first place through their provision of cheap animal foods. That these commodities are worth eat -
ing and buying, on the other hand, is the manifestation of the symbolic power of meatification. 
5.7.2 Poverty alleviation
“Livestock  sector  growth  contributes  to  poverty  reduction  and  development”  (Global 
Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016c).
 
The second assertion and storyline naturalizing the Livestock Revolution is its contribution to 
poverty alleviation. “No other sector is more important to the lives and livelihoods of the poor 
than livestock,”  according to  the  Global  Agenda (Global  Agenda for  Sustainable  Livestock 
2014a). The documents on the Livestock Revolution never stop emphasizing the vital status of 
livestock for “the most vulnerable,” in particular the publications of the International Livestock 
Research Institute with its focus on poor smallholders.275 Livestock is portrayed as a “tradi-
tional” source of income for “the poor” (Delgado et al. 1999, vii). 1.3 billion people worldwide 
depend on livestock production, out of those 800 million poor small-scale farmers the Majority 
World (Thornton, Herrero, and Ericksen 2011, 1). The majority of poor, landless people are  
women* (Delgado et al. 1999, 40, 42; FAO 2011b, 3; Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 
2014b, 4); however, gender is almost never used as a lens of analysis, despite the fact that the 
International Livestock Research Institute writes that “poor women” are the “primary clients of 
ILRI” and should be “involved as genuine participants in research affecting them” (ILRI 2002, 
2).
Livestock provides the poor with cash income, food, manure, and draft power, independently 
from agricultural seasons and shocks (Blümmel et al. 2013; Dijkman, Gebrewold, and Pearson 
2000). The manure is essential “especially when rising petroleum prices make chemical fertiliz-
ers unaffordable,” the Revolution report claims. Moreover, livestock is a form of insurance “for 
people who have no other financial markets available to them” (Delgado et al. 1999, 3). Ulti-
mately, livestock as a status symbol also embodies “non-tradable functions” like payment of  
dowry (Dijkman 2009, 2; Hoffmann 1999; Mathias 2012). Most vitally, via the use of “com-
mon-property resources,” livestock production is accessible for the landless poor. Consequently, 
it  “offers one of the few rapidly growing markets that poor, rural people can join even if they  
lack substantial amounts of land, training, and capital” (Delgado et al. 1999, 3, 40). This is why 
the Livestock Revolution “is a rare opportunity for smallholder farmers to benefit from a rapidly 
275 Thornton, Herrero, and Ericksen elaborate how livestock is crucial for the “resilience of vulnerable poor people”  
(Thornton, Herrero, and Ericksen 2011, 2).
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growing market” (Delgado et al. 2000, 10).  They can expand their production  of “high value 
livestock products and by-products […], particularly so in arid and semi-arid areas where crop  
production is not a viable alternative” (FAO 2008, 2). For all these reasons, livestock is depicted 
as the number-one “pathway out of poverty” (FAO 2008, 1; ILRI 2002). Joining the Revolution 
appears to be a humanitarian imperative.
From the very beginning, the Livestock Revolution is presented as full of prospects. Nonethe-
less, the paradoxes are immediate. The ongoing, rapid industrialization of the sector threatens to 
drive out  the poor  (AGTR 2011; Delgado et  al.  2000,  10).  Consequently,  the opportunities 
should only benefit the poor if they were accompanied by “the right policies and technologies” 
(ILRI 2000a, 3).276 The foreword of the Revolution Report, authored by the Director General of 
the International  Food Policy Research Institute,  the Assistant  Director-General,  Agriculture 
Department of the FAO and the Director General of the International Livestock Research Insti -
tute, stresses the need for policies to “help small, poor livestock producers become better inte-
grated with commercial livestock marketing and processing.” It depends on such policy-action 
“whether the Livestock Revolution helps or harms the world’s poor and malnourished.” (Del-
gado et al. 1999, vii). In a nutshell, if countries adopt policies for the poor, they should “quickly 
reap the benefits” of the Revolution. However, if they “adopt a laissez-faire approach,” they risk 
that the poor will be “shut out of one of the few expanding markets available to them.” (ILRI 
2000a, 10 [original emphasis]). The International Livestock Research Institute in particular con-
centrates on “ensuring that the Livestock Revolution serves the poor.” (ILRI 2000b, viii).
The message is straightforward, and does not leave room for interpretation. The Livestock Rev-
olution, this unprecedented, dramatic shift in global agriculture, will be either a blessing or a  
curse. The International Livestock Research Institute names poor livestock keepers as the “ma-
jor equity issue” of the Livestock Revolution (ILRI 2000a, v). Even the World Bank under-
scores the Revolution’s detrimental effects on “social equity” (World Bank 2005, ix). Notably,  
the necessary counterpart of monetary poverty, wealth (Rist 2008, 229), is neither scandalized 
nor deemed a major equity issue. Being “vulnerable” or “poor” seems to be a natural, deficient 
state that lacks structural reasons. Further, “the poor” are depicted as one homogenous cate-
gory.277
276 Steinfeld: “There is a danger that livestock production and processing will become dominated by integrate large-
scale commercial operations, displacing small-scale livestock farmers and thus exacerbating rural poverty and mal-
nutrition. […] On the other hand, correctly managed, a dynamic livestock sector could prove catalytic in stimulat-
ing rural economies.” (Steinfeld 2004, 40).
277 The uniform terminology of “the poor” is maintained to reflect the discourse. 
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Notwithstanding this,  the authors are aware of the many large pitfalls of the Revolution. At  
times, their accounts are a confirmation of the status quo, and at other times, they are highly 
critical of the manifold challenges for “the poor.” According to the FAO, the key problems en-
countered by the poor are lack of access to land and water and the risks of animal diseases, 
drought, and theft (FAO 2008, 5). They poor face several barriers to market integration: lack of 
capital for the necessary investments, inappropriate or insufficient access to land, urban mar-
kets, technology, and information about markets (Dijkman 2009, 4; Lapar, Holloway, and Ehui 
2003; Rivera-Ferre 2009, 99; Steinfeld et al. 2006, 18). Market access is described as even more 
difficult for women* (ILRI 2002, 7).
As the Revolution authors specify, the poor cannot benefit from economies of scale and low 
transaction costs like large producers. The latter have a higher  negotiating power and  higher 
level of market information, they enjoy tax holidays, they profit from government services and 
subsidies, and they have access to better infrastructure, which is crucial for dealing with such  
perishable goods (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 19–20; Delgado et al. 1999, 42; ILRI 
2000a, 17).
What is more, changing economic conditions are not favorable for smallholders (van der Zijpp,  
Wilke, and Carsan 2010, 142). The Livestock Revolution is “underpinned by structural changes 
along the whole animal food supply chain,” according to Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld. Char-
acteristics  are  large  retailers,  industrialization,  and  vertical  integration—the  industrial  meat  
regime. This development is not favorable for small-scale producers. Costales, Gerber, and Ste-
infeld point out that “sustaining the revolution may not be compatible with sustaining small 
scale livestock production” (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 15). Small poultry and egg 
producers in particular will have a hard time competing against the industrial sector (Delgado, 
Narrod, and Tiongco 2008, 122).
At this point, it is important to bear in mind that the same structural changes in the sector have 
already occurred in the Minority World. “[Y]ou have to grow in order to survive” has been and 
still is the imperative for many farmers in Europe and Turtle Island. As outlined in part 2.1.3.2 
on corporate consolidation, thousands of small-scale farmers have been pushed out of business, 
from the United States to Denmark and Romania. Many of the remaining family farms are heav-
ily  indebted (Mathias  2012,  1–2).  Notably,  the  documents  on the Livestock Revolution are 
silent about these negative consequences and the precarious situation of farmers in the Minority 
World. Livestock’s Long Shadow soberly contends: 
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“there is a need to accept that the intensification and perhaps industrialization of livestock 
production is the inevitable long-term outcome of the structural change process that is on-
going for most of the sector.“ (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 283).
A decade after the declaration of the Revolution, case studies illustrate its impact in the Major-
ity World. Millar and Photakoun determine that market dynamics are leading to increased social  
inequality and ruling out small-scale producers in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Mil-
lar and Photakoun 2008, 91).  In a Brazilian case study, Lundström (2011) concludes that the 
Revolution marginalizes small-scale producers: it forces them to upscale their production and 
exposes them to financial risk. Rae and Zhang (2009) suggest that the Revolution can deepen 
income inequality in China. Upton (2000) examines the implications for smallholder agriculture 
in Kenya. He maintains that in the Majority World, the number of people working in agriculture  
is still rising, yet land resources are becoming increasingly scarce. Intensification is seen as the 
only option for sustaining farmers (Upton 2000, 4). Nevertheless, intensification benefits those 
who already own land, nonhuman animals, and feed, and who, in addition, have access to tech-
nology and the market (Millar and Photakoun 2008, 90-91, 99-100; Udo et al. 2011). 
More disadvantageous tendencies for “the poor” include trade liberalization, volatile prices on 
the world market, and booming urban markets favoring peri-urban intensified production. The 
shift from pastoral ruminant to industrial monogastric production entails higher expenses for 
feed. Additionally, grain prices continue to spike (see subdivision 5.7.3 on food security), and 
grasslands are increasingly deteriorated (MacLachlan 2015, 32–33; Millar and Photakoun 2008, 
92, 100). The increasing need for imported vaccines, feed, or antibiotics puts pressure on small-
scale farmers (FAO 2005, 5). Food safety regulations, a precondition to enter the international 
livestock market and trade, can be hard for smallholders to meet (ILRI 2000a; Steinfeld 2004, 
23, 35; compare Hall, Ehui, and Delgado 2004 on the impact of WTO sanitary and phytosani -
tary standards on smallholders). The Revolution is characterized by the growing influence of su-
permarkets, and compliance with their quantity and quality (uniformity) demands are another 
hurdle  for  small  producers  (Lundström  2011).  Mathias  (2012)  and  Delgado,  Narrod,  and 
Tiongco (2008, 122)  observe how livestock turns from an asset into a liability: smallholders 
take out loans to afford the necessary investments and accumulate substantial debt . If they are 
not able to meet the requirements, transnationals “will find little incentive” to choose them as 
suppliers and will go for bigger producers (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 19). 
In essence, the FAO demands that “livestock keepers” must become “livestock producers,” they 
have to produce “beyond survival requirements to benefit from expanding market opportunities” 
(FAO 2008, 5). Small-scale producers who will not intensify and partake in the concentration of 
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production “may be squeezed out of the sector” (FAO 2011b, 1; 2005, 2)—or, as Costales, Ger-
ber, and Steinfeld more subtly write, they are “taken out of the market chain loop” (2006, 19).  
This involves that “those who need the activity most could be driven out” (Delgado et al. 1999, 
42).
These assertions echo the apprehensions that the Revolution could be either blessing or spell for 
the poor. While the degree of concern is different in each paper, the Global Agenda downplays 
concerns  about  the  need  for  “equitable  development,”  only sporadically  addressing  poverty 
(“the poor” are completely absent) (Global Agenda of Action 2013, 2). Most publications, none-
theless, place stress on deliberate pro-poor policies. The original  Revolution report identifies 
four policy necessities that refer to the changing economic conditions in the sector:
“(1) removing policy distortions that artificially magnify economies of scale in livestock 
production; (2) building participatory institutions of collective action for small-scale farm-
ers that allow them to be vertically integrated with livestock processors and input suppliers; 
(3) creating the environment in which farmers will increase investment in ways to improve 
productivity in the livestock sector; and (4) promoting effective regulatory institutions to 
deal with the threat of environmental and health crises stemming from livestock.” (Delgado 
et al. 1999, 4).
As a consequence of the Revolution document, the FAO launched the “Pro-Poor Livestock Pol-
icy Initiative” in 2001 (MacLachlan 2015, 31).278 The International Livestock Research Institute 
issued several reports and strategies on “how to make the livestock revolution work for the  
poor” (ILRI 2000a; 2000b; 2000c; 2005); the International Food Policy Research Institute con-
tributed, among others, the publication Delgado, Narrod, and Tiongco 2008. In their “Livestock 
Policy Brief” 2005, the FAO demands policies for the elimination of market distortions such as 
subsidies, the support of  participatory producer  cooperatives, the establishment of land tenure 
rights, and regulation of access to communal lands, micro-credits and veterinary services (FAO 
2005). However, as if the FAO was afraid of painting a picture that was too friendly to small-
holders, it reassures the reader in its 2008 “Livestock Policy Brief” on “Livestock Policy and 
Poverty Reduction:”
“The goal of the proposed policies is not to promote a smallholder-dominated livestock sec-
tor but to establish a level playing field which allows smallholders to make choices with re-
spect to expanding their holdings, linking-up with other producers or withdrawing from the 
livestock sector altogether.” (FAO 2008, 4–5). 
278 Its homepage http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/pplpi/home.html does not exist anymore (19 Janu-
ary 2017). 
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Similarly, FAO author Dijkman calms: 
“The  objective  of  pro-poor  livestock  sector  development  interventions  […]  should  not, 
however, be to punish largescale production nor to maintain smallholder production sys-
tems at any cost.” (Dijkman 2009, 4).
It perhaps does not come as a surprise, then, that the FAO evaluation of existing pro-poor poli -
cies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the same Policy Brief of 2008 is sobering. On the one 
hand, existing pro-poor policies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America do not focus on livestock, 
and if they do, they prioritize productivity increase rather than poverty alleviation. Livestock 
policies, on the other hand, neglect the needs of small-scale producers, and they will probably  
continue to  do so in  the  future  (FAO 2008,  6–7).  Heffernan (2004)  notes  that  “rhetoric  of 
‘poverty-focused’ projects and programs often dominates,” yet “very little work” has been done 
to understand more completely the relationships between livestock and poverty and the Revolu-
tion’s macro-economic effects on poor livestock keepers. Steinfeld presents a similarly critical 
account:
“Development interventions in the livestock sector have, generally, not been very success-
ful.  Undoubtedly,  inappropriate  technologies  and  the  failure  to  deliver  services  to  poor 
farmers  have  contributed greatly  to  the lack of  success  of  many livestock development 
projects. However, even in cases where the technologies were appropriately targeted and 
the focus was distinctly pro-poor, technical projects have in many cases failed to deliver 
any significant sustainable improvements in the livelihoods of the poor. Analyses of these 
issues clearly indicate that an enabling institutional and political environment is indispens-
able in adopting a pro-poor focus, enhancing the sustainability of pro-poor interventions, 
and ensuring that agricultural intensification strategies have impact at the desired social lev-
els.” (Steinfeld 2004, 33–34).
The requisite institutional and political environment is the crux of the matter. In 1999, the Revo-
lution authors deplored how public health services are weakened in parts of the Majority World 
since “government services are being curtailed” (Delgado et al. 1999, 51). The International 
Livestock Research Institute specifies: policies favoring human and environmental health, nec-
essary for the Livestock Revolution, might be difficult for “cash-strapped governments in devel-
oping countries […], especially at a time when many of them are being urged to cut public ex-
penditure.” (ILRI 2000a, 22). In 2005, the FAO observe that the funding of public agricultural 
research has declined, but the funding of private agricultural research increases, which exclu-
sively benefits the growing industrial sector (compare equally ILRI 2000c on stakeholder roles 
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and expectations from international livestock research). Likewise, veterinary services are in-
creasingly privatized (FAO 2005, 6–7). 
On top of those political and economic variables, climate change continues to aggravate the sit-
uation of poor producers (Rege et al. 2011). 105 million tons of total losses in future cereal pro-
duction are estimated for 2080 (Keyzer et al. 2005, 198). Nardone et al. (2010) anticipate a 25 
percent loss of animal production in the Majority World due to climate change. Heat waves, se-
vere droughts and water scarcity, desertification, soil infertility, and higher solar radiation on  
animals will especially affect pasture-based production in Africa and some parts of Asia. As the  
researchers specify, industrialized systems will be better prepared for these changing conditions 
because they can adjust the temperature, humidity, and feed and medication input in the con-
trolled  environment  of  CAFOs.  In  addition,  Tackling  Climate  Change expresses  fears  that 
adopting existing greenhouse gas mitigation strategies—turning animal exploitation sustainable
—could constitute a socio-economic risk for subsistence farmers.279 
For FAO analyst Dijkman, it is illusory to think that subsistence farmers could “tap the poten-
tial” of the Livestock Revolution and enter the global market; he calls it outright “wishful think-
ing.” As noted above, such market entry entails risk, competition, the compliance with interna-
tional standards, and so on. Small-scale producers neither have the assets nor capacity to deal  
with the constant change in the fast-paced global market (Dijkman 2009, 2). Structures inhibit 
“the poor” in partaking in the Revolution. Dijkman compares the Livestock Sector with a bro-
ken ladder, the rungs at the bottom symbolizing the informal sector of small-scale farmers: 
“it appears that the ‘livestock ladder’—the process by which smallscale traditional livestock 
keepers could gradually intensify and scale up their production, and, in doing so, use live-
stock as ‘pathways out of poverty’—is largely a myth. The ‘ladder’ seems to have rungs at 
the bottom and top only, with a yawning, generally insurmountable void between the two.” 
(Dijkman 2009, 2).280
279 As detailed above, livestock traditionally provides smallholders with a variety of ancillary services, including 
draught power, the provision of manure, financial, social, or insurance functions. The publication Tackling Climate  
Change perceives the danger that efficiency improvements and a lower herd size will diminish those non-food pro-
duction functions, and warn that “a single-minded commodity-based focus on production efficiency can come at the 
expense of some ancillary services of livestock that are important for poor rural households, including their role as  
a store of wealth.” (Gerber et al. 2013, 99). “Unless they are able to be cost-effectively substituted with mechaniza-
tion, use of artificial fertilizers, and banking and insurance systems, these lost services would be detrimental to farm 
household livelihoods” (Gerber et al. 2013, 88).
280 Industrialization does not necessarily impinge on that sector, and that is why Dijkman deems it equally fictitious  
that industrialization pushes small-scale farmers out of business (depicted with the ‘livestock slide’).  Still,  the  
yawning, “widening gulf” between the industrial and the informal livestock sector in countries where the Livestock  
Revolution is supposed to take place remains a matter of concern (Dijkman 2009, 2–3). 
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In point of fact, the increasing demand for animal products has, until now, not benefitted small-
scale producers but “a relatively small number of large producers” instead (Steinfeld 2004, 32). 
And this is meant to last: the Livestock Revolution will almost uniquely be driven by large-scale 
producers (Dijkman 2009, 4; Steinfeld 2004, 23). And, according to Livestock’s Long Shadow, 
this intensification “is only achieved at the cost of pushing numerous small- and middle-scale 
producers […] out of business,” despite the overall growth of the sector (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 
279).
Nonetheless, declarations as straightforward as the latter, or the ones quoted above, are rare. In 
general, the authors are cautious in making clear statements about the future of pastoral and  
mixed systems—which signifies, the future of the majority of the sector—and use a lot of hedg-
ing rhetoric.281 Nonetheless, despite the authors’ reluctance to realistically assess the extremely 
precarious position of small-scale farmers, they predict their needed “transition” to another sec-
tor: 
“For those small-holders that are unable to compete, policies need to be designed that facili-
tate  their  transition  from the  livestock  sector  towards  other  livelihood  options.”  (FAO 
2011b, 29).
As “further job shrinkage in the agro-food sector” is likely, “appropriate exit strategies for 
those smallholders who decide to leave the sub-sector” are needed (FAO 2008, 5). 
“[E]xit strategies should be designed for those who are unable to cope.” (Costales, Gerber, 
and Steinfeld 2006, 25).
Fifteen years after the announcement of the Revolution and the repeated need for pro-poor poli-
cies, the Global Agenda austerely determines that the poor might not fit in the model of devel-
opment. Yet, the “viable growth in value chains” should allow the poor to “find secure liveli -
hoods and participate in growing markets or  take up other opportunities outside the sector”  
(Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014a).282
In these times and conditions, the benefits of animal exploitation for the “rural poor” are more 
than doubtful. Instead of evening out  social inequalities, the Livestock Revolution appears to 
exacerbate them, as the Green Revolution did in India and around the world (Holt Giménez and 
Shattuck 2011, 110; Khan and Bidabadi 2004, 99). For Dijkman, in the course of the Livestock 
281 In an interesting exploration, the World Bank presents mixed evidence: the emergence of large-scale producers in 
some countries crowded out small-scale producers; in others, a parallel system evolved. Vertical integration can  
provide employment opportunities for the poor, nonetheless, it can also cost farmers’ independence and reduce their 
margins. Likewise, cooperatives show a mixed record worldwide (World Bank 2005, 13–14).
282 Compare a similar statement by the FAO in 2011: “Even where production is in the hands of larger-scale com-
mercial livestock owners [...], there will be employment opportunities generated along the value chain; both up-
stream and down-stream of the producer.” (FAO 2011b, 29). 
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Revolution, “livestock is an expression of poverty, rather than a pathway out of poverty” (Dijk-
man 2009, 2). Yet, Pica-Ciamarra et al. (2015) find that factors like farming systems, species, 
class and the use of livestock determines if livestock contributes to poverty reduction: there is 
no universal wisdom about it. 
What is quite startling in the Livestock Revolution discourse is that the heavily discussed “poor  
livestock keepers” whose future is threatened by the Livestock Revolution do constitute the ma-
jority of the sector (FAO 2008, 4). The majority of food consumed in the Majority World (both 
animal and plant-based) is equally produced by small-scale, semi-subsistence farmers (Steinfeld 
2004, 32). In Senegal, Sudan, and Niger, outright 80 percent of agricultural output is supplied 
by pastoralists (Mathias 2012, 8). In other words, the Livestock Revolution bypasses the bulk of  
its current producers and consumers in the Majority World and is completely geared towards the  
global agri-food players who rule the sector and who, in turn, produce for consumers in the Mi-
nority World. This circumvention demonstrates the discursive instrumentalization of “the poor” 
in efforts to legitimize the Livestock Revolution.283 To a considerable degree, the storyline of 
the sector’s commitment to “food security and poverty alleviation” and the call for pro-poor 
policies look like mere lip service in face of the actual socio-economic, political, and environ-
mental  situation.  Fritz  of  the  German  Centre  for  Research  and  Documentation  Chile-Latin 
America sums it up:
“The livestock development strategy promoted by international organisations like FAO, IF-
PRI and ILRI actually resembles more a declaration of surrender to the forces of the indus-
trial livestock complex than a poverty-sensitive approach where the most vulnerable small-
holders take centre stage.” (Fritz 2014, 14).
Rather than philanthropically feeding and “modernizing the poor” with products from animal 
exploitation (Twine 2012, 14), international lobbies and corporations are trying to capture new 
markets in view of stagnating turnovers in the Minority World (Sanbonmatsu 2011b, 23). In this 
sense, the discourse of “poverty alleviation” in reality constitutes a process of economic and 
cultural imperialism. 
5.7.3 Food security
“The livestock sector is vital to global food security and health” (Global Agenda for Sus-
tainable Livestock 2016c).
283 See also Rivera-Ferre (2009, 102). For FAO analyst Dijkman, this “smallholder romanticism” needs “significant  
revision.” Instead, he suggests to explore “the type of capacity that is needed to allow producers to innovate” (Dijk-
man 2009, 3–4). 
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The third argument for the naturalization of the Livestock Revolution is its importance for food 
security. In every single document analyzed for the present study, the storyline that the livestock 
sector is “vital to global nutrition and food security” appears (Global Agenda for Sustainable  
Livestock 2014a).284 The Global  Agenda calculates that the complex provides 26 percent of 
global protein consumption and 13 percent of  total  calories (Global  Agenda for Sustainable 
Livestock 2014b, 2). As problematized in part 2.3.3 on land-system change, this is not a particu-
larly strong performance, given the sector’s occupation of 80 percent of arable land and its use 
of 35 percent of the global grain harvest for fodder. Still, the discourse accentuates the nutri-
tional benefits of livestock products especially for “vulnerable communities,” “the poor,” chil-
dren, and to mankind in general (ILRI 2000a). Animal products are defined as “higher value and 
quality foods” (Steinfeld 2004, 21, see also AGTR 2011). The farcicality of this argument, how-
ever, is that those “vulnerable communities” in rural, pastoral areas will not be the ones benefit-
ting from more animal protein. The Livestock Revolution is a phenomenon of “urban consumers 
in emerging economies,” as noted by Gerber et al. (2013, 83).285 
And not only will those “vulnerable communities” be deprived of these so-called quality foods
—they will additionally have to compete with the sector for their daily bread—or their tortilla,  
injera, pita, or chapati. As elucidated in the subdivision “Feeding capital” (2.1.4.1), the Revolu-
tion authors  calculated the  world cereal use for feed  for the two periods 1992/1994 and 2020 
and projected it  to more than double in the Majority World—from 194 to 409 million tons. In 
the same period of time, cereal use in the Minority World was projected to grow by 17 percent.  
Total use of cereals as feed in the world was forecasted to expand from 636 million tons in  
1992/1994 to 928 million tons in 2020 (Delgado et al. 2000, 7, quoted in FAO 2005, 3). How is 
the use of 928 million tons of cereals for feed by 2020 compatible with food security? When the 
Revolution report was written in 1999, the authors proceeded on the assumption that the “era of  
cheap food” would go on, and they made their calculations accordingly. “Real cereal prices, 
however, are not likely to rise very much by 2020.” The Revolution authors justified their pro-
jection with the world’s “considerable reserve capacity for additional cereal production” (Del-
284 Although the term “food sovereignty” already existed in 1999, food security is the term of preference in the doc-
uments examined here.
285 Moreover, the nutritional benefits of animal protein might be levelled out by detrimental health effects. The Live-
stock Revolution is said to both benefit and impinge on public health (Steinfeld 2004, 19, 23). “As these events un-
fold, many people’s diets will change, some for the better, but others for the worse, especially if food contamination 
is not controlled.” (Delgado et al. 2000, 2). Contaminated products of animal origin are a major source of food-
borne diseases; moreover, international trade and industrialized production aggravate the risk of zoonosis (Delgado 
et al. 1999, 49; FAO 2005, 3). On preventing the spread of animal diseases while still benefitting the poor, from a 
Livestock Revolution perspective, refer to Hall, Ehui, and Christopher Delgado (2004).
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gado et al. 1999, 36).286 They believed that agricultural production could be expanded and mar-
kets would adjust (Fritz 2014, 7–8). They argue:
 
“Demand increases for meat and milk have largely been met through expansion of feed 
production or  imports  at  world prices  that  are  declining in  real  terms.  Historically,  the 
livestock sector has helped stabilize world cereal supply. Evidence from cereal price shocks 
in the 1970s and 1980s suggests that reductions in cereal supply were largely absorbed by 
reductions in feed for livestock.” (Delgado et al. 1999, 61).
For the Revolution authors, their findings suggest “that the Livestock Revolution is intimately 
wrapped up with nutritional and food security” (Delgado et al. 1999, 36). Still, in the section on 
nutrition, food security, and poverty alleviation in the Revolution report, the authors reflect on 
the social justice aspect of turning cheap food into expensive meat: 
“It seems probable, for example, that massively larger amounts of cereals will be used as 
feed to produce items consumed primarily by better-off urban people in countries where 
outright lack of food is still common.” (Delgado et al. 1999, 37).
“Others worry that increased use of feed to produce animal products for the relatively rich 
puts upward pressure on prices of cereals, the staple food of the world’s poor. Feeding ce-
reals and soybeans to animals typically creates fewer calories and less protein than ani-
mals absorb.” (Delgado et al. 2000, 9).287
However, critical deliberations on the threats of feed-grains to food security are designated as 
“highly emotional and often imperfectly grounded in facts” (Delgado et al. 1999, 37): 
“However, the idea that reduced demand for feed would overcome the complex income, in-
frastructure, and food distribution problems that result in calorie malnutrition is an unrealis-
tic oversimplification of the problem.” (Delgado et al. 2000, 9).
286 The report lists several reasons for the assumed “high supply responsiveness of cereals.” First, “the large grain-
exporting countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, have the ability to bring large amounts of  
land typically not sown to grain into cereal production as prices rise.” Second, exporting countries can sustain their  
production by increasing fertilizer use. Third, “in a system of global markets, where actors all over the world re -
spond to changing price incentives, individual shocks are smoothed out over time through myriad adjustments  
throughout the system. In other words, world supply will be more price-responsive than individual country supply.”  
And fourth, “in areas containing a significant share of the world’s poor, the rise in the consumption of calories from 
animal products is matched by a decrease in calories from starchy staples. […] Rice and wheat are the grains typi -
cally consumed in China. These grains have significantly lower average yields per hectare than maize, a feed grain 
increasingly cultivated by Chinese farmers. Thus, substitution of meat and milk for grain in the diet liberates some 
grain from direct consumption as food, and the consequent increase in aggregate grain supply is amplified by the  
relatively higher yields of feed grains per hectare.” (Delgado et al. 1999, 36).
287 Note the hedging terminology of “relatively rich.” The poor are not described as “relatively poor.”  Relative 
wealth relativizes inequality.
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Correspondingly, the Revolution document’s section on food security concludes on an opti-
mistic note: 
“The Livestock Revolution’s  effect  on the food security  of  poor  people,  through cereal 
prices, is likely to be far less important than its effect on the income of the poor.” (Delgado 
et al. 1999, 39).
The  2001  update  confirms  the  1999  findings  (Delgado,  Rosegrant,  and  Meijer  2001,  18). 
Equally, the International Livestock Research Institute contends that it is a “myth” that feed will 
compete with human food, and it justifies this assertion with the low expectations for any grain  
price increase  (ILRI 2000a, 11; Vercoe,  Fitzhugh,  and Kaufmann 2000, 411). Still in 2006, 
Livestock’s Long Shadow also observed a “long-term decline of grain prices” since the 1950s 
and believed this trend would continue (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 12). And in the same, by now fa-
miliar contradictory manner, the Global Agenda declares: 
“The  Agenda  partnership  promotes  livestock  production  based  mainly  on  materials  not 
competing  with  direct  use  as  human  food.”  (Global  Agenda  for  Sustainable  Livestock 
2014a). 
A critical appraisal of this food security assessment raises several questions. First, the difference 
between cereal production for feed and for food should be emphasized. The above paragraphs 
have discursively shown that the world had “considerable reserve capacity for additional cereal 
production” and that production could additionally be boosted to expand the feed base sustain-
ing animal production. The relative ease with which billions of farmed animals can apparently  
be fed is notable. Given that confidence in global agricultural production, one might ask why it 
would not be similarly simple to produce the same grains for the millions of people suffering 
from undernutrition. Nevertheless, here again, capital is at the heart of the matter. In the view of 
the authors, predominantly agricultural or livestock economists, hunger does not constitute a de-
mand, because the hungry lack the income to manifest the demand. In capitalism, production is 
geared towards profit, and not needs. Costales and Steinfeld illustrate: 
“The sometimes popular view, that the world hunger problem could be resolved by simply 
curtailing demand for meat and other livestock products, and thereby releasing grain used as 
feed for  human consumption, is  flawed. In the absence of  demand for  feed grains,  less 
would be produced, and the hungry would still go hungry. This underlines the notion that  
world  hunger  is  a  demand (income)  problem rather  than  a  supply problem.”  (Costales, 
Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 25).
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Nonetheless, the agricultural economists observe that the increasing use of grains for feed disad-
vantages the poor: 
“While it is probably true that livestock do not detract food from those who currently go 
hungry, it raises overall demand and prices for crops and agricultural inputs.” (Steinfeld et 
al. 2006, 270).
“[I]t  is  clear  that  the  growing  livestock  sector  demand  for  feed  grains  and  other  feed 
ingredients raises the price of these and other similar commodities to higher levels than 
would otherwise be the case. This makes grains and other staples less accessible to the poor  
who have to buy them.” (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 25).
Thornton indicates that in the future there will be “considerable competition between food and 
feed production” (Thornton 2010, 2864). The Global Agenda maintains: 
“There are clearly areas of competition between direct food and feed uses for many crops, 
and  livestock  also  compete  for  land  and  water  resources  locally,  and  through  trade, 
globally.” (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2014b, 2).
Second, a perhaps even more substantial observation is that the International Food Policy Re-
search  Institute,  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization,  and  the  International  Livestock 
Research Institute were wrong in their predictions about the cereal market. They did not foresee 
the price hikes of the coming decade (Sumberg and Thompson 2013, 12): cereal and food prices 
in fact spiked in 2008 and similarly again in 2011. In the three years before 2008, global food 
prices rose by 83 percent, and world hunger peaked, as well, unleashing a number of food riots  
in different parts of the world—at the same time, global harvests soared, and the profits of the 
world’s foremost transnational agribusinesses have also rocketed (Holt Giménez and Shattuck 
2011, 111). Food prices have diminished since, but remain relatively high, with increased price  
volatility (Dijkman 2009, 3; Fritz 2014, 7–8). Malnutrition keeps growing (Rivera-Ferre 2009). 
With rising cereal, and thus feed, prices, the cost of animal foods also increases (Rivera-Ferre  
2009, 96). Papers published after the grain price hikes are much less optimistic about the bene-
fits of the Livestock Revolution for the poor and for food security  (Sumberg and Thompson 
2013, 14). For instance, in their Ethiopian case-study, Ali and Neka speak of a “grim situation” 
that the livestock sector created with its demand for feed and water (Ali and Neka 2012, 208). 
Not only grain prices but feed demand as well has supposedly been underestimated. With global 
population growing by 40 percent by 2050 and a higher average food energy intake, agricultural 
production must increase by 70 percent. This translates into an additional billion tons of cereals 
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compared with production in 2005/2007 (FAO 2011b, 5). Yet Keyzer et al. project an additional 
global demand of almost two billion tons of cereals already by 2030 (Keyzer et al. 2005, 198).  
In 2016-2017, the use of cereals for feed was 35 percent of global cereal utilization, amounting 
to 2,564 million tons (FAO 2016f).  Herrero et al. estimate that almost 50 percent of the grain 
produced between 2000 and 2050 will go to feedthroughs (Herrero et al. 2009, 112). 
A third reflection covers the approach to food security in the first place. As echoed in some of 
the  Revolution  documents,  and  as  shown  in  detail  in  chapter  two  on  the  animal-industrial 
complex, animal production is an inherently inefficient way to create food.288 The production of 
plant-based calories is four to twenty times more efficient than the production of calories from 
animal products (Bajželj et al. 2015; van der Zijpp, Wilke, and Carsan 2010, 135). Yet again, in  
capitalism, efficiency is not defined in terms of satisfying needs but rather in monetary terms.  
The  inefficient  cycling  of  nutrients  through  animal  bodies  in  order  to  sell  meat,  or  the 
“destruction of large volumes of useable nutrition in grains and oilseeds,” as Weis puts it, makes 
sense in capitalism (Weis 2013b, 76). Any discussion of food security should bear in mind that 
the animal-industrial complex does not aim to “create food,  but to make money”  (Gunderson 
2013, 260–61 [original emphasis]). Weis elaborates: 
“the  great  surpluses  of  cheap  food  from  the  industrial  grain-oilseed-livestock  complex 
involve  an  illusion  of  efficiency,  which  is  defined  in  terms  of  high  yields  and  high 
productivity per farmer.” (Weis 2013b, 80).
The  illusion  of  efficiency  belongs  to  the  productivist  approach  to  food  security,  a 
unidimensional  line  fixated  on  the  continuation  of  the  Livestock  Revolution,  and  the 
ongoing meatification of diets: 
“Meatification  is  thus  a  key  part  of  the  serious  misrepresentation  that  occurs  when 
champions of high-input agriculture portray hunger and future food security as matters of 
enhanced  yield,  and  by  extension  matters  of  more  input-intensive  approaches  and/or 
continuing genetic modification of seeds and animals. Rather than ratcheting up insufficient 
yields and production, a much more compelling priority is to urgently ratchet down meat  
consumption  and  confront  the  social  and  ecological  disaster  that  is  industrial  livestock 
production.” (Weis 2013b, 80).
288 Even Livestock’s Long Shadow acknowledges: “Livestock compete for crops but provide a buffer against grain 
shortages. In simple numeric terms, livestock actually detract more from total food supply than they provide. Live -
stock now consume more human edible protein than they produce. In fact, livestock consume 77 million tonnes of 
protein contained in feedstuff that could potentially be used for human nutrition, whereas only 58 million tonnes of  
protein are contained in food products that livestock supply. In terms of dietary energy, the relative loss is much  
higher. This is a result of the recent trend towards more concentrate-based diets for pigs and poultry, with nutri -
tional requirements more similar to humans than ruminants.” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 270).
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5.7.4 Environmental benefit
“The livestock sector is crucial to society achieving its environmental, social and economic 
and health objectives” 
“The  livestock  sector  can  contribute  significantly  toward  climate  change  mitigation” 
(Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016c).
The fourth line of argument and storyline naturalizing and legitimating the Livestock’s Revolu-
tion is its positive relationship with the environment. The following paragraphs trace this eco-
logical discourse and then classify the Revolution’s environmental impact according to the plan-
etary boundaries of climate change, biogeochemical flows, freshwater use, land-system change, 
and change in biosphere integrity. 
A peculiar feature in the discourse is the periodical downplaying of the sector’s contribution to 
climate change. For instance, the International Livestock Research Institute details that “it is  
worth remembering that animal themselves are neutral in their effect on the environment,” and 
that what matters are the management of livestock and regulation towards “sustainable produc-
tion” (ILRI 2000a, 10). What is more, livestock systems, “if managed properly, play their part 
in […] counteracting environmental degradation” (ILRI 2002, i). In addition, the emissions of  
the complex are justified with its social contribution. Thornton, Herrero, and Ericksen contend 
that 
“[g]iven that almost all human activity is associated with GHG emissions, those from livestock in  
these systems are relatively modest when compared to the contribution that livestock make to the 
livelihoods of this huge number of people.” (Thornton, Herrero, and Ericksen 2011, 2).
The Tackling Climate Change report adversely (and somewhat paradoxically) claims: 
“The global livestock sector contributes a significant share to anthropogenic GHG emis-
sions, but it can also deliver a significant share of the necessary mitigation effort.” (Gerber 
et al. 2013, xii).
The Global Agenda even lauds the livestock sector for being “instrumental in landscape man-
agement and enhanc[ing] biodiversity in numerous settings” (Global Agenda for Sustainable 
Livestock 2014b, 7), and recognizes “the potential contribution of livestock to the sustainable 
use of terrestrial ecosystems, […] and to improve biodiversity” (Global Agenda for Sustainable 
Livestock 2016e). The Global Agenda does not, however, provide any reference for these alle-
gations. Other papers indicate local environmental benefits as well, such as enhancing biodiver-
sity,  carbon sequestration, and landscape maintenance,  but  only in reference to pastoral  and 
agro-forestry systems (Herrero and Thornton 2013, 20879; Steinfeld 2004, 34).  Herrero et al. 
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(2009, 118), on the other hand, portray industrial agriculture as decreasing the sector’s overall 
impact on biodiversity by more efficient production. Barrett adds that the “environmental bene-
fits of industrial systems may seem elusive, but they do exist.” (Barrett 2001, 317).
The contradictions on the environmental repercussions of the animal-industrial complex, and of 
the Revolution in particular, are probably the most confounding aspect of the whole discourse. 
Chapter 2.3 has advanced a systematic examination of the sector’s contribution to the ecological  
crisis, and to the crossing of planetary boundaries. In view of those variables, to claim that the 
livestock sector is crucial to society in “achieving its environmental objectives,” according to  
the Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock in 2016, is quite astounding—and can be read as a 
distraction from the massive detrimental impact of the animal-industrial complex. 
At the same time, the discourse features rather pessimistic perspectives on the ecology of the  
Revolution. The Revolution report prognoses  “unprecedented stress on the resources used in 
livestock production” as the sector changes from using “surplus and waste resources” to seeking 
“new resources” (Delgado et al. 1999, 2) and dedicates a whole paragraph to the “Risks of the 
Livestock Revolution,” including environmental threats like land degradation, deforestation, air 
pollution, and waste problems (Delgado et al. 2000, 9). According to the Livestock Policy Brief 
“Responding to the ‘Livestock Revolution,’” those repercussions are predominantly generated 
by rapidly spreading industrial livestock systems (FAO 2005, 6). Costales, Gerber, and Stein-
feld fear “externalities in the form of environmental damages” if ongoing industrialization is 
“poorly managed” (Costales, Gerber, and Steinfeld 2006, 15), that is, if exploitation is not trans-
formed into sustainable exploitation. Livestock’s Long Shadow maintains that the complex “is a 
major stressor on many ecosystems and on the planet as a whole” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 267), 
and it worries: 
“In  the  absence  of  major  corrective  measures,  the  environmental  impact  of  livestock 
production will worsen dramatically. Viewed very simply, if production doubles, without 
any  reduction  in  environmental  measures  per  unit  of  production,  then  environmental 
damage will double.” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 275).
In 2011, the FAO deems it “certain” that the Livestock Revolution will pointedly threaten food 
security, fresh water and forest resources, that it will impact climate regulation and air quality,  
and that it will champion infectious diseases (FAO 2011b, 31). On a different level, Hegarty 
(2013) and Leng (2005) question a “business-as-usual” continuation Livestock Revolution be-
cause of its  dependence on declining oil  reserves.  The  Tackling Climate Change document 
equally expresses its apprehension about future livestock production:
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“With demand for livestock products projected to grow by 70 percent by 2050, concerns 
about  the  unbalanced  nature  of  this  growth  and  its  attendant  environmental  and  socio-
economic consequences are increasing. To date, most of the increase in demand has been 
met  by  rapidly  growing,  modern  forms  of  production  while  hundreds  of  millions  of 
pastoralists and smallholders, who depend on livestock for survival and income, have little 
access to emerging opportunities for growth. In addition, there is increasing concern about  
the impact of production growth on natural resources of which the sector is a large user; it  
is, for example, the world’s largest user of agricultural land.” (Gerber et al. 2013, 83).
This comment reciprocates the ever-increasing amount of scholarly evidence on the ecology of 
the  Livestock  Revolution.  What  do  the  scrutinized  documents  say  about  the  forecasted 
environmental  repercussions?  How  will  the  Revolution  affect  planetary  boundaries?  The 
following paragraphs are not a complete but rather a basic enumeration of the future drains on 
nature. Most publications maintain their silence about the concrete environmental impact of the 
Livestock Revolution. Yet this minimalist account mirrors the weight ecology is attributed in the  
Livestock  Revolution  discourse.  Perhaps  environmental  sustainability  is  just  not  a  priority.  
Indeed,  Livestock’s  Long  Shadow asks:  “what  relative  value  should  we  assign  to  the 
environment, compared to other objectives such as the provision of livelihoods or the cheap 
supply of animal products?” (Steinfeld et al. 2006, 267). Similarly, Thornton speaks of “[t]rade-
offs  between  food  security,  poverty,  equity,  environmental  sustainability  and  economic 
development”  that  will  “inevitably”  occur  in  future  livestock  development  (Thornton  2010, 
2856–2957). One wonders how such a trade-off should look like given the biosphere is the basis 
of all life and human endeavors. 
5.7.4.1 Climate change and biogeochemical flows
As outlined in part 2.3.1, one goal of climate change mitigation is to keep emissions below two  
degrees  Celsius  by the end of  the  twenty-first  century.  Hedenus,  Wirsenius,  and Johansson 
(2014) advance a maximum of 13 gigatons carbon dioxide equivalents of total annual emissions 
of all sectors for the year 2070 if this target is to be met with a chance of above 50 percent. Yet, 
they similarly calculate that the agricultural sector alone—without including any other global 
sector, like energy or transport—will total approximately emissions of 13 gigatons carbon diox-
ide equivalents in 2070 if the Livestock Revolution is to happen without rapid increases in pro-
ductivity and “dedicated technical mitigation measures.” Animal products account for 80 per-
cent of those 13 gigatons. The authors warn that “food-related emissions, if they remain un-
abated, are on track to take up most, if not all, of the long-term annual emission space allowable  
under the 2 °C target” (Hedenus, Wirsenius, and Johansson 2014, 85–86).289
289 It is relevant to note that the authors’ reference value is 7.1 gigatons carbon dioxide equivalents per annum in 
2000 (Hedenus, Wirsenius, and Johansson 2014, 79), which is lower than the FAO calculation applied in this thesis 
(Tackling Climate Change determines emissions of 7.1 gigatons carbon dioxide equivalents per annum just for the 
164
The prognosis of Bajželj et al. (2014) is even more serious. They estimate that the projected 
Revolution (Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2012) alone—again, just one part of the agricultural  
sector—would engender a global warming of two degrees Celsius even earlier, by 2050 (and not 
2100,  as the Intergovernmental Panel  on Climate Change’s scenario predicts)  (Bajželj  et  al.  
2014). Pelletier and Tyedmers determine that greenhouse gas emissions will increase by 39 per-
cent above levels reported in 2000 and that the animal industry’s share of the safe operating  
space for greenhouse gas emissions will rise from 52 percent as of 2000 to 70 percent by 2050  
(Pelletier and Tyedmers 2010, 18372).
In terms of biogeochemical flows, reactive nitrogen mobilization would increase by 36 percent  
above levels reported in 2000, and the share of the safe operating space for reactive nitrogen 
mobilization will expand from 117 percent as of 2000, to 294 percent by 2050 (Pelletier and 
Tyedmers 2010, 18372). By 2050, nitrogen fertilization is projected to rise by 1.9 to 3.9, and 
phosphorus increase is estimated at 1.6 to 3.4-fold (Tilman et al. 2001, 283). Those increases 
will engender eutrophication of freshwater and coastal waters 2.4 to 2.7 times greater than in 
2000 (Tilman et al. 2001, 281). Kahiluoto et al. conclude that “a radical transformation of agri-
food systems using a broad range of means is imperative,” particularly so because increasing ef-
ficiency in livestock production alone does not suffice to return to the safe operating space of  
biogeochemical flows (Kahiluoto et al. 2014, 20). 
Whereas  the  scientific  studies  assess  the  technological  mitigation potential  differently,  they 
agree on the necessity of lowering the consumption of animal foods. Hedenus, Wirsenius, and 
Johansson calculate that emissions may be kept to 7.7 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalents 
per  annum (GtCO2eq/year) in 2070 if faster growth in livestock productivity is coupled with 
technical mitigation measures.290 Yet, the authors maintain that “if structural changes in human 
diets are included, emissions may be reduced further, to 3–5GtCO2eq/year in 2070. […] We 
conclude that reduced ruminant meat and dairy consumption will be indispensable for reaching 
the 2°C target with a high probability, unless unprecedented advances in technology take place.” 
(Hedenus,  Wirsenius,  and  Johansson  2014,  79).  Nonetheless,  the  authors  specify  that  “the 
livestock sector (Gerber et al. 2013, xii, compare section 2.3.1).
290 Still, Hedenus, Wirsenius, and Johansson problematize the focus on higher productivity in intensified production, 
because it entails higher rates of nitrogen fertilizer application. More concretely, intensified livestock production  
implies, first, less grazing on permanent pasture and a higher share of oilseeds as feed which equals higher nitrogen  
fertilizer application rates. Second, intensified production and less grazing propagate a higher concentration of ma-
nure in stables, precipitating higher methane emissions from manure storage facilities. Third, intensified production  
and higher productivity in the dairy sector signifies that “less cattle meat (from surplus dairy calves and culled  
cows) per unit of milk is produced as a by-product.” The authors calculate that the by-product cattle meat has less  
greenhouse gas emissions than cattle meat from suckler cow beef systems. “Given constant beef demand, this  
means that the higher the dairy cow milk yield, the higher the average GHG emissions per unit of total beef sup -
ply.” (Hedenus, Wirsenius, and Johansson 2014, 85).
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prospects for deep emission cuts in agriculture through technology seem unfavorable.” Technol-
ogy has limits, and even if technological options existed, their diffusion might be slow (Hede-
nus, Wirsenius, and Johansson 2014, 88). A “radical shift in diets” is thus needed (Hedenus, 
Wirsenius, and Johansson 2014, 86).
Bajželj et al. (2014b) calculate that sustainable intensification can cut 4  GtCO2eq/year emis-
sions; conversely, a moderate reduction in the consumption of animal protein would eliminate  
5.6 GtCO2eq/year emissions. In their article “Forecasting potential global environmental costs 
of livestock production 2000-2050,” Pelletier and Tyedmers conclude that the application of 
technological  means  alone  in  the  animal  industry  will  not  suffice  to  stay  within  planetary 
boundaries. Reducing the production of animal foods must be a policy priority (Pelletier and 
Tyedmers 2010). 
Ripple  et  al.  measure  an  emission  reduction  potential  of  0.2–1.6  GtCO2eq/year  for  higher 
livestock feeding efficiency, and a potential of 0.2–1.9 GtCO2eq/year for enhanced crop yields. 
Reducing meat consumption, conversely, has a reduction potential of 0.7–7.3  GtCO2eq/year. 
The mitigation potential of demand-side measures is thus much higher than the one of supply-
side measures (Ripple et al. 2013, 3). The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change equally discusses studies on demand-side options to mitigate climate 
change, in particular substituting animal foods with plant-based products, termed “less GHG-
intensive food” (Smith et al. 2014, 838):
“Popp et al. (2010) estimated that agricultural non-CO2 emissions (CH4 and N2O) would 
triple by 2055 to 15.3 GtCO2eq / yr if current dietary trends and population growth were to 
continue. Technical mitigation options on the supply side, such as improved cropland or 
livestock management, alone could reduce that value to 9.8 GtCO2eq / yr, whereas emis-
sions were reduced to 4.3 GtCO2eq / yr in a ‘decreased livestock product’ scenario and to 
2.5 GtCO2eq / yr if both technical mitigation and dietary change were assumed. Hence, the 
potential to reduce GHG emissions through changes in consumption was found to be sub-
stantially higher than that of technical mitigation measures. Stehfest et al. (2009) evaluated  
effects of dietary changes on CO2 (including C sources / sinks of ecosystems), CH4, and 
N2O emissions. In a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario largely based on FAO (2006), total GHG 
emissions were projected to reach 11.9 GtCO2eq / yr in 2050. The following changes were 
evaluated: no ruminant meat, no meat, and a diet without any animal products. Changed di-
ets resulted in GHG emission savings of 34—64 % compared to the ‘business-as-usual’ sce-
nario […]. The analysis assumed nutritionally sufficient diets; reduced supply of animal 
protein was compensated by plant products (soy, pulses, etc.).” (Smith et al. 2014, 840).
5.7.4.2 Freshwater use
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If the Livestock Revolution is to take place, agriculture will consume 13,500 km3 water, almost 
twice the amount of water used today (Herrero et al. 2009, 116). In 2050, irrigated area will be  
1.9 times bigger than in 2000 (Tilman et al. 2001, 283). Next to water use, the Revolution will 
add to water pollution (Deutsch, Lannerstad, and Ran 2011, 5; Gerber et al. 2013, 88; Thornton 
2010, 2864). The pollution of water bodies and soil is, until now, “associated with industrial  
production systems” in the Minority World and their excessive amounts of manure and other  
waste. With the Revolution, water and soil pollution will deepen in the Majority World, too  
(Steinfeld 2004, 34). 
5.7.4.3 Land-system change and change in Biosphere integrity
The  Livestock  Revolution  will  be  accompanied  by  vast  land-system change,  or  meat  grab 
(Schneider), mainly to grow feed. One specificity of the Livestock Revolution is that the  ex-
ploitation of pigs and chickens will outpace the exploitation of cows, hence, the share of pas -
tures will relatively decline, and the share of cropland for oilseeds will comparatively expand 
(Herrero et al. 2009, 114).291
Weis has coupled FAO projections on land degradation with projected population growth. In  
2050, 0.15  hectares of arable land will be available per person. In 2010, 0.21  hectares were 
available, and in 1961, 0.46 hectares of agricultural land were available per person (Weis 2010, 
133). Tilman et al. estimate that in the Minority World, agricultural land area will shrink, and 
the area converted into agricultural land in the Majority World will expand. By 2050, this net  
loss  of  natural  habitats  in  the  Majority  World—mostly  in  Latin  America  and Sub-Saharan 
Africa—will be as big as one billion hectares, an area greater than that of the United States. The 
combination of withdrawing agricultural land in the Minority World and adding land in the Ma-
jority World results in an average agricultural land base increase of 18 percent in reference to 
2000 (Tilman et al. 2001, 283). 
Wirsenius, Azar, and Berndes (2010) have simulated different scenarios for agricultural land 
use in 2030. The reference scenario of the FAO projects the extent of global agricultural land to  
rise to 5.4 billion hectares by 2030. Wirsenius, Azar, and Berndes calculate that higher effi-
ciency in animal productivity could scale down this area to 4.8 million hectares by 2030. A shift 
from ruminant to monogastric meat would decrease land use to 4.4 million hectares, and a 25  
percent decrease in meat consumption per capita in the Minority World plus less food waste  
would diminish the agricultural  area  to  4.2 million hectares (Wirsenius,  Azar,  and Berndes 
2010, 637). Given the coupling of milk and beef production, it would have been interesting to 
291 Schader et al. (2015) calculate the environmental impacts of reducing the share of food-competing feedstuffs.
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include a vegan scenario.292 As introduced in the chapter on planetary boundaries, a vegan diet 
has the potential to diminish land use by up to 50 percent (Hallström, Carlsson-Kanyama, and 
Börjesson 2015, 3). Machovina and Feeley have elaborated a scenario of a vegan diet, substitut -
ing meat with soy protein. In this scenario, animal production would not exist, and crops would 
be grown only for human consumption. As elaborated in part 2.4.1 on hunger, around 90 per-
cent of energy is lost when plants are “converted” into animal foods. The authors deduce that a  
shift to a vegan diet would augment “the number of calories available for human consumption 
by as much as 70% — enough to feed an additional 4 billion people, exceeding the projected  
global population growth of 2 to 3 billion,” without a single additional hectare of agricultural 
land. Further, even if animal products constituted ten percent of the human diet, the expansion 
of agricultural land would be stopped (Machovina and Feeley 2014).
The conversion of natural habitats into agricultural land always entails biodiversity loss  (Ma-
chovina and Feeley 2014). Currently, meat production is emergent in tropical regions of the Ma-
jority World, where fifteen of the existing seventeen megadiverse countries are located. This  
meat grab will add an unprecedented biodiversity loss (Machovina, Feeley, and Ripple 2015).  
Even the Global  Agenda—despite its  assertion that  livestock “improves” biodiversity—con-
cedes that livestock is a “threat to biodiversity in 306 of the 825 ecoregions” (Global Agenda  
for Sustainable Livestock 2014b, 7).
292 A reduction in milk consumption, for example, does not necessarily curtail land-use change. Wirsenius, Azar,  
and Berndes explain: 
“Increasing the milk yield of dairy cows does not in itself lead to significant land savings as long as beef demand  
remains unchanged, since the lower production of dairy beef that follows from higher milk yields has to be com -
pensated by a higher production of more land-demanding beef cattle meat. To fully exploit the land savings of in-
creased milk yields, therefore, beef demand must decrease to the same extent as the decrease in dairy cattle beef  
supply.” (Wirsenius, Azar, and Berndes 2010, 637).
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6 CONCLUSION
6.1 Summary
This thesis enquired about the discourses and structures fueling the Livestock Revolution, a 
planned upsurge in the consumption of animal foods of around 70 percent by 2020 which is ex-
pected to continue to 2050. It scrutinized its supposed inexorableness and its consequences for  
animals, society, and the environment. 
The two hypotheses were that the Livestock Revolution universalizes the Minority World’s me-
atified production and consumption systems and that the sustainable exploitation of farmed ani-
mals, while benefitting capital interests, aggravates current social and ecological crises. 
Nearly one hundred documents on the Livestock Revolution have been explored following Ha-
jer and Keller, from the Revolution’s first definition in 1999 in a publication by the Interna-
tional Food Policy Research Institute, the International Livestock Research Institute, and the  
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, to current papers, predominantly is-
sued by international institutions, as well. The analysis has been embedded in an examination of 
the wider context of the Revolution, the animal-industrial complex, and in a theoretical investi-
gation of green capitalism. The engagement with existing literature on the subject and with the 
data has resulted in proposing a mirror move of naturalization and capitalization.
The discourse analysis laid bare the discursive legitimizations and structural conditions of the 
Revolution. It showed that the widely shared biologistic assertion that population growth, in-
come increase, and urbanization in the Majority World provoke an increasing consumption of  
animal protein conceals the discursive and structural settings of the Revolution. It demonstrated 
that  the  Revolution  is  not  inevitable  but  rather  a  process  promoted  in  view  of  stagnating 
turnovers in the Minority World: the Minority World still consumes three times more animal  
foods than the Majority World, nonetheless, the center of gravity is shifting. The concomitant 
universalization of the imperial diet, global meatification, is profitable for exporting countries 
from the Minority World and agribusinesses that transfer knowledge, technology, and whole 
production systems to the Majority World. Industrial livestock operations now provide around 
80 percent of animal foods and have largely overridden pastoral and mixed systems. Such live-
stock industrialization is accompanied by the narratives of modernization, poverty alleviation, 
food security, and environmental value—storylines that unite actors as diverse as UN institu-
tions,  development  agencies,  pharmaceutical  research  companies,  meat  corporations,  social 
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movements, and animal and environmental protection organizations in one, unison discourse 
coalition. 
The concept of sustainable exploitation summarizes the two chief characteristics and effects of 
the current and future development in animal agriculture as proposed by the Livestock Revolu-
tion. First, the term exploitation underscores the bloody and brutal character of the complex and 
its detrimental effects not only on farmed animals but on workers, communities, and nature, too.  
Second, the term sustainable promises environmental stewardship, green growth, and social eq-
uity and thus has an appealing, “progressive” green façade. However, behind this façade, there  
are imperial origins and (neo-)colonial practices. 
Sustainable exploitation equals systemic and unprecedented violence perpetrated on farmed ani-
mals, both on a quantitative and qualitative scale. In the last fifty years, the number of slaugh-
tered animals multiplied more than eightfold to roughly 70 billion individuals, and the Revolu-
tion is supposed to increase this number to 120 billion. The sustainable aspect adds environmen-
tal violence to the suffering of the sentient beings treated as “renewable resources” or “primary 
inputs” of the complex.
On a societal level, sustainable exploitation perpetuates the enormous amount of resources used 
by the industry which advances hunger and water stress, the colonization of new territories (the 
sector already covers  45 percent  of  global  land surface),  climate injustice,  brutal  work and 
health conditions,  and environmental racism. It penalizes  subsistence agriculture and pastoral 
systems for their high emission intensities and unsophisticated technology, and  it reproduces 
global power structures when small-scale farmers cannot comply with the (environmental) stan-
dards of agribusiness and are asked to either intensify production or provide “environmental ser-
vices.”
The environmental impact of the livestock sector is equally without precedent—it is one of the 
main drivers of climate change, biodiversity loss, land-system change, biogeochemical flows,  
ocean acidification, and freshwater use. The ecological hoofprint of a carnivore diet is more 
than twice as big as that of a vegan diet. The projected Revolution alone—without including 
any other global sectors, like energy or transport—would engender a global warming of two de-
grees Celsius by 2050 (and not 2100, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change pre-
dicts). It is unresolved where the necessary resources and land should be taken from to grow 
crops or where to create pasture to propel the “nutrition transition.” Still, the eco-modernist dis-
course of sustainable exploitation feigns a feasible future of unfettered expansion and resource 
exploitation. 
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In sum, sustainable exploitation aggravates the socioecological crisis, however, the green veneer 
distracts from these new forms of control, oppression, and business opportunities: the label “en-
lightens,” reforms, and legitimizes the commoditization of farmed animals with sporadic animal  
welfare policies; it enlightens structural change in the food system as “poverty alleviation” and 
the destruction of large flows of cereals as the (humanitarian) provision of essential animal pro-
tein; and it enlightens continuing environmental degradation through emission certificates. This 
enlightened, sustainable exploitation naturalizes and capitalizes on the Livestock Revolution, 
universalizes the industrial meat regime, and continues the imperial past of sustainable develop-
ment. 
6.2 Implications
What are the implications of the Livestock Revolution and sustainable exploitation? The en-
lightened green label assigned to the various aspects of livestock production and the unified dis-
course coalition make dissent almost impossible. The Livestock Revolution discourse is in its  
uniformity highly successful. At the same time, paradoxical statements on the Revolution’s ef-
fects, such as it being both danger and opportunity, magnify, like alternative facts, the distrac-
tion and confusion and complicate a determined intervention. The paradoxes are entrenched in  
ecological  modernization  theory’s  equally  ambivalent  market  optimism  coupling  economic 
growth and environmental stewardship. 
The animal-industrial complex is ingrained in contemporary capitalist society and affects people 
on an economic, cultural, and emotional level. Though this entanglement is contingent and ever-
changing, it is exceptional to find a counterhegemonic perspective in the discourse. Similarly,  
the green economy is a powerful  imaginary and has quieted some of its  early critics.  Fritz 
poignantly formulates that one  of the biggest challenges in the Livestock Revolution,  much 
more than tackling climate change, is to dismantle the symbolic power of the Minority World’s 
meat consumption (Fritz 2014, 15). For Weis, “the need to challenge and reverse the race to-
wards greater meat consumption emerges as an essential aspect of struggles for a more equitable  
and sustainable world” (Weis 2013b, 67).
Nevertheless, given the magnitude of animal production, and the all-embracing nature of dis-
course, who has the power to intervene? A fruitful starting point could be the marginalized per-
spectives of critical animal studies and decolonial political ecology. To reach the core of the is-
sue, an intersectional, multi-optic vision (Kim 2015) is needed, addressing the diverse forms of 
oppression in the complex, and the structures that benefit from it. Above and beyond, it is cru-
cial to reveal that the animal-industrial complex’s primary aim is not to produce food but to  
171
make money (Gunderson 2013, 260–61). Likewise, Schneider defines meat not as food, but as 
capital, given that industrial meat equals corporate livestock, and thus capital accumulation:
“industrial meat represents the diversion of calories, soil nutrients, water, fossil fuels, research 
funds and focus, and labor away from possibilities for producing food and livelihoods for people 
in an equitable and sustainable way, and towards feeding corporate livestock, which in turn feeds 
capital accumulation. In both a material sense (related to the physical use of land and resources 
to  produce  feed  and  industrial  meat  rather  than  food)  and  an  ideological  sense  (related  to 
modernist notions of ‘dietary transitions’ that include increased meat consumption) meat is a 
category that elides easy classification as simply the food of food security. The space created  
between  nutrient  and  energy  losses  when  grains  and  oilseeds  are  converted  into  meat  is  a 
political, as well as a metabolic, space.” (Schneider 2014, 615).
The political aspect Schneider evokes is vital. The Livestock Revolution is not a matter of fate 
but a question of power and capital interests. If there is no resistance and conflict, the Revolu-
tion might essentially take place—a Revolution whose form is to be determined, yet one thing is 
certain: its biophysical contradictions will persist. From an ecological perspective, this imperial 
mode of living cannot be generalized (Brand and Wissen 2012, 554). Given that infinite growth 
in a finite world is an impossibility, green  capitalism is degrading its own resource base.  As 
much as ecological modernization wants to make us believe it, planetary boundaries cannot be 
technologically managed or regulated with the market.293 Equally, as much as the Revolution 
wants us to believe that there is no alternative to meatification, it is not a biological necessity,  
not all societies have to follow one unidirectional path and buy into imperial meat or milk, and 
sentient beings are not primary inputs. 
To apply Audre Lorde’s dictum “the master’s tool will  never dismantle the master’s house” 
(Lorde 2007, 110) in a dissimilar context: instead of overpowering the crisis with even more 
meat, technology, and growth, the present deconstruction of sustainable exploitation implies the 
need for a different approach to the interconnected ecological and social crisis, the need for a 
wholly altered food system, and the necessity of a renunciation of this imperial mode of living.
6.3 Evaluation and directions for future research
What are the limitations of the present “political ecology of the Livestock Revolution”? They 
are located on the planes of individual perspective, methods, academic discipline, and thematic  
focus.
293 Interestingly, the planetary boundaries team was criticized for not addressing their prioritization of natural factors  
enabling human survival over other conditions, such as economic ones. The team answered:
“Critics have suggested an additional normative dimension, that the biosphere is the basis for human wellbeing. We  
argue that this is no longer a normative issue for argument, but rather a fact based on empirical evidence.” (Rock -
ström 2015).
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The first constraint is the author’s perspective. As much as a writer’s reflection on their own po-
sition enables insights, it also obstructs them. As outlined in the introduction, the author’s privi-
leged position as a white Minority World inhabitant engenders a specific comprehension of and  
attitude towards the subject. All privilege is ignorant at its core, and reaching epistemological 
decolonization, as demanded by Quijano, is a difficult, long, and permanent process. In addi-
tion, from the standpoint of discourse theory, there is no place outside the discourse. Accord-
ingly, the dissertation is a child of its time. For instance, in sections on the ecological hoofprint, 
the thesis does not necessarily encounter ways of grasping or depicting nature other than as  
compartmentalized ecosystems. 
There is no definite remedy to those issues, as leaving one’s standpoint and deleting one’s own 
experience or history is futile. Nevertheless, it is feasible to reflect on one’s background and to  
unlearn certain modes of thinking. This endeavor needs exchange with and critique from other 
perspectives to retrieve the blind spots in one’s analysis.
A second limitation of such an exploration of policy papers is that exploring the actual imple-
mentation of pro-poor policies or environmental regulations and their effect on the ground is out 
of scope. By the same token, this dissertation performs an analysis of the Livestock Revolution 
discourse from 1999 to 2016—and not an extensive empirical (say, statistical) investigation of 
when and how the Revolution will unfold (although chapter five comprises some hints in this  
direction from its analysis of discourse fragments). The lack of such additional data on the fu-
ture of livestock expansion entails that the question if the Livestock Revolution will take place 
for good cannot be fully answered. 
Hence, future research could include quantitative methods or additional qualitative studies that, 
in contrast to the present strand of discourse analysis, do not rely on already published and pub-
licly available documents but instead generate data themselves. Possible qualitative courses of  
action could include (expert) interviews with representatives from international institutions such 
as the International Food Policy Research Institute or the FAO, multi-stakeholder partnerships 
such as the Global Agenda, researchers, corporations, lobbies, and non-governmental organiza-
tions, and with producers themselves; or participant observation at relevant field sites (pastoral  
communities, research institutions, or headquarters of lobby organizations, to name a few). 
Third, the interdisciplinary nature of the subject has both advantages and disadvantages. In the 
thesis, sociological theory meets agronomic statistics, and veterinary medicine clashes with cli-
matology. This variety does justice to the many facets of the animal-industrial complex. Yet it  
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must be acknowledged that the author’s background in social sciences restricts to a certain de -
gree  a  critical  investigation  of  insights  from other  disciplines.  Nonetheless,  this  constraint  
should by no means discourage such an interdisciplinary endeavor. Far too often, social sciences 
do not attempt to problematize the material circumstances of society, namely global ecological  
processes, and hence leave the playing field to the natural sciences. These latter, in turn, lack an 
understanding of societal dynamics. This dissertation’s approach to socio-ecological relations 
commands a critical examination of technology, ecology, and their disciplinary vocabularies, 
which are generally void of power and politics (Hornborg 2009, 238, 240). 
In this regard, both disciplinary and interdisciplinary research on the Livestock Revolution are  
necessary. The present analysis can be complemented by a further examination of the political 
and economic factors propelling the Revolution, for instance concentrating on the role of  for-
eign direct investment in selected countries. In the same way, the critical investigation of the 
causes of the Revolution by Pica-Ciamarra and Otte (2009) can be carried on. What virtually all 
discourse fragments left unmentioned was that population growth demands a surge in cereal  
production by 50 percent by 2050, yet, nobody speaks of a “Cereal Revolution.” What are the 
reasons for this omission and the sole focus on the livestock industry?
Furthermore, a complete study of the influence of animal farming on the crossing of planetary 
boundaries would be highly instructive. Such a project could be accompanied by comparing this  
impact with the contribution of a vegan diet. This appraisal would add to research on the mitiga-
tion potentials of the demand-side, instead of propagating the already existing literature on the  
supply-side. An asset in natural science publications would be the inclusion of societal under-
currents.  Overall,  work  from critical  animal  studies  could  take  account  of  the  situation  of 
farmed animals and thus add complexity and depth to a discussion of the Revolution. 
The fourth and last limitation is on the thematic plane. The global focus of the thesis enabled to 
fully envisage the similarly broad Livestock Revolution discourse and global power dynamics. 
However, there are also the downsides to the simplification, generalization, and disregard of re-
gional, national, or cultural differences. The dilemma is manifest in the dichotomy Majority/Mi-
nority World as well. Likewise, the dissertation reverberated the discourse’s use of “the poor” 
or “smallholders,” terms that can essentialize and simplify reality, ignore context and the inter-
sectional nature of identities. 
In consequence, additional research is welcome that focuses on the concrete repercussions of  
the Livestock Revolution in specific contexts, regions, cultures, and for people of different iden-
tities, backgrounds, classes, races, genders, religions, and so on. Here, the concepts of imperial  
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meat and imperial milk that arose in this dissertation could be further developed and fleshed out.  
Moreover, the discursive actors of the Livestock Revolution were rendered as unified in one dis-
course coalition. Whereas this holds true, the actors themselves and their interests diverge heav-
ily. Studies could embrace the range of the sector’s different stakeholders. 
Finally, the thesis disclosed the hegemonic discourse of the Livestock Revolution. Future inves-
tigations could, in contrast, reveal the various forms of resistance against this expansion of the  
animal-industrial complex. Those rebellions happen on numerous levels, including the societal, 
animal, and environmental, and both in the Minority and Majority World. Research shedding 
light on these acts of resistance can also contribute to a rupture of the dominant discourse and of  
the ontologization of oppression. 
The Livestock Revolution is not only a drastic change in agricultural production; it is a perpetu-
ation of an imperial mode of living. It maximizes capital accumulation by maximizing “sustain-
able” animal exploitation and violence. The far-reaching consequences of the Livestock Revolu-
tion demand an equally radical  response.  Indeed,  if  the  Revolution goes  unchallenged,  this 
profit-driven attack on so many lives turns into a war on life as such.
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APPENDIX 2: MEMBERS OF THE GLOBAL AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE 
LIVESTOCK 
Compare section 4.2.2.2.2 on the presentation of actors.
This  list  combines  information  from  news  announcements  from  the  Global  Agenda  for 
Sustainable Livestock (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016a, 2016c) and from the 
Global Agenda’s homepage section “Partners” as of December 30, 2016 (Global Agenda for 
Sustainable Livestock 2016d). It is nowhere specified to which of the seven clusters a specific 
member pertains. This table is a detailed proposal to structure the members in clusters, and in 
their  origins—stemming  from  either  the  Majority,  or  Minority  World  (table  4  in  section 
4.2.2.2.2 provided an overview of the present categorization). Despite its potential flaws, 294 the 
structure offers an overview of the diverse clusters and their respective weight in the Agenda.  
The  additional  information  provided  on  the  actors  stems  from their  respective  homepages. 
Whenever the institution is of multinational nature, its headquarters are listed. 
 Cluster Minority World Majority World
1 Public sector
Total: 16
Minority World: 6
Majority  World: 
10
1. GIZ,  Deutsche  Gesellschaft  für 
Internationale  Zusammenarbeit, 
Germany 
2. Government of France, France
3. Government of Ireland, Department 
of  Agriculture,  Food  and  the 
Marine, Ireland
4. Ministry  for  Primary  Industries, 
New Zealand 
5. Ministry of Economic Affairs,  The 
Netherlands 
6. Government  of  Switzerland, 
represented  by  the  Swiss  Federal 
Office for Agriculture, Switzerland
1. Government  of  Dominican 
Republic,  Ministry  of 
Agriculture,  Dominican 
Republic; and Dirección General 
de ganadería, (Department of the 
Cattle  Industry)  Dominican 
Republic
2. Government  of  Rwanda, 
Ministry  of  Agriculture  and 
Livestock, Rwanda 
3. Ministerio  de  Desarrollo 
Agropecuario, Panama
4. Government  of  El  Salvador, 
Ministry  of  Environment  and 
Natural  Resources  (MIDA 
ministerio de medio ambiente de 
El Salvador)
5. Government of Uganda, Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics 
6. Government of Kenya, Ministry 
of  Agriculture,  Livestock  and 
Fisheries;  Directorate  of 
Livestock  Production,  Busia 
County;  Kenya  Dairy  Board 
(statutory organization mandated 
by an Act of Parliament)
7. Government  of  Costa  Rica, 
294 The structuring is a putative one, and the lines between the cluster academia/research, NGOs, and social move-
ments are blurred. Consequently, the structure must be taken with a grain of salt.
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Ministry  of  Agriculture  and 
Livestock
8. Government  of  Cuba,  Ministry 
of Agriculture and Livestock
9. Government  of  Ethiopia, 
Ministry  of  Livestock  and 
Fisheries
10. Government  of  Paraguay, 
Ministry  of  Agriculture  and 
Livestock
2 Private sector
Total: 16
Minority  World: 
15
Majority World: 1
1. Animal  Task  Force,  based  at  the 
“Maison  Nationale  des  Eleveurs,” 
France 
“The  stakeholders  from  industry  and  
research  from  across  Europe  inform  
about  their  goals,  activities,  and  their  
organisation.” Public-private platform.
2. European  Livestock  and  Meat 
Trading Union, European Union
“The  EU  voice  of  national  federations  
representing livestock markets, livestock  
traders (cattle, horses, sheep, pigs), meat  
traders  (beef,  horse  meat,  sheep  meat,  
pig  meat),  and  the  meat  industry  
(slaughterhouses,  cutting  plants,  meat  
preparation plants).”
3. Global  Dairy  Platform  (listed  as 
Global Initiatives), United States of 
America
“Global  Dairy  Platform  leads  the  
development  of  a  collaborative,  unified  
approach  on  common  industry  issues  
and the nurturing of innovative research  
so that consumers value milk and dairy  
products  as  naturally  nutritious,  
enjoyable  and  an  essential  part  of  a  
healthy diet. Our membership of CEOs,  
executives  and  researchers  from 
corporations,  communication  and  
scientific bodies  work in partnership to  
align and support  the dairy industry in  
the  promotion  of  sustainable  dairy  
nutrition. “
4. Global  Roundtable  for  Sustainable 
Beef,  The  Netherlands/United 
States
Its executive committee comprises of the 
(almost all white and male*) president, a 
representative  of  the  Canadian 
Cattlemen's  Association,  the  Vice 
President,  of  the  World  Wildlife  Fund, 
1. Association  pour  la  Promotion 
de  l’Elevage  au  Sahel  et  en 
Savane (APESS), Burkina Faso 
“Fondée en 1989 à Bobo Dioulasso  
au Burkina Faso,  l’Association pour  
la Promotion de l’Elevage au Sahel  
et en Savane (APESS) est aujourd’hui  
une  organisation  internationale  
d’éleveurs d’Afrique de l’Ouest et du  
Centre.”
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The Secretary-Treasurer,  of  Elanco, and 
the  two  “members  at  large”  are 
representatives  of  McDonald’s  
Corporation and JBS, USA. 
5. International  Dairy  Federation, 
Belgium
Represents the global dairy sector 
6. International  Egg  Commission, 
United Kingdom
7. International  Feed  Industry 
Federation, Germany/Luxemburg
8. International  Meat  Secretariat, 
France 
Represents the global meat and livestock  
sector
9. International  Poultry  Council, 
United States
“Bringing together poultry leaders from  
around the world”
10. Novus  International,  United  States 
of America 
Animal  health  and  nutrition  company,  
producing e.g. feed preservatives
11. The  Canadian  Cattlemen’s 
Association, Canada
12. Ranch 4 International Ltd, Canada 
13. Turkey Farmers of Canada, Canada
14. Van Drie Group, The Netherlands
15. Country Carbon, Australia
3 Academia/research organizations
Total: 28
Minority World: 17
Majority World: 11
Universities
Total: 15
Minority World: 6
Majority World: 9
1. Bern  University  of  Applied 
Sciences, HAFL, Switzerland 
2. CIRAD.  Centre  de  Coopération 
Internationale  en  Recherche 
Agronomique  pour  le 
Développement, France
“The French agricultural  research  and  
international  cooperation  organization  
working for the sustainable development  
of tropical and Mediterranean regions.”
3. INRA,  Institut  National  de  la 
Recherche Agronomique, France
4. Royal  Veterinary  College, 
University  of  London,  United 
Kingdom
5. Swedish University of Agricultural 
Sciences, Sweden
1. Beijing  Environmental  Asset 
Management  Consultancy 
Centre, China 
2. CATIE,  Centro  Agronómico 
Tropical  de  Investigación  y 
Enseñanza, Costa Rica 
3. Instituto  Plan  Agropecuario, 
Uruguay
4. National Institute of Animal Sci-
ences,  Thuy  Phuong,  Tu  Liem, 
Ha Noi, Viet Nam
5. SAVES,  Society  of  Animal, 
Veterinary  and  Environmental 
Scientists, Pakistan 
6. Universidade  Federal  de  São 
João del-Rei, Brasil 
7. Universidad  Nacional  de  la 
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6. Kansas  State  University  -  College 
of  Veterinary  Medicine,  United 
States
Patagonia Austral, Argentina
8. Instituto Nacional de Tecnología 
Agropecuaria (INTA) Argentina
9. El  Colegio  de  la  Frontera  Sur 
(ECOSUR), Mexico
Consultancies  / 
private  research 
centers
Total: 13
Minority World: 11
Majority World: 2
1. ATB,  Leibniz  Institute  for 
Agricultural  Engineering  Potsdam-
Bornim, Germany
“The  Leibniz  Institute  for  Agricultural  
Engineering  and  Bioeconomy  is  a  
nationally  and  internationally  acting  
research  center  at  the  interface  of  
biological  and  technical  systems. 
Our  research  is  aimed  at  sustainable  
intensification.  We  analyze,  model  and  
evaluate  bio-economic  production  
systems.  We develop and integrate new  
technologies and management strategies  
for  a  knowledge-based,  site-specific  
production  of  biomass,  and  its  use  for  
food, as raw materials and fuels - from  
basic  research  to  application. 
Thus  we  are  contributing  to  food  
security, animal welfare, the holistic use  
of  biomass,  and  to  protect  the  climate  
and environment.”
2. FBN,  Leibniz  Institute  for  Farm 
Animal  Biology  (Leibniz-Institut 
für  Nutztierbiologie),  Germany 
(member of the Leibnitz-Society)
3. Agri benchmark, Germany 
“Agri benchmark is a global, non-profit  
network  of  agricultural  economists,  
advisors,  producers  and  specialists  in  
key  sectors  of  agricultural  and  
horticultural  value  chains.  agri  
benchmark  is  a  non-political  and  non-
profit activity.”
4. AgResearch, New Zealand 
 “AgResearch partners with the pastoral  
sector  to  identify  and  deliver  the  
innovation that is needed to create value  
for  New  Zealand.  It  is  a  vibrant  
organisation  with  staff spread  across  
four campuses and farms in the Waikato,  
Manawatu, Canterbury and Otago.”
5. Institut de l’Elevage, France 
“The  French  Livestock  Institute  (short  
name Idele) is a non-profit, non-govern-
mental  R&D organization appointed by  
the  French  ministry  of  agriculture  as  
1. CIPAV,  Centro  para  la 
Investigación  en  Sistemas 
Sostenibles  de  Producción 
Agropecuaria, Colombia
2. Fundación  Produce  Michoacán, 
Mexico
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technical center for agriculture (member  
of ITA network). It is the national refer-
ence  and  normative  body  in  livestock  
farming systems.”
6. LIFE,  Local  Livestock  for 
Empowerment of Rural People
“Local Livestock For Empowerment (the  
LIFE Network) is an action research and  
advocacy  network  of  organizations and  
individuals who are concerned about the  
future  of  local  livestock  breeds,  and  
about  the  people  who  rely  on  these  
animals for their livelihoods.”
“The  LIFE Network  consists  of  a  core  
group  of  active  members  and  a  wider  
network  of  supporting  partners  who  
adhere  to  a  common  Charta.  It  has  a  
board,  a  secretariat  and  regional  
coordinators for Africa and Asia.
Membership is open to non-government  
organizations working at the grassroots  
level,  herders’  associations,  scientists,  
volunteers and individual supporters.”
Its  international  office  is  based  at  the  
“League  for  Pastoral  Peoples  and  
Endogenous  Livestock  Development”  
secretariat  in  Germany;  LIFE  equally  
has a contact in India and Kenya. 
7. LIFLOD,  Livestock  Farming  and 
Local  Development  Network 
(LIFLOD has no proper secretariat)
“Livestock  farming  and  local  
development  network  (LiFLod)  is  a  
strategic  partnership  between  
researchers,  farmers,  development  
agencies  and  other  stakeholders  
dedicated  to  understanding  and  
analyzing  the  relationships  between  
livestock  farming and sustainable  local  
development.  
This  network  aims  to  bring  together  
groups  from different  countries  to  con-
tribute to the debate on the future of live-
stock  farming,  focusing  particularly  on  
the interactions between livestock farm-
ing and local development. “ Members: 
Waquil Paulo (animal sciences), Federal 
University of Rio Grande do Sul Homem 
Valéria (veterinary), Ministry of Agricul-
ture;  Belgium:  Lambin  Eric  (livestock 
geography),  Univ.  Louvain  la  Neuve; 
Burkina Faso: Aliou Ibrahima (livestock 
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development),  APESS;  Cameroon: 
Aboubacar  Njoya  (animal  sciences), 
CORAF;   Canada:  Woodrow  Maureen, 
Univ. Ottawa; China: Long RuiJun (live-
stock sciences),  Univ. Lanzhou; France: 
Dedieu  Benoit  (livestock  systems  sci-
ences), INRA, Ickowicz Alexandre (live-
stock systems sciences), CIRAD, Manoli 
Claire (veterinary), INRA-CIRAD, Tour-
rand  Jean  François  (livestock  systems 
sciences),  CIRAD,  Derkimba  Adeline 
(livestock  systems  sciences),  INRA-
CIRAD;  Italy:  Gerber  Pierre  (livestock 
geography),  FAO  AGAL;  Kenya:  Her-
rero  Mario  (livestock  sciences),  ILRI; 
New Zealand: Paine Mark (livestock sci-
ences), DairyNew Zealand,  Wedderburn 
Liz (livestock systems sciences),  AgRe-
search;  Senegal:  Ly  Cheikh  (livestock 
economy),  EISMV;  Uruguay:  Morales 
Hermes  (livestock  systems  sciences), 
Inst. Plan Agropecuario.
8. VetEffecT, The Netherlands 
“A Dutch company with many years of  
expertise  in  veterinary  and  dairy  
management.”
“Our mission is to contribute to healthy  
people  and healthy  animals  in  balance  
with the environment.
We support organisations with ideas and  
knowledge turned into actions. These ac-
tions are based on key success  factors:  
on sound professional knowledge and ex-
perience  of  animal  health  and  food  
safety, dedicated project implementation  
based  on  established  project  manage-
ment  techniques,  and  knowing  what  it  
takes to let people work together.”
9. Savory Institute, United States
“The Savory Institute  facilitates  the  
realization  of  a  life  of  enduring  
returns  for  the  land  and  all  who  
depend on it. The Institute is the brain 
trust of the organization. We develop  
innovative  tools  and  enhanced  
curricula,  inform  policy,  establish  
market  incentives,  increase  public  
awareness,  and  coordinate  relevant  
research,  cultivating  relationships  
with aligned partners.”
“The  Savory  Institute  engages  many  
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different  audiences  to  change  public  
perception that livestock itself causes the  
degradation of grasslands. It is actually  
the way humans manage livestock that is  
the  culprit.  This  fundamental  shift  in  
thinking  must  happen  to  drive  needed  
policy and market shifts.”
10. TAFS Forum, Switzerland  
“The  TAFS  forum  was  founded  in 
2002 as the International Forum for  
Transmissible  Spongiform 
Encephalopathies  (TSE)  and  Food 
Safety, in response to the urgent need  
to address the BSE/TSE issue.” “The 
TAFS  forum  is  an  independent,  
Swiss-based  forum,  with  
international membership, dedicated  
to  studying,  reporting  and  making  
recommendations  on  controversial  
and emerging issues  relating to  the  
safety of food derived from animals.  
Our  activities  include  scanning  the  
horizon for new risks,  assessing the  
level  of  risks  for  the  food industry,  
and recommending risk management.  
We  bring  together  scientists,  
industry,  regulators  and  consumers  
in  the  TAFS forum to  facilitate  the  
understanding  of  these  issues  by  
policy-makers,  politicians,  the  
scientific community, journalists and  
members of the public.” 
11. IFCN  Dairy  Research  Network, 
Germany
“We are the leading, global knowledge  
organisation  in  milk  production,  milk  
prices  and  related  dairy  economic  
topics.”
4 Donors
Total: ?
? ?
5 NGOs
Defined as “representatives from interest groups such as animal welfare and environmental or livelihood 
non-governmental organizations” (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016b).
Total: 9
Minority World: 8
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Majority World: 1
Animal  welfare 
organizations
1. Compassion  in  World  Farming, 
United Kingdom 
2. Humane  Society  International 
(affiliates in Canada, Europe, India, 
Latin  America,  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  the  United  States), 
United Kingdom
3. World  Animal  Protection,  United 
Kingdom 
4. Veterinaries  Without  Borders-
Switzerland
Livelihood 
organizations
1. Heifer International, USA
Environmental 
organizations
1. Inter Eco Center, Ukraine
2. The  Nature  Conservancy,  United 
States
3. World Wildlife Fund, Switzerland
1. Fundación  CoMunidad, 
Panama
6 Social movements and community-based organizations
Defined as “representatives of pastoralists, indigenous people, agricultural workers, small farmers and 
peasants” (Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock 2016b). 
It is in some cases complicated to distinguish between research institutions and social movements.
Total: 4
Minority World: 1
Majority World: 3
1. League  for  Pastoral  Peoples  and 
Endogenous  Livestock 
Development, Germany
1. Redes Chaco, WAMIP (Alianza 
Global  de  Pastoralistas), 
Argentina
2. WAMIP North Africa
3. Pacto  Coqueta:  Cero 
Deforestación  y  Reconciliación 
Ganadera, Colombia
7  Inter-
governmental  and 
multi-lateral 
organizations
Defined  as 
“institutions  that 
have  a  mandate  in 
livestock  sector 
development” 
(Global  Agenda  for 
Sustainable 
Livestock 2016b)
Total: 7
Minority World: 4
Majority World: 3
1. FAO, Rome (initiator)
2. The World Bank, Washington DC
3. Pastoralist Knowledge Hub (FAO) 
“The  Hub  is  hosted  by  FAO  and  
combines the organization’s expertise in  
livestock  production with its  knowledge  
on civil society and indigenous peoples.”
4. World  Organization  for  Animal 
Health, OIE, Paris
1. African  Union  –  Inter-African 
Bureau  for  Animal  resources, 
Kenia
“The  African  Union  Inter-African 
Bureau  for  Animal  Resources  (AU-
IBAR)  is  a  specialized  technical  
office  of  the  African  Union.  It  was  
established in 1951 and was initially  
known as the Inter-African Bureau of  
Epizootic  Diseases.  Initially  it  was  
mainly  concerned  with  rinderpest  
control,  but  its  mandate  was  
expanded  to  other  major  animal  
diseases  in  1956  and  finally  to  all  
aspects  of  animal  resource  
development in 1970. The 2005-2007 
AU/IBAR  programme  is  focused  on 
Animal  Health  and  production  as  
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well as trade and markets.” (Source:  
WHO).
2. ILRI,  International  Livestock 
Research Institute
“ILRI  is  an  international  research  
institute  with  its  headquarters  in  
Kenya  and  co-hosted  by  the  
Government  of  Ethiopia  in  Addis  
Ababa. It works through a network of  
regional  and  country  offices  and  
projects in East, South and Southeast  
Asia,  Central,  East,  Southern  and  
West Africa, and in Central America”
“ILRI  is  a  CGIAR  research  centre  
[Consultative  Group  for  
International Agricultural Research],  
a  global  research partnership of  15  
centres  working with many partners  
for a food-secure future.”
3. African Development Bank
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APPENDIX 3: QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THREE 
DISCOURSE FRAGMENTS
Compare sections  5.4.4 and 5.5.1 of the dis-
course analysis.
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